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INTRODUCTION	 
In the last 30 years there has not been a person in global politics who has risen so 
high and fallen so low – and so quickly – as Aung San Suu Kyi. Her spectacular fall 
from grace calls for closer examination. Unfortunately, to this day, this phenom­
enon has not been properly addressed. This serious gap should certainly be filled at 
the academic level. This book explores the multitude of narratives that attempt to 
settle, once and for all, discussions around Suu Kyi’s political actions and decisions, 
asking such questions as: Are these sufficient in their explanations? Do the existing 
narratives on Suu Kyi explain her behaviour to our satisfaction? The answers are 
negative. These narratives, based on too few variables, reduce Suu Kyi’s behaviour 
to one explanation, whereas a multidimensional outlook is required to move 
beyond the existing paradigms and clichés. This book, based on voluminous sour­
ces – two talks with Suu Kyi (as well as conversations with her supporters and 
rivals) – aims to push past these clichés. Furthermore, this academic gap will be 
addressed through the researcher’s observation of Suu Kyi’s behaviour during 
intergovernmental talks as well as the experience of 10 years of researching 
Myanmar and 16 research trips there. By means of postcolonial theory, this work 
will try to explain Suu Kyi’s behaviour. 
The puzzle 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s story has achieved great fame and has been written about in 
countless articles and several biographies. Most of these works, however, deal with 
the pre-2015 period when Suu Kyi was still considered a democracy icon, and 
express more about the expectations foreigners projected onto her than about her.1 
After ascending to power and especially after taking the Tatmadaw and the peo­
ple’s side on the Rohingya crisis, Suu Kyi became universally criticised in the West. 
Yet – with few notable exceptions – little has been written in depth explaining her 
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behaviour in politics. To the global world Suu Kyi has become both a dis­
appointment and a puzzle. The deep sense of discontent over Suu Kyi in the West 
has indeed become universal (it permeated even academic circles) and has con­
tributed to a general disinterest in her. The number of articles and books about her 
has decreased dramatically, as have conference presentations. One may even dare to 
speculate that in the same manner as it was fashionable to research Suu Kyi in the 
1990s and 2000s, since the mid-2010s it has become passé to do so. However, Suu 
Kyi has also become a puzzle: her actions make her something of an enigma to the 
outside world (though one may claim that she has always been one). Before the 
2010s, Suu Kyi was not always well understood outside of Myanmar policies. Her 
opposition to the military rule, house arrest, choice of politics over her family, 
made Suu Kyi a personification of democratic values, if not a symbol of good and 
morality in politics. How is it then, that this beacon of hope, who was supposed to 
be “the living symbol of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”,2 a person 
who had “a message for our planet”3 and should have been granted “Freedom to 
Lead”, could now silently endorse crimes against humanity, if not genocide, con­
ducted in her own country? How is it, that this democracy icon rules in an effec­
tively authoritarian way, with an iron grip, without tolerating any dissident voices 
and by jailing journalists and censoring press? How can yesterday’s nemesis of the 
Tatmadaw now cohabitate with the army? And why is she unsuccessful in gov­
ernance? Why was there such fundamental incoherence between the actions of 
Suu Kyi and the international expectations of her? The list of questions and accu­
sations is long and the critical, anti-Suu Kyi intellectual mood has contributed to 
the end of the pre-2010s mainstream narrative of Suu Kyi as a democracy icon 
leading the forces of good against an evil military. 
Instead, several new narratives emerged. The first may be called ‘the Lord Acton 
approach’: this narrative – quite popular, if not the most popular – claims that 
power corrupted Aung San Suu Kyi. Hence all these (Western media) voices that 
had at first called on Suu Kyi to ‘wake up’ and speak in defence of the Rohyinga 
changed to strong moral condemnation when she failed to do so – expressing dis­
belief at her lack of action, considering it a ‘betrayal of values’ and accusing her of 
‘becoming a politician’.4 Some have even gone so far as to accuse Suu Kyi of 
harbouring anti-Muslim resentment, if not outright racism.5 This narrative is 
intellectually coherent. According to it, Suu Kyi had liberal, universalist ideas but 
she betrayed them due to political interests once she gained power. This narrative 
may have a point, as power indeed corrupts universally and there is no reason to 
believe that even the very disciplined Suu Kyi is free from the temptations of 
power. One may doubt, too, whether Suu Kyi has anyone in her milieu brave 
enough to whisper “Hominem te memento!” in her ear. Nevertheless, this narra­
tive is shallow and does not take into consideration many domestic variables (the 
logic behind her confrontation with the Tatmadaw and the different interpretation 
of democracy and human rights in Burma). Most importantly, this narrative is 
unable to grasp why the people in Burma are not judging Suu Kyi for her 
‘betrayal’ of democratic values (they do not, because there is something different at 
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play). Finally, this narrative is quite a convenient one for all those who glorified 
Suu Kyi before and who condemn her now. Accepting this narrative liberates 
them from a guilty conscience, which may ask why Suu Kyi had been promoted as 
the symbol of morality in politics for more than 25 years and why so many turned 
a blind eye when her authoritarianism was quite clearly already visible in the 1990s. 
Yet it is fair to say that there are voices that critically examine the West’s past 
admiration: for example, the idea that the pre-2010s beatification of Aung San Suu 
Kyi offered the Tatmadaw generals “an easy route back to legitimacy”6 or critique 
of the notion of “a personal betrayal” targeted at Suu Kyi.7 
The other major narrative of Suu Kyi after 2015 may be called ‘the Machia­
vellian approach’. The easy way to resolve the puzzle around Suu Kyi is to portray 
her as a realist politician, who fought only for personal power and changed her 
tactics in accordance with her political interests. In this narrative, the Rohingya 
crisis only revealed what had previously been hidden: Suu Kyi’s apparent true 
nature – that of a political realist.8 In its radical form, this narrative leads to accu­
sations of hypocrisy: presenting liberal ideals to the outside world and governing 
without taking notice of these ideals at home. In the more moderate form, the 
message is more or less the following: Suu Kyi hasn’t changed, but after the 
Rohingya crisis the world belatedly realised that yesterday’s democracy icon is a 
political realist, closer to Indira Gandhi than to Mahatma Gandhi.9 The realist 
approach is true to some extent. There was an (un)healthy dose of idealization of 
Suu Kyi in the 1990s and 2000s in the West. The current global condemnation of 
Suu Kyi after 2012 is directly proportional to the former admiration. Moreover, 
Suu Kyi’s behaviour in power after 2016 strips away any democratic illusions 
people may have had before that time that she would bring to Burma a different, 
and better, version of politics: her governance style is closer to a precolonial 
Burman pattern of governance than to that of a democratically elected modern 
politician. And, of course, hypocrisy is the inevitable fellow traveller of politics 
everywhere and anywhere. So, there are solid grounds to make Suu Kyi a Henry 
Kissinger in a hta mein (female sarong). Yet, it would not do her justice: her pol­
icymaking is more about a personal sense of duty and obligation than about a 
desire for power. And, more importantly, it would narrow the scope of research 
concerning this astonishing and complex individual to power politics and political 
manoeuvring, consequently not showing the picture in its full extent. For example, 
the realist approach fails to explain why Suu Kyi had not struck a deal with the 
generals earlier (in the 1990s or early 2000s), even though the conditions offered to 
her upon entering the ruling politico-military establishment of Myanmar were no 
worse than those in 2011/2012. The realist way can greatly help, but cannot 
explain her stubborn stance, her personal approach to politics, her sense of duty 
and mission, or her choices as well as many other ‘soft’ variables. 
There are voices that try to combine the ‘betrayal’ narrative with that of the 
‘power-hungry’ one. Hanna Beech in her stylish journalistic piece laments the 
speed and the scale of Suu Kyi’s transformation. She suggests that Suu Kyi has 
cheated the world (“she allowed herself to be misread”), making her a demonical, 
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Tartuffe-style politician.10 Beech’s article reads really well (and the poignant image 
of Suu Kyi’s mean dog Taichito stays for long in one’s memory),11 yet it offers 
little value in terms of clarifying Suu Kyi’s motives and actions. In a significant and 
widely commented upon article (“What Happened to Aung San Suu Kyi?”) Ben 
Rhodes offers an intellectually honest attempt to unravel the puzzle of Suu Kyi. 
Rhodes rightly acknowledges that Suu Kyi is multidimensional: “the idealist, the 
activist, the politician, the cold pragmatist”. He  offers no small amount of self-cri­
ticism and critique of the Western view on Burma and portrays her as both a 
Burmese Machiavelli and a renegade democrat who dreams to be a queen. At the 
same time, between the lines Rhodes tries to defend the Obama administration’s 
policy in Myanmar.12 
Other voices, outside these narratives, show Suu Kyi as an inexperienced poli­
tician who entered real politics but was no match for the Realpolitik-veterans from 
the Tatmadaw and/or failed in confrontation with the grim reality. According to 
one of her biographers, whose piece must be considered a desperate attempt to 
save the pre-2010s narrative on Suu Kyi, stated that she made a critical mistake by 
accepting the army-made 2008 Constitution and all that followed was a tragic 
consequence of this error. She gained little (in terms of real power) and lost 
everything (in terms of her global image). As a consequence, she should resign to 
save her legacy13 (which, of course, she never has ). An equally futile attempt to 
justify Suu Kyi’s actions from the previous idealised paradigm comes from Nilan­
jana Sengupta. In her otherwise excellent book Sengupta admits that in the case of 
the Rohingya crisis Suu Kyi’s pragmatism was “showed in a bad light”, just once. 
Nevertheless, Sengupta tries to justify Suu Kyi’s stance by linking her rationale to 
Havel’s concepts and to Engaged Buddhism.14 More appealing, yet still scanty, is 
the characterological interpretation of Suu Kyi being a stubborn politician, whose 
inflexibility was an asset during house arrest but has now become a burden.15 
Researchers have offered more sophisticated explanations on Suu Kyi. An ‘old 
Burma hand’, Andrew Selth, in his insightful articles on Suu Kyi’s governance, 
showed how ill-prepared she was to rule the country, how she created many of her 
own problems and even how she had “little understanding of how a democracy 
worked in practice”. Consequently, he suggests her governance resembles a “rick­
ety old bus”.16 Another Myanmar expert, Mary Callahan, illustrated how Suu Kyi 
shied away from “the messy daily” politics and instead occasionally offered public 
sermons on duties, which allowed her “to maintain her status as a political icon” in 
Myanmar.17 Selth’s and Callahan’s pieces are very valuable, yet they answer only in 
part the Suu Kyi puzzle, as they concentrate on Myanmar current affairs only. 
There is also, naturally, the Burmese narrative, or rather the narrative of the 
majority of society (excluding the Tatmadaw and a few disillusioned dissidents). It 
is a ‘Mother Suu’ narrative, or ‘the mother of the nation’ story. By her actions, 
most importantly sacrificing family to her political cause, Suu Kyi was able to 
create a compassionate, motherly image within society and link her struggle with 
symbolic motherhood. Because of that, her supporters saw all political actions as a 
form of personal sacrifice, similar to those of a mother who sacrifices herself for the 
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good of her children.18 This has proved to be (so far) an unparalleled winning 
strategy, as it shelters Suu Kyi from scant, sceptical domestic voices over her ability 
to govern successfully. The Burmese public’s anger and rejection of Western criti­
cism is best demonstrated by the slogan “We stand with Aung San Suu Kyi”. This 
‘mother of the nation’ narrative obviously bypasses the contradictions between Suu 
Kyi’s pre-2012 image and her subsequent actions. In this narrative, everything is 
explained by her commitment to the country. As such this narrative, although 
valuable in its own way – because it shows the emotions and attitudes of the 
Burmese – cannot be helpful here. 
As for more constructive Burmese voices, one should certainly mention Mon 
Mon Myat’s brave and intellectually honest, yet unconvincing, attempt to defend 
Suu Kyi’s stance. Mon employs the perspective of Max Weber’s famous distinction 
of ethics of convictions and ethics of responsibility.19 Mon offers several valuable 
insights about “a cognitive dissonance” between the actions of the politician Suu 
Kyi and the activist Suu Kyi, as well as about the imagined Suu Kyi as an embo­
diment of human rights groups’ ideals in the West. Mon’s theoretical observation 
on Weber is particularly important. Unfortunately, Mon is blinded by her 
admiration for Suu Kyi. She has justified Suu Kyi’s unwillingness to help the 
Rohingya citing, quite shockingly, one of the Ten Duties of a King – an ancient 
moral Buddhist guidance for governance. Additionally, Mon’s main argument, that 
Suu Kyi does not live in a liberal democracy so she cannot do much, is uncon­
vincing at best. Furthermore, Mon’s text suffers from a typical (albeit presented in a 
more sophisticated and intellectually elegant way than usual) Burmese illusion: “the 
world does not understand us”. This perspective has some valour, as universalizing 
attempts by some groups in the West indeed may irritate (e.g. the allochronism of 
the many narratives on Myanmar)20 and demands a response. One may also ask 
valuable questions as to what extent outsiders may familiarize themselves with such 
a closed and self-isolating country as Burma (the ‘hermit kingdom’!). But overall, 
the argument “we are so unique so that foreigners/Westerners cannot understand 
us” (a sentiment expressed in other Asian countries as well, see e.g. Japan’s nihon­
jinron or Thailand’s khwampenthai) is weak. Texts can be translated, intricacies 
resolved, cultural differences pointed out and discussed. Not everything is lost in 
translation. We do not live in a compartmentalized world where cultures are 
within cages with little or no contact with the outside world. With globalization, 
standardization, the influx of social media and a worldwide dominance of the 
English language, this is not so. Consequently, one cannot honestly claim that the 
West was that unfamiliar with Suu Kyi. That is too easy. Although Suu Kyi 
became an icon without her consent (deification of her person beginning during 
her first house arrest), once liberated, she actively shaped and sustained her inter­
national image. Her words and actions touched a chord because she knew Western 
cultural patterns well. She knew them because she assimilated them. Her own 
words concerning Tagore, “the assimilation of foreign elements in Tagore’s intel­
lectual apparatus was so complete that they form an integral part of the depth and 
breadth of his unique talent”,21 can easily be applied to her as well. This is 
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especially so given her fascination with the Indian “synthesis of East and West”, 
and she made good use of it. Suu Kyi wanted to remain both a mother of Burma 
and a worldwide democracy icon and behaved accordingly. Only the Rohingya 
crisis annihilated her plans. 
Finally, one should also mention the Burmese dissidents, both domestic (the 
former ‘third force’) and diaspora, grouped around several (often conflicted) orga­
nizations and media outlets. The Burmese dissidents have a complicated relation­
ship towards Suu Kyi. On one hand, they respect her and understand her much 
better than most of the outside world. On the other, not infrequently they feel a 
resentment towards her for ‘stealing’ their revolution and/or failing to bring about 
real change in Myanmar. This all, however, is balanced by their unwillingness to 
harm the democratic cause she is personifying. These considerations produce a 
fascinating, conflicting landscape of texts – sometimes books,22 more often arti­
cles – that will be used in this book. They, however, do not constitute a united 
approach on Suu Kyi. 
All these narratives are valuable to an extent; they point out and explain several 
aspects of Suu Kyi’s behaviour and the reality surrounding her. As such, they must 
be taken into consideration. However, none provides a comprehensive way to 
resolve the puzzle around Aung San Suu Kyi. None of them offers a fully satis­
factory answer that would explain Suu Kyi’s actions both before the 2010s and 
after. This book has the ambition to fill this gap by using postcolonial theory. 
Theoretical and conceptual framework 
In the current globalized world ideas cross borders, cultural spheres and influence 
one another; the interactions and exchanges take place across societies, changing 
them decisively. This is particularly true in the postcolonial world, where various 
exchanges between the colonizers and colonized people (and the heritage resulting 
from these interactions) led to a new, complex identity: fluid and relational. In 
researching such areas there are no grand theories. One cannot explain a politician’s 
behaviour by such overarching, essentialist categories as liberal universalism, poli­
tical culture, Asian values, etc. To paraphrase a famous metaphor, a researcher who 
is left in the dark has too many directions to point their torch. 
How can one then explain the behaviour of a politician like Suu Kyi, who at 
one moment can say that “democracy is the only ideology consistent with free­
dom”23 and at the same time calls those who disagree with her “renegades and 
traitors”24; the behaviour of one who was considered to be an embodiment of the 
best of East and West in the 1990s and 2000s while at same time being criticised 
for her Westernized behaviour inside Burma (publicly by the regime and quietly by 
the rest),25 and who is now accused of being a Burman-Buddhist nationalist. 
Here postcolonial theory with its concept of hybridity offers a helping hand. 
Homi K. Bhabha’s “cultural and historical hybridity of the postcolonial world” is 
our paradigmatic place of departure. For Bhabha, hybridity is something more than 
just the effect of mixing two cultures – it is a way of negotiating between the 
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boundaries that form identities and cultures. In the researcher’s words hybridity is: 
“an international culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the 
diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity”; 
called the “third space” that lies “in-between” those two and has “no primordial 
unity or fixity that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistor­
icised and read anew”.26 In other, simpler words, upon the point of contact of two 
cultures, a third one comes into existence with its own structures, objects and 
practices. However, it is not a simple result of mixing these two cultures, but a 
new entity, new quality, a creative yet ambivalent one. Bhabha is acknowledged in 
postcolonial studies for this observation. His recognition of the third space as an 
ambivalent space of cultural identity offers a perspective to “overcome the exoti­
cism of cultural diversity in favour of the recognition of an empowering hybrid­
ity”.27 This hybridity has the ability to “transverse both cultures and to translate, 
negotiate and mediate affinity and difference within a dynamic of exchange and 
inclusion”. Consequently, “hybrid strategy opens up a third space of/for rear­
ticulating negotiation and meaning”.28 Hybridity “releases power” that allows “a 
means of evading the replication of the binary categories of the past and developing 
new antimonolithic models”.29 It “involves fusion, the creation of a new form, 
which can then be set against the old form, of which it is partly made up”.30 
Applying hybridity to an individual from a postcolonial country is risky. 
Hybridity originally described power relations in colonial times; later it was used in 
postcolonial theories, sociological theories of identity, in studies on multi­
culturalism and globalization.31 Yet, it can be creatively used elsewhere: transferred 
from postcolonial theory to political science and applied to a political agent – Aung 
San Suu Kyi. After all, political science frequently borrows theories, paradigms, 
terms and concepts from other sciences for its own good. Hybridity is no different 
here. In political science this term is used to view interactions between interna­
tional and local levels of international systems, although it is usually used in a 
‘undertheorized’ way, that is, without conceptual reflection. Hybridity is used in 
analyses of the space of political interventions and in the critique of binaries of such 
interventions (international/modern and local/traditional).32 Most frequently, 
however, the term is just used descriptively, to name entities that do not fit into 
established definitions (consider the popularity of terms like ‘hybrid regime’ or 
‘hybrid war’). However, hybridity is rarely, if ever, used to analyse individuals in 
politics; I have not found the expression ‘a hybrid politician’. Perhaps this is due to 
sensitive overtones that may coincide while using it. Applying the concept of 
hybridity to an individual, especially an individual from Southeast Asia, is risky 
given the inglorious colonial usage of this word.33 This is even more so, given the 
fact that Suu Kyi was mercilessly slandered by the Burmese military regime for her 
marriage to an Englishman.34 Hence, using the concept of hybridity here is a risky 
undertaking. However, in the case of hybridity, the “emancipative potential of 
negative terms” is materialized. In the 1990s the concept was taken on and sub­
verted to challenge the essentialist model.35 Consequently, the postcolonial theor­
ists transformed this concept into a “celebrated and privileged kind of superior 
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cultural intelligence owing to the advantage of in-betweeness, the straddling of two 
cultures and the consequent ability to negotiate the difference”.36 In short, 
hybridity lost its colonial overtones, at least on the academic level, and became a 
neutral term which can be effectively applied as it combines antithetical and con­
tradictory features and meanings. Given the fact that hybridization better describes 
current processes than older terms, such as homogenization, modernization or 
Westernization,37 it seems an adequate lens to research such political agents as 
Aung San Suu Kyi. Let alone the fact of associating hybridity with India in post­
colonial studies (Bhabha and many other postcolonial theorists, as well as writers 
are either Indian or of Indian origin/roots), Suu Kyi with her fascination of India 
and the Indian fusion of East and West, seems a interesting, nonobvious case study 
here. There is also one more reason why Suu Kyi is adequate to be researched via 
hybrid lenses: one connected to social class. Suu Kyi comes from postcolonial 
Burmese elites, who wanted to be independent yet were “culturally Anglicized”; 
their elite status was based “on their enlightenment British style”.38 Among other 
features, they used English in official correspondence and sometimes in private as 
well (Aung San wrote letters in English to his Burmese friends), they read British 
classics and sent their children to British schools. Thus, hybridity applies to this 
upper class of Burmese elites (contrary to the Burmese masses and to the majority 
of the Tatmadaw soldiers). 
Using hybridity, this book claims that Suu Kyi is indeed a product of many 
worlds, a person where East and West meet, but not exactly the way her pre-2010s 
admirers had thought. She is not the unifier of East and West and not necessary the 
ideal one, for hybridity does not have to automatically mean a positive thing. Suu 
Kyi is a hybrid politician, both Burmese and international at the same time: she is 
immersed in Burma’s tradition of policymaking, especially in the modernized ver­
sion of her father, and yet she has been influenced by many foreign concepts, both 
Western and Asian. Hybridity offers a way to resolve the problem of apparent 
inconsistencies of her agenda. Thanks to this concept, it is possible to understand 
why Suu Kyi considers herself a democrat (and is considered so in Burma) and yet 
rules autocratically. Why she can honestly speak about fear and freedom from it, 
and remain indifferent to more than 700,000 people who escaped her country in 
total fear. And so on. 
Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi’s case shows both the strengths and the limits of 
hybridity. For two decades (late 1980s – early 2010s) she was able, consciously or 
not, to switch codes in order to function successfully in politics. She spoke to 
Burmese people using local idioms and to the world in a language it understood. 
For a long while, it proved successful and brought her priceless political assets: 
visibility, recognition and support. For a time, Suu Kyi’s hybridity seemed to be a 
perfect, even if illusionary, answer to both Burma’s multiple domestic problems as 
well as to global challenges. But then came the moment of truth during the 
Rohingya crisis and Suu Kyi’s two worlds began to diverge. She could no longer 
stay on the fence about this issue. Suu Kyi had to choose and it was a dramatic 
choice. Throughout her political career she had always had two main assets: 
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popular support and foreign backing. Now, picking one equalled losing the other. 
That is why Suu Kyi’s story shows the strengths and the limits of hybridity in the 
world of politics. It proved that such a model of leadership can be effective only to 
a point. Consequently, applying the hybridity theory allows us to ask questions not 
only about Suu Kyi as a unique political actor within Myanmar. We can ask about 
her role in Myanmar’s extraordinary political system of ‘disciplined democracy’, 
which is stuck midway between democracy and autocracy. 
This book’s proposed approach is naturally an agency-centred explanation. 
Agency-centred theories stress the ability of individual agents to (re)construct their 
worlds. Agents here can be individuals (politicians, decision-makers, activists) or 
groups (interest groups, lobby groups, clans, protest movements and other). Agency 
is understood as the capacity of individuals to consciously make their own choices, 
realize their intentions and act in accordance with their free will (human agency). 
Such theories as ‘great man theory’ (and its contemporary equivalents, such as 
‘great leaders of crowds’, ‘charismatic authority’, ‘personal legitimization’) or dif­
ferent intentionist theories (e.g. rational choice theory; public choice theory; and 
pluralism) are individualistic. They are based on ideas of the central importance of 
agents in social systems and/or on the presumption that only the actions/deeds of 
actors can be researched.39 
Such aspects as the dominance of personalization of power in Burmese politics 
(individuals are much more important than institutions), the political transforma­
tion carried out by conscious elites and overall weakness of Myanmar’s political and 
economic institutions all influence the agency-centred theoretical choice of this 
monography. The main reason for choosing agency-centred explanations is, how­
ever, different. The reason is the absolute dominance of Suu Kyi’s person over all 
other factors of the Burmese transformation, combined with the intellectual dis­
course concerning Burma in the world (in both academic and popular writing). As 
a consequence, Suu Kyi is politically unassignable. The Burmese leader plays “a 
critical role” in Burmese politics and, “accordingly, those who want to understand 
Myanmar politics will have to understand her personality, her political philosophy 
and her role in the political life of the country”.40 The importance of Suu Kyi can 
be seen in the fact that her political foes, the military generals of Myanmar, tried to 
carry out the transformation into a legitimized, internationally accepted military-
dominated system of governance without her (1988–2011), but failed to do so 
(their failure was signalled in the international sanctions against Myanmar, spanning 
from 1997 to 2012). It was only once they realized she was irreplaceable that they 
co-opted Suu Kyi to the elite and shared power – which they did effectively. They 
finally succeeded in transforming themselves from international pariahs to accepted 
leaders (recent soft condemnation after Rohingya expulsion notwithstanding), 
thanks to co-opting Suu Kyi. 
Moving onto a methodological level, this book will apply a hermeneutic 
approach, based on an attempt to understand social actions.41 According to Bog­
danor’s explanation of hermeneutics, “in order to understand the way people 
behave, we need to understand their motives for doing what they are doing and 
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what they think they are doing, and also to know their world outlook and how 
they see their place in the world”.42 In other words, the aim is to place Suu Kyi’s 
behaviour and her actions within a specific cultural and socio-cultural context. This 
follows Gadamer’s “horizon of understanding”, which is determined by all the 
socio-cultural environments a person is integrated in. A human being “understands 
the world as a result of complex interaction of specific horizons of understanding, 
that are constantly overlapping”.43 This guarantees value-free criterion of social 
science.44 This is not a frequently used perspective in political science. Usually 
discussions over constitutive elements of politics (such as power, order, state, 
interest, etc.) prevail in a decontextualized, depersonalized sphere. However, a 
political science that abstracts or neglects the everyday meaning of political-ness 
and the meaning of intersubjective relations, is a science that deals with anatomized 
political exhibits. Instead, this book will try to look for the sources and dynamics of 
political phenomena and processes in interactions between domestic sources of a 
personality and identity of a political agent, and structured forms of external reality 
for her or him. That is why it will focus on the cultural schemes of Burmese pol­
icymaking and will try to extract a certain logic from their meaning and their 
orientated activities. The book is an attempt to capture the subjective and objective 
mechanisms of Burma’s “moral universe”,45 of politics that shaped the policy-
making of Aung San Suu Kyi, along with her external influences. This inter­
pretative framework is possible, however, only if the Burmese doctrinal, 
philosophical, cultural, political and social conditions are taken into account. This is 
an attempt to catch ‘the Burma-ness’ of meanings and casual connections. These 
connections originate from a theoretical line that demands knowledge of everyday 
meanings and symbols that shape the Burmese attitudes towards politics in order to 
make the intentional acts of a political agent meaningful in social and cultural 
context. Through the structuralized meaning of everyday practice, the book tries to 
understand and explain the norms and values of Burmese policymaking as well as 
the axiological and normative background of their system of motivations and 
behaviour. As such, this attempt may be called an example of interpretative political 
science. 
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BECOMING A HYBRID POLITICIAN	 
What makes Aung San Suu Kyi a hybrid politician is a complex fusion of over­
lapping political perspectives, both Burmese and foreign. Naturally, the Burmese 
component is stronger. Suu Kyi was influenced by the moral, Buddhist under­
pinnings of policymaking (politicians are judged by morality more than by com­
petence), by the Ashokan model, the personalization of power, the importance of 
unity and the eclectic, utilitarian assimilation of foreign elements. However, this 
does not mean that the external ideas that shape her policymaking can be neglec­
ted. Suu Kyi at various stages of her life, but particularly before entering politics, 
inhaled Christian influences, the ‘non-violence’ ideology personified by Gandhi, 
Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela, Western democratic ideas and Indian 
syncretic cosmopolitanism. 
The Burmese background 
Aung San Suu Kyi once wrote that “to be Burmese is to be Buddhist”,1 and 
Buddhism is certainly the most important feature of Burmese identity, historically 
providing the idioms, structure and concepts for Burmese policymaking. The atti­
tude of doctrinal Buddhism towards politics is clear: politics is an inevitable activity, 
yet of secondary importance.2 That is why in Buddhist texts political engagement is 
often depicted as the antithesis of enlightenment-seeking. However, this does not 
mean that Buddhism is “unpolitical or anti-political”.3 Politics is not central to 
Buddhism, yet it matters; political aspects are clearly visible in canonical and post-
canonical texts. The fundamental goal of politics is to guarantee stability, order and 
peace with a strong accent on preventing poverty (“only when your stomach is full 
can you keep the precepts”) and limiting the evil tendencies of mankind. From this 
understanding, sets of normative imperatives for a ruler originate: she or he should 
be moral, care for the people and rule in an enlightened manner. Otherwise there 
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would be natural disasters, people would transgress and, ultimately, society would 
collapse. It is this tradition that prompted Suu Kyi to write: “the root of a nation’s 
misfortunes has to be sought in the moral failings of the government”.4 
Emperor Ashoka (304–232 BC) represents the archetype of this behaviour, 
though it is often conveniently forgotten that Ashoka started his enlightened gov­
ernance after causing the death of around 100,000 people. His lesson, however, is 
not lost on many Buddhist rulers who have applied what can be called ‘the Asho­
kan model’: carrying out ‘necessary’ yet immoral actions first, followed by more 
moral and enlightened rule.5 Hence, the tradition of Burmese ‘warrior kings’ who 
made imperial conquests first and later turned (or hoped to turn) to piety. It is 
worth bearing in mind this practice of the Ashokan model of behaviour when 
interpreting the Tatmadaw’s massacre of the ‘8888’ (8 August 1988) revolution or 
even Suu Kyi’s reaction to the Rohingya crisis. The Ashokan model, as well as 
other multiple ways to bypass the inconvenient Buddhist moral precepts in gov­
ernance, both doctrinal6 and practical,7 was born out of the tension between 
Buddhist ideals and the hard realities of politics.8 The tradition of ‘modifying’ such 
politically inconvenient Buddhist rules as prohibition of killing by saying that “in 
certain cases one may destroy life”9 or by claiming that the defence of dhamma 
overrides the laws of kamma, 10 although not central to Buddhism, nevertheless 
survived into the twenty-first century. 
From the basis of Buddhism originates the Burmese tradition of policymaking. It 
is founded on consideration of politics as a field of moral actions under Buddhist 
laws.11 This deeply religious background of politics in Myanmar produces a reality 
where the moral perception of politics still dominates, leading to the personifica­
tion of power (institutions and laws are secondary to individuals and loyalty is 
personalized), the sacralization of the leader and condemnation of the opponents 
and everlasting calls for unity (the central value in Burmese political thought) 
understood as a moral ability to move beyond one’s selfishness.12 
On a more social level, policymaking in Burma was and still is state-centred, 
where the general population is disinterested and/or excluded from this sphere of 
life. Although this elitist approach has been challenged by more inclusive voices,13 
including that of Aung San Suu Kyi, it still remains the dominant approach, albeit 
on a lesser scale than before. 
The traditional political paradigm of Burma emphasizes the imperfection of 
human nature: people are prone to transgression and enter into conflict with others 
which produces a never-ending cycle of violence. Only a strong political authority 
can be a remedy to that, as it can keep the imperfect nature of people in check.14 
This is the authoritarian, antidemocratic tradition (the people cannot be the ulti­
mate source of sovereignty because the people are immoral)15 that has dominated 
in the history of Burma. 
The alternative, which may optimistically be called a feeble democratic tradition 
in Burma, does not argue about people’s desire-driven nature, but stresses their 
capacity to overcome it and live ethical lives; here, the purpose of politics is, then, 
to establish circumstances that encourage the moral behaviour of the people.16 This 
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is a more inclusive approach that may – but does not have to – lead to the estab­
lishment of a democratic system. One may ascribe to this tradition the ambitious 
yet failed democratic reforms proposed by Hpo Hlaing and other modernizers (U 
Kaung, Kyaw Htun) in the mid-nineteenth century; Nu’s erratic democratic gov­
ernance in the 1950s and the unfulfilled universalism of the “Buddhist moder­
nists”17 in the mid-twentieth century. This is a tradition where one could place 
Aung San Suu Kyi, though not necessarily her father. 
Aung San, the father of Suu Kyi and the founder of modern Burma, is the 
pivotal figure for both Suu Kyi and Myanmar. Following several political, military 
and ideological twists during World War II, Aung San secured Burma’s indepen­
dence and, although assassinated shortly before it became a reality, became a Bur­
mese hero. Until 1988 all Burmese governments built their legitimacy upon him 
and so did Suu Kyi when entering politics. It was all too easy given the fact that 
Aung San was a realist pragmatist, with a quite flexible and eclectic political 
agenda.18 In the Burmese context, Aung San represented “a syncretic mixture of 
Burmese tradition and ‘modern’ global ideas”.19 
If Suu Kyi had not been Aung San’s daughter she would not be in politics, as 
was the case with Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto, Sheikh 
Hasina Wajed, Khaleda Zia Rahman, Corazon C. Aquino, Megawati Sukarnoputri 
and Park Geun-hye; the “infectious charisma that came from being ‘widows-of­
him’ or ‘daughters-of-him’”20 is well-researched in literature. From this standpoint, 
Suu Kyi with her “karmic credentials”21 that came from her perfect lineage is just a 
Burmese equivalent of an Asian phenomenon. But in the case of Suu Kyi, there is 
more at stake. Her obsession with her father (visible in so many aspects)22 turns the 
power struggle in Myanmar into ‘family quest’ for regaining the power from the 
hands of military usurpers.23 Finally, and most importantly, Aung San, with his 
eclecticism, his ideological flexibility, his skilful usage of Buddhist rhetoric, his 
Leninist style of party governance and many other aspects, remains the ultimate 
model of leadership for Suu Kyi. 
Aung San, who employed several foreign ideologies to suit his policies, followed 
a local tradition of assimilating foreign ideas. In Southeast Asia there exists a cen­
turies-long tradition of accepting, assimilating and transforming foreign ideas in a 
way that with time one can barely recognize the original versions.24 This tradition 
dates back to at least the Indianization, while in more modern history it became 
very visible during the colonial times. Responding to the challenge, modernizing 
movements in Southeast Asia did not consider Westernization as the only guaran­
tee of success (as it was in the case of Atatürk’s Turkey for example), but they 
assumed ideological eclecticism instead. They strived to emulate the sources of the 
West’s successes – ‘external’ (technical or technological) modernization without 
compromising the identity of the country and without undergoing a deep social 
change. Mindon’s modernization with its Buddhism and monarchical power at the 
centre accompanied by technological modernization in the background is the best 
example.25 This attitude, similar to Japan’s Meiji reforms or to China’s zhong ti, xi 
yong, in Southeast Asia succeeded only in Thailand (then known as Siam). In 
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Burma, despite the brave yet unfinished reforms in the mid-nineteenth century, it 
failed. It left, however, an important legacy on Burmese policymaking. Since then, 
almost all Burmese political leaders have considered Western-born ideologies as the 
means to their goal of regaining independence first and rebuilding the country’s 
greatness later. Ideologies, concepts and political systems taken from the West 
changed, though the eclecticism remained constant: they chose parts and rejected 
the rest. Western ideas are not considered autotelic values. Eclectic usage of these 
ideas functions as a way of modernizing a country. This attitude was true for Aung 
San as well as to his direct successors: Nu (“the Buddhist socialism”) and Ne Win 
(“the Burmese way to socialism”), who both tried to assimilate the then fashion­
able, socialist ideas. Post-1988 Tatmadaw generals did the same with the most 
popular global idea of the last half-century: democracy. Hence, ‘the disciplined 
democracy’ was born. This is the intellectual tradition where one should locate 
ideas formative for Suu Kyi. 
The reason why Burmese reforms failed, both in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, offers perhaps a clue as to why Suu Kyi is unsuccessful in governance 
now. According to widespread opinion in Burma, the British colonized the coun­
try because they were stronger (they had guns, better weapons) not because they 
had more just social institutions. From then on, the Burmese elites were looking to 
the West in search of sources of power and influence. This was connected to the 
idea of copying the ‘good things’ from the West (science, technology) and dis­
carding the rest (a concept they called ‘preserving traditional values’) – just like 
Mongkut and Chulalongkorn successfully did in Siam.26 And it was and still is not 
about establishing a more just social system or empowering the individual or 
masses. The people do not matter. The leader does. The aim is to empower the 
leader: king, adipati, prime-minister, chairman of the military council, president or 
state counsellor.27 This is where the personalization of power in Burma shows 
itself: the Burmese elites (in the very tradition of Maha--Sammata – moral leaders 
make a good system, nothing else matters) do not transform institutions (as insti­
tutions are secondary to individuals) and consequently cannot transform a country. 
The same applies to Suu Kyi. She has spoken a lot about empowerment of an 
individual (all her “revolution of the spirit” ideas). Yet her policies are about her 
(what she can do for the country, how she can reform it, etc.), not about the 
people, not about the system. The contradiction between Suu Kyi’s words and 
actions is clearly seen in the fact that she did not empower any member of her 
party. And if one listens to the National League for Democracy (NLD), one may 
come to the conclusion that the biggest problem in Myanmar as of 2019 is the lack 
of amendment to chapter 3, no 59 (f) of the Constitution (prohibiting her from 
becoming president because of her children’s foreign citizenship). Many more 
examples of these self-centric policies of Suu Kyi will be presented later. 
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The international dimension 
The Burmese dimension is naturally the most important for Suu Kyi. Yet, one 
should not marginalize or neglect the international one. Suu Kyi in her texts and 
speeches invoked and quoted such authors as David Hume, John Locke, Karl 
Popper, Mahatma Gandhi, Abraham Lincoln, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther 
King, Václav Havel, Berthold Brecht, George Orwell, Natan Sharansky, Edith 
Bone, Rabindranath Tagore, Sulak Sivaraksa and many others. This should not 
come as a surprise, for there are many sources of Suu Kyi’s inspiration. The years 
she spent in India, the UK, the USA, Japan and Bhutan intellectually influenced 
her in a significant way. 
In her childhood Suu Kyi attended Christian schools in Rangoon and in Delhi 
which together with her Christian maternal grandfather opened her to some 
Christian influence. She will later say “saints are the sinners who go on trying”,28 
quote the biblical “perfect love casts out fear”29 and write personal letters to her 
husband saying that the trust of her people “is the biggest cross” she would have to 
bear.30 In freshly postcolonial India, where Suu Kyi went next (1960–1964) as a 
teenager, she studied in a college and mastered the English language, even though 
with a touch of prissy Victorianism. There she came across Gandhism and its non­
violent means; something which would have a long-lasting and formative effect on 
her – non-violence would become one of the cornerstones of her political agenda. 
But there was more than Gandhism for her in India. She absorbed the postcolonial 
cosmopolitan intellectual atmosphere of India and would later present it as a model 
for Burma, envying India’s ability to achieve “the intellectual impulse that sought a 
harmonious fusion of East and West”.31 Then she moved to study at Oxford 
University (1964–1967), living at the Gore-Booth’s family home in Chelsea during 
study breaks and after graduating. Here, she was almost treated as an extra daughter 
by Sir Paul (former British Ambassador to Burma) and his wife Patricia, becoming 
almost like them and certainly inspiring to be so. This, together with her later 
marriage (1972–1999) to a British man, Michael Aris (whom, incidentally, she had 
met at the Gore-Booths), would shape her profoundly. Suu Kyi, a child of post­
colonial elites, who mastered English in the impeccable way worthy of Eton 
alumni and developed an aristocratic style of Englishness, would then enter the 
British elites and inhale the core Anglo-Saxon ideas of parliamentarianism, rights-
based democracy, rule of law, checks and balances, empowerment of the people, 
and so on. She would assimilate as well many aspects of Western culture, both high 
and popular.32 It was at Oxford, too, that she became inspired by Nelson Mande­
la’s struggle in South Africa, especially by the political role of international sanc­
tions. A stay in New York (1969–1970) and work for the United Nations opened 
Suu Kyi to Henry David Thoreau’s ideas of civil disobedience, best fulfilled by 
Martin Luther King. His struggle for civil rights would become a model for her 
1989 movement; she would quote his famous words (“injustice anywhere is 
injustice everywhere”)33 and try to copy his methods. Her almost yearly stay in 
Bhutan (1972) exposed her to the importance of traditional identity based on 
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religion in keeping the country united. Finally, a research stay in Japan (1985– 
1986), where she followed the footsteps of her father, allowed her to personally 
confirm the pros and cons of this 1980s’ Asian success story. 
The world Suu Kyi lived in before 1988 had undergone profound political, 
cultural and social changes: decolonization reshaped the global order; the USA 
underwent countercultural revolution; Western Europe redefined itself in a more 
inclusive way; East Asian ‘tigers’ started to catch up with the developed countries; 
China initiated its ground-breaking reforms; the first serious cracks in the Eastern 
Block appeared and the issues of international justice and responsibility of the 
international community began to be addressed more seriously. When Suu Kyi 
entered politics in 1988 the West was no longer afraid of communism as its main 
ideological rival and after decades of economic growth was entering a period of 
optimism. The third wave of democratization was on the way and soon would 
spectacularly reshape Eastern Europe and contribute to the USSR’s fall. In 1988 
change was already in the air.34 The subsequent events in the collapsing Eastern 
Block and the end of South Africa’s apartheid contributed further to a triumphant 
intellectual mood, where democracy seemed the only successful ideology world­
wide. Democratic change and progress seemed behind every corner.35 The strong 
conviction of being on the right side of history empowered Suu Kyi and helped 
her in her first steps in politics, yet with time it also became a burden. 
Before politics 
Before Suu Kyi entered politics, she was a housewife and an aspiring academic. 
Her academic texts are quite good from the point of view of literary studies36 and 
more controversial from the point of view of political science.37 What is important 
in these texts is the fact that her overriding theme was not to seek universal aspects 
binding East and West; despite her admiration for Tagore, she was not a humanist 
philosopher following in his footsteps. As one critical of Suu Kyi, a former British 
Ambassador commented: 
she is no great intellectual, and only managed a modest 3rd class degree at 
Oxford. This intellectual inferiority has stayed with her. She is terrified of being 
out-argued, which is why she has declined any BBC Hard Talk interview (…) 
She avoids debate whenever she can. She is in her element when offered the 
world stage – her address to both Houses of Parliament in the UK and her two 
BBC Reith Lectures lacked any substance and in parts were sheer bunkum.38 
Although his remark about Suu Kyi’s Oxford degree is a bit petty – history knows 
many great intellectuals with low grades at school and even more good politicians 
who were poor political science students – he has a point. Suu Kyi is not a pro­
found intellectual and when she tries to act as one, the result is shallow (“there is 
no hope without endeavour”),39 infantile (“the person who sees only the worldly 
materials, has only one eye but the person who tries to achieve both worldly and 
Becoming a hybrid politician 19 
spiritual goals has both eyes”)40 or worthy of Mao Zedong’s “Little Red Book” 
(“we have to know the right from wrong)”.41 Unsurprisingly, one Burma watcher 
later concluded that “some of her speeches have the intellectual depth of a Chinese 
fortune cookie”.42 
Indeed, Suu Kyi’s strength lies not in intellectualism but in her eclectic combi­
nation of ideas. In her texts one can see an overarching attempt to understand how 
to successfully adjust Burma to the modern (Western) world and how to blend 
Burmese Buddhist ideas with Western concepts.43 Hence she was critical of 
Burma’s heritage not being able to create a “synthesis of East and West”, between 
“the true synthesis of traditional and modern, Burmese and Western”; according to 
her, the “old ways should be adapted, pruned, revitalized or in some cases even 
discarded altogether”.44 The reason why the Burmese were unable to do so, and 
consequently Burma lagged behind the world, was the lack of leadership. Her 
father started the work but was assassinated. So, she as the successor of Aung San, 
felt she was destined to lead the people of Burma – to combine the good elements 
of their tradition with the requirements of the modern world (democracy), so that 
Burma may finally realize its full potential. The time to fulfil her self-proclaimed 
destiny came in 1988. 
Suu Kyi returned to Burma on 2 April 1988 after 28 years abroad to take care of 
her ill mother. Quite unexpectedly, she found herself in the eye of the storm. A 
popular revolt against 26 years of army rule was raging on the streets. Initially, Suu 
Kyi did not intend to step into politics but eventually she got carried away and 
took the lead … or so the narrative goes. 
There are many different versions: from “accidental politician”45 to the call of 
duty of a national hero’s daughter.46 Common here, quite conveniently for Suu 
Kyi, is the notion of being somehow forced to enter politics by circumstances; 
although she did not plan it, she could not have stayed on the sidelines. The cur­
rent state of knowledge does not allow rejection of this version out of hand. Yet 
there are reasons to suspect that Suu Kyi had planned on entering politics much earlier. 
Politics was always around the corner for Suu Kyi. Her childhood passed in the 
shadow of her deceased father, the memory of whom was cultivated by her 
mother.47 She grew up among the Burmese establishment and must have over­
heard more than a few conversations led by her politically conscious mother. 
During her teenage years she took part in Khin Kyi’s — then Burma’s Ambassador 
to India – many meetings, both formally and less so. Suu Kyi chose to study poli­
tical science in Delhi and then again in Oxford, though one may suspect that these 
decisions were not entirely of her own making – a suspicion further enhanced by 
her poor grades and failed attempts to change political science into forestry and 
English literature. During her studies politics was not her calling: she was politically 
inactive. After graduating she had no heart in assisting Hugh Tinker and Frank 
Trager, then top political scientists, on Burma. There is no record of her political 
engagement during her work for the UN in New York. The same can be said 
about her marriage (marrying a British man was not the best entry into Burmese 
politics). So, there is solid evidence of her disinterest in politics before 1988. 
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But there are also traces that disturb this narrative. The first one is Suu Kyi’s 
letter to Michael Aris from the early 1970s, where Suu Kyi wrote “should my 
people need me, you would help me to do my duty by them”; not a random 
message, given Aris’s comment that “she constantly reminded me that one day she 
would have to return to Burma”.48 This is not only an unorthodox way of saying 
to your fiancée that you have second thoughts (a suspicion reinforced by Suu Kyi’s 
displeasure that her husband disclosed this letter in 1991).49 The second trace is Kyi 
Maung’s interview from 1996 where he surprisingly revealed that Suu Kyi in 1987 
sounded him out about an involvement in politics (but he refused to help).50 
Other clues are more circumstantial. Such as Suu Kyi being questioned upon her 
trips to Burma before 1988 as to whether she had political ambitions by the secret 
service (according to her own account),51 by former general Kyaw Zaw52 and by 
librarian Myint Swe.53 Some biographers, too, point to her stay in Japan in the 
mid-1980s as the turning point in her political awakening.54 But this is still too 
little, especially given the counterevidence, such as family friend Peter Carey’s 
testimony: he ridiculed suggestions about Suu Kyi’s political plans (“I didn’t get the 
sense that here was somebody plotting in an old Oxford house, like Lenin in 
Zurich, to get back to Burma in a great political role”).55 Given the current state of 
knowledge one may not formulate any conclusive statements about Suu Kyi’s 
political plans prior to 1988: one may only ask questions and raise doubts. 
What is certain is that in the 1980s Suu Kyi was looking for her place in the 
world. Her life until then, though not average, did not give her satisfaction: she 
found herself a mere appendix to her husband and felt professionally unfulfilled. 
Given her strong conviction of whose daughter she was – which sometimes 
expressed itself in an unusual way56 and later led to a sense of mission57 – politics 
was certainly an option. A hypothesis may be the following: Suu Kyi was con­
sidering entering politics in the 1980s (perhaps earlier) but she waited for a good 
moment. Before 1988 there was no space for entering politics: the political scene 
of Burma was cemented by the Tatmadaw – the ana of the military had been 
unquestioned. Besides, her children were too young: she, as Aris hinted, might 
have imagined “that if a day or reckoning were to come, it would happen later in 
life, when our children were grown up. But fate and history never seem to work 
in orderly ways”.58 When Suu Kyi found herself in Burma in April 1988 it might 
have been earlier than she wanted and planned. 
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2 
THE KAIROS MOMENT	 
Kairos, Zeus’ youngest son, is a little known yet important figure in Greek 
mythology. He is the god of used opportunities and wasted chances. When Kairos 
appears on someone’s path, the passer-by has only moments to catch him. But if 
Kairos escapes, there is no hope to get him. Once in Burma, Suu Kyi realized – 
consciously or not – that this was her ‘Kairos moment’: the short-term political 
window of opportunity. 
The ‘Kairos moment’ did not materialize instantly upon her arrival on 2 April 
1988. Sources say (and there is no reason to disbelieve them), that initially all Suu 
Kyi did was take care of her ill mother; first at a hospital and then, from 8 July, at 
home. The anti-regime protests had already started and Suu Kyi was paying 
attention to them from the sidelines, but the turning point probably came on 23 
July. Ne Win, at the hurriedly called Congress of the BSPP, realizing that the 
protests had significantly weakened the position of the army, unexpectedly resigned 
from his position and called for a referendum on reintroducing a multi-party 
system. He most likely made a calculated concession but, if so, he miscalculated 
badly. By resigning, Ne Win not only united the protestors (a short-term euphoria 
followed – nothing delights people more than a dictator’s fall) but he also created a 
political vacuum. Most importantly, however, he showed weakness. And in 
Burmese political tradition, a sign of a ruler’s weakness automatically leads to his 
de-legitimization and to the emergence of minlaungs – contenders to the throne. 
“I can still remember watching with Suu the scene (of Ne Win’s resignation) in 
the congress as it was shown on state television” – recalled her husband – 
She, like the whole country, was electrified … . I think it was at this moment 
more than any other that Suu made up her mind to step forward. However, 
the idea had gradually taken shape in her mind during the previous fifteen 
weeks.1 
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Prior to this moment, the political scene in Burma had been constricted, so any 
thoughts Suu Kyi may have had to enter politics were merely in the sphere of 
fantasy. Now the impossible became possible. 
A cautious beginner 
We do not know for certain why Suu Kyi decided to enter politics. A sense of 
mission mixed with a search for her own place in life and seizing the opportune 
moment seem to be the most probable explanations.2 Whatever the reason, once 
Suu Kyi made the decision, her steps became rational and calculated moves to 
increase her political options. Contrary to the popular belief that Suu Kyi – seeing 
mass protests against the military regime – took the lead and became the unques­
tioned leader of the democratic opposition (she herself contributed to this image),3 
she initially waited and weighed her options. Between the probable decision of 
entering politics (23 July 1988) and her breakthrough speech at Shwedagon Pagoda 
(26 August 1988), she waited and refused to join the protests. This was despite the 
fact that many people placed high hopes on her. The protestors, who demonstrated 
on the street holding pictures of Aung San, were looking for a leader. In accor­
dance with ‘karmic’ logic, Aung San’s children were the obvious first choice. 
When Suu Kyi’s brother Aung San Oo proved to be a hopeless option, protestors 
turned to Suu Kyi. Political pilgrims began flocking to her house at University 
Road 54. Lawyers, doctors, students, journalists, retired politicians and random 
protesters started calling her house and persuading her to join the protests. Soon 
Suu Kyi’s house became “the main centre of political activity in the country”.4 
Yet Suu Kyi was cautious: “she was no fool, she waited and studied”.5 Initially 
she did not back the protestors other than “morally”,6 which frustrated some pro­
testing students. Suu Kyi declared that she wanted to remain neutral; to mediate 
between the regime and the protesters.7 That is why her first political action was a 
letter sent on 15 August to the military regime where she proposed to set up a 
People’s Consultative Committee in accordance with the 1974 Constitution.8 The 
letter suggested mediations between the regime and protesters. Such an action 
proves that Suu Kyi entered politics wisely through positioning herself as a med­
iator between the army and demonstrating students. Unfortunately, the regime was 
not interested in maintaining a dialogue and her request was initially ignored.9 So, 
too, was her request for a private meeting with Ne Win and, to make matters 
worse, she was informally warned by the regime not to engage in politics.10 Only 
then, in an attempt to force the generals to negotiate, did Suu Kyi turn to oppo­
sition. It was a rational decision: if the regime rejected her proposals, the only 
chance to remain in the political game was to jump on the bandwagon with the 
protests. 
Initially Suu Kyi did this without burning bridges. Before her first public speech, 
she secretly met justice minister Tin Aung Htein and via him asked Ne Win for 
approval on her planned first public speech (making speeches was officially illegal 
due to the martial law), ensuring the dictator that she had “no political aspirations” 
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or “hidden agenda”. Tin Aung Htein advised her not to mention Ne Win in 
public and not to criticize him. When Suu Kyi agreed, martial law was lifted the 
day before her speech.11 This fact sheds light on her method of political action. It 
shows, too, that from the very beginning she was playing behind-the-scenes games 
with the regime instead of becoming an all-out dissident. 
Suu Kyi’s maiden speech took place on 24 August 1988 in front of the General 
Hospital: she was precise and to the point. She confirmed rumours about her 
political involvement, expressed her hope of transition to a democratic system and 
invited everyone to listen to her new speech at Shwedagon Pagoda two days later. 
This was a good move: she invoked interest and curiosity among the public. But 
she also pushed the limits of her unwritten agreement with the regime. During her 
talks with Tin Aung Htein, Suu Kyi had informed him about one speech only – 
near the hospital – not a new one, let alone a speech at the Shwedagon which, 
with its profound politico-religious symbolism, was in an entirely different cate­
gory. Ne Win might have felt that Suu Kyi had broken the rules. On the other 
hand, Suu Kyi had to show the regime that she needed to be reckoned with. The 
army responded to it with its boorish style by producing racist anti-Suu Kyi leaflets, 
which explored her political weak point: marriage to a foreigner.12 Although the 
regime agents were caught (a terrible incompetence of Military Intelligence!) 
before they distributed their brochures on 26 August, that very fact showed the 
way Khin Nyunt’s secret service worked. This was the first warning. A warning 
that the regime would fire back and not hesitate to use underhand tactics. By then, 
however, it was much more important for Suu Kyi to give a good speech. Apart 
from the short hospital introduction, she had had no public experience and there 
were doubts whether her Burmese would be good enough after almost three 
decades outside of Burma.13 Yet this did not discourage the crowds that gathered 
at the bottom of Shwedagon. Around half a million curious people arrived to see 
Aung San’s daughter.14 Under this ‘show-style’ first major appearance, under her 
father’s painted picture and Dobama’s fighting peacock flag, she burst onto the 
national political stage. 
The Shwedagon speech 
At Shwedagon, Suu Kyi made her first and perhaps most important rally speech. 
Speaking spontaneously without notes, in fluent Burmese, she convincingly put 
her point across. Suu Kyi presented impressive rhetoric skills: she started her speech 
by greeting the monks, then asked for a minute of silence in memory of students 
killed and smoothly rejected accusations of not being patriotic enough due to her 
living abroad and marrying a foreigner.15 Her greatest moment was playing the 
‘Aung San’ card. Initially when Suu Kyi entered politics she had only her name, 
but she used this asset in a politically brilliant way. She evoked her father’s words 
about different kinds of politics and noting that her father had rejected ‘power 
politics’, so did she. So why did she change her mind to pursue a political path? 
“The answer is that the present crisis is the concern of the entire nation. I could 
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not as my father’s daughter remain indifferent to all that was going on. This 
national crisis could in fact be called the second struggle for national indepen­
dence”.16 In other words, Suu Kyi did not reject politics per se, but only one kind 
of politics – power politics – which her father apparently had dismissed too. Con­
sidering Aung San’s actions (not words) – this was Suu Kyi’s eristic at its finest.17 It 
allowed Suu Kyi to smoothly justify her previous absence in politics (suggesting the 
regime was conducting dirty politics) and her current involvement (by claiming to 
follow Aung San’s good politics). This eristic argument explained and justified Suu 
Kyi’s entry into politics: she was forced to step into politics by dire political cir­
cumstances to finish her father’s job. The “second national independence” argu­
ment was far-fetched at best – Aung San founded the Tatmadaw and the analogy 
between the British rule and the rule of the army was “spurious”18 – but by this 
convenient interpretation of Aung San’s heritage, Suu Kyi had stolen the army’s 
legitimacy. She delegitimized the Tatmadaw’s rule and placed herself as the rightful 
‘heir’ to the throne. Although there had certainly been personal reasons for Suu 
Kyi’s attitude, what matters here is that Suu Kyi had skilfully used her father in her 
political career, de facto monopolizing the memory of Aung San. Initially Aung 
San was the only card Suu Kyi had while entering politics, but she made the best 
use of this asset making it her trump card in Burmese politics. This is how a 
“second struggle for national independence” became Suu Kyi’s political raison 
d’être. Now the time came to fulfil her theoretical thoughts. Burma had been 
unable to match the good elements of its tradition with Western ideas, and lagged 
behind the world. Aung San had realized this and tried to fix it, but did not 
manage to. His successors failed too. Now it was Suu Kyi’s task to do it. She 
believed that the means to achieve “a synthesis of East and West”19 is through 
democracy. This is what makes Suu Kyi a hybrid politician. She borrowed 
“democracy” (alongside with “discipline”, “unity”, “sacrifice” etc.)20 from her 
father’s speeches, but poured her own meaning into these concepts. From then on, 
she presented democracy in her unique, eclectic way, which combines populism, 
sloganeering, moral phraseology, a shortage of details and a deep conviction that 
only democracy allows economic development as well as an utopian belief that 
democracy would heal all the problems of Burma. Such an idea of democracy 
would become enormously popular as it exemplified everything the military gov­
ernment was not.21 Democracy understood in that way would become a unifying 
slogan. The Shwedagon speech was Suu Kyi’s first victorious battle in a political 
struggle to secure legitimacy built on Aung San. By playing with the public’s 
emotions, juggling facts and interpreting history in accordance with her political 
needs, Suu Kyi proved that she was a natural born politician. 
Moreover, she was a politician who, being conscious of the negative social 
connotations of this profession, from the very beginning tried to manoeuvre herself 
into a position above politics: that of a national leader forced to step in due to 
extraordinary circumstances. Later, she developed this line when telling the press 
that “a life in politics holds no attraction for me. At the moment I serve as a kind 
of unifying force because of my father’s name and because I am not interested in 
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jostling for any kind of position”.22 These words had little to do with reality. In 
August/September 1988, Suu Kyi was only one of three (or four, if Nu is counted) 
major opposition figures, along with Tin Oo and Aung Gyi, but she was hardly the 
unifying force. However, these words must be read as a statement of intent rather 
than as an analysis of a real political situation. They prove that, from the very 
beginning, Suu Kyi politically understood that words create worlds. 
The  rest of  the  Shwedagon  speech  is less exhilarating,  but equally  meaningful.  
Emphasizing “unity and discipline” she deplored “dissension” between the people and 
the army and reminded them that her father founded the army. The Tatmadaw should 
have been “a force having the honour and respect of the people”, otherwise the army 
would have been built in vain. That is why not only did she feel a “strong attachment 
for the armed forces” (this is the first time Suu Kyi declared her love to the army in 
public!), but she also appealed to the people “not to lose their affection for the 
army”.23 These seemingly unintelligible words – in light of recent massacres enacted 
by the army – should not come as a surprise. They prove Suu Kyi’s correct political 
assessment: she must have been conscious that her success depended not only on 
popular support but on influencing army ranks as well. Most probably, contrary to her 
declarations about the need for unity, she gambled on a split within the army, hoping 
for the defiance of ordinary soldiers against the commandership. It seems that she was 
following de Talleyrand’s remarks  of:  “speech was given to man to conceal his 
thoughts”. To achieve her goal, she needed to remind soldiers who the founder of the 
army was; to make them understand that Aung San’s successors misused his ideas for 
their own, personal purposes. 
If, most likely, hope for disunity within the Tatmadaw was Suu Kyi’s hidden 
agenda, then escalating political demands was her public policy. This is clearly seen 
at the end of the Shwedagon speech and in her subsequent interviews. Suu Kyi 
rejected the idea of both Ne Win’s and Maung Maung’s promised referendum 
about multiparty democracy.24 But this was just the beginning … an interim gov­
ernment was required to “put the country back on an even keel”.25 This was a 
clear attempt to push further than forcing more concessions from the Maung 
Maung government.26 It was a bid to make it surrender to public pressure and 
dissolve. This was a bridge too far: Suu Kyi would soon realize that she was pow­
erless to achieve this. So far, however, she was triumphant. The Shwedagon speech 
was her major success. In her (almost) debut speech, she had won the hearts and 
minds of the people and transformed herself from a random child of a famous 
father into a serious political contender. 
Approaching climax 
The time was good for Suu Kyi, but not for Burma. The initially joyful revolution 
was turning into an anarchy, with revenge becoming prevalent (“beheadings 
became an almost daily occurrence”) – Suu Kyi tried to prevent lynchings, but was 
not successful.27 This shows she did not control the opposition movement. 
Nobody did – the lack of central leadership was the 8888 revolution’s biggest 
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weakness. Aung Gyi, Tin Oo, Suu Kyi and Nu had no vision or plan; instead they 
quarrelled for leadership. The reformist regime under Maung Maung was ready to 
make concessions, but only up to a certain point. This was the bone of contention. 
The regime agreed to organize general elections within three months, but the 
opposition, backed by mass protests raging on the streets, demanded an interim 
government (Nu even announced his government, but others, including Suu Kyi, 
disagreed with him). Mistrust ran high. The regime established an electoral com­
mission, yet this was rejected by the opposition – nullifying the chance for com­
promise. Maung Maung in his later memoirs criticised those politicians who 
“roused excited people to frenzy” and added “fuel to fire”, most likely having Suu 
Kyi in mind.28 Seen from this point of view, because of their escalating demands 
the opposition lost its chance to strike a deal with the reformists within the regime 
when it was on the table. However, forcing concessions on the regime had proved 
to be a winning strategy till this point, so they possibly felt that they had good 
reasons to continue to do so. 
The opposition had the street’s support, but not that of the army. Despite some 
defections, the core of the Tatmadaw remained loyal: “any high ranking army 
officer who had taken an armed infantry unit into the capital and declared his 
support for the uprising, would have become a national hero immediately, and the 
tables would have been turned”.29 But none did. There are reasons to believe Suu 
Kyi understood the key importance of the army well. On 12 September, she 
explicitly stated that “the role of the army in Burma in crucial”.30 A comparison of 
her statements from 15 August till 13 September shows her growing criticism of 
the armed forces and diminishing hope for achieving a satisfactory settlement. She 
moved from refraining from criticism (15 August), by reminding who founded the 
army and why (26 August), to warning “my father said the army should keep out 
of politics and I support that view totally” (29 August) and dotting the “i” by 
saying that “Aung San gave many warnings against the army turning into a tyr­
annical force of oppression” (13 September).31 For comparison, during her Shwe­
dagon speech, she quoted her father’s single warning about the army going astray. 
Now this had been replaced with the message that Aung San had given ‘many 
warnings’ about it. It was almost an open call to soldiers to rebel against their leaders. 
Suu Kyi was clearly gambling on a split within the army. Finally, on 13 September, 
she crossed the Rubicon by declaring that the “creation of a neutral” interim 
government could only happen “if Ne Win were exiled first” from Burma.32 
This not only shows how far Suu Kyi had come within just one month – from 
negotiating with the regime to calling for expulsion of the former dictator. More 
importantly, if so far Suu Kyi had behaved wisely and consciously, now she made 
her first major political mistake. Theoretically speaking, in developing countries, 
where power, privileges and survival of the regime are intertwined, preserving the 
regime becomes a paramount necessity. When losing power often means losing not 
only privileges or property, but even one’s freedom or life, the stakes of the poli­
tical game rise dramatically. Suu Kyi, a hybrid politician socialized in a Western 
democratic political culture, may not have understood this sentiment adequately. 
The Kairos moment 29 
The events were reaching their climax. On 13 September, the triumvirate of 
Aung–Suu–Tin rejected the regime electoral commission and on the next day they 
demanded an interim government, later setting 19 September as the date of its 
appointment. Meanwhile, incidents on the streets intensified, with attacks on state 
institutions (e.g. bank, town hall), riots and an aborted attempt to lay siege to army 
headquarters; in short “the situation was getting out of hand”.33 Whether the chaos 
and the degeneration of the protest movement was autogenous or Tatmadaw­
inspired (the latter interpretation was propagated by Suu Kyi)34 is not that impor­
tant here. Until the very end (even on the day of the coup), negotiations took 
place between the regime’s reformists and the opposition, but the Tatmadaw’s 
coup on 18 September turned the tables. The army mercilessly restored its power. 
Could Aung San Suu Kyi have done more? Did she have a chance to take over 
power? Contrary to her many declarations from that period, she was quite politi­
cally weak at that time: she neither united the movement nor controlled it. Having 
little assets, she skilfully used the major one: her descent and added personal char­
isma. Not having the army’s support (Suu Kyi tried to divide the army in vain – it 
was the ranks’ loyalty that contributed to the Tatmadaw’s victory), she used the 
escalation of demands – a reasonable tactic in these circumstances. On reflection, 
she could have called for an uprising, but it is probable that she would have ended 
up just like Nu in 1969: i.e. marginalized. So, peaceful escalation was her best 
option, albeit insufficient. Perhaps she could have been a little bit more conciliatory 
towards the reformists within the regime and could have resorted to behind-the­
scenes deals with Maung Maung and other soft liners. But they had ignored her 
once and could have sidelined her in the future. All in all, her political debut 
performance was acceptable, despite its negative final outcome. It has to be 
remembered that barely a month and half before, she had been a political nobody. 
Now, she had skilfully used the window of opportunity created by extraordinary 
circumstances to enter politics. And after more than 20 years of searching for her 
own place in life, she found her calling: to finish the job that (she thought) her 
father set out to do. 
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3 
THE LIONESS	 
The post-coup period proved decisive for Aung San Suu Kyi’s political life. By 18 
September 1988, Suu Kyi had become recognizable. However, she was still not a 
national leader, just one of several minlaungs. Only after the coup, Suu Kyi’s time 
had come. 
Party politicking 
Having staged a coup and massacred protestors, the generals announced their 
intentions to restore law and order (hence the name of the junta: State Law and 
Order Restoration Council, or SLORC). They proclaimed their hope to secure 
the well-being of the country and – in a response to domestic and international 
criticism – declared their intentions to hold democratic elections. Internal security 
coupled with regime survival became a predominant issue for the junta. Conse­
quently, repressions against student leaders soon followed, though initially the 
SLORC left the most famous dissidents, Suu Kyi included, alone. Just after the 
coup Suu Kyi behaved in a conciliatory way too. Instead of criticizing and con­
demning the coup, she tried to resume negotiations. Her first move was to write a 
“politely worded” request for dialogue to general Saw Maung, the nominal chief 
of the SLORC, receiving a “vague promise of talks” in return.1 Only when she 
was de facto ignored did she condemn the massacre and send letters to Amnesty 
International, the United Nations and foreign ambassadors with requests for help.2 
These actions mark the end of the ‘conciliatory’ period and the beginning of her 
balancing tactics against the generals. But all bridges were not yet burned. 
At the same time, the junta allowed for the formation of political parties (21 
September) and reiterated its will to hold free and fair elections (23 September). In 
the limited political space in post-coup Burma, this gave Suu Kyi and other dis­
sidents room for manoeuvre and a reason not to be too confrontational towards the 
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junta. From then onwards, the opposition faced an irreconcilable, structural pre­
dicament: the military was both the political contender and the organizer of mul­
tiparty elections that were a means to achieve regime change. Initially, given lack 
of better options, they decided to accept the conditions dictated by the SLORC. 
For Suu Kyi it required a modification of previous declarations. Barely a month 
before Suu Kyi had declared her disinterest in party life,3 now she changed her 
mind and on 24 September, along with Aung Gyi and Tin Oo, co-founded the 
National Democratic United League (NDUL), renamed the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) three days later; Aung Gyi became the chairman, Tin Oo his 
deputy while Suu Kyi took up the position of secretary general. This showed Suu 
Kyi’s real political position at that time. 
From the very beginning the NLD was not a properly organized political party 
but rather a beneficiary of the “spontaneous mass movement for democracy”, with 
chaotic organization, a lack of control over regional branches and no ideological 
blueprint.4 These issues, however, were not necessarily disadvantages. The NLD 
soon became a mass party that capitalized on social protest against the military 
establishment. If energy and zeal were its assets, then its inability to formulate 
constructive propositions was the NLD’s biggest failure. Simply put, the NLD 
lacked (and probably still lacks) ideas on how to rebuild Burma. The NLD’s first 
programme, accepted during the founding meeting, was full of platitudes 
(“importance of free enterprise”), melodramatic assessments (“misfortune verging 
on the tragic”) and universally accurate postulates (“we must seek solution to the 
problems”) without any specifics.5 Very little changed after a year of functioning 
when the NLD announced its manifesto. Indeed, the NLD from the very begin­
ning was “a broad coalition” of people disenchanted with Ne Win, deeply “divi­
ded by factionalism”,6 which was so bad that “the party could have split into 
different groups”.7 The founding of the party took place at Aung Gyi’s s house 
after “heated discussions” between various factions.8 Of these, there were at least 
three major ones, corresponding with the leading triumvirate: Aung Gyi’s faction 
(mostly his business associates, many with a military past, e.g. Kyi Maung); Tin 
Oo’s ‘ex-commander group’ (former military men such as U Lwin or Aung Shwe); 
and Suu Kyi’s intelligentsia wing (students and intellectuals such as Win Tin, Myint 
Myint Khi, Aung Lwin, Khin Maung Swe, Tin Myo Win, Maung Thaw Ka and 
others). Each faction had different interests and strategies.9 The majority of the 
NLD’s Central Committee (CC) and its Executive Committee (CEC) consisted of 
persons from Aung Gyi and Tin Oo’s factions.10 Distrust and tensions between 
civilians and ex-military men, and between young and old members of the party, 
ran high. The first major clash commenced between Aung Gyi and Suu Kyi as 
early as late November 1988, barely two months after the NLD’s founding. Var­
ious reasons for this altercation were cited: from different organizational and lea­
dership styles, social background and life choices to disagreements about political 
strategy and direction of actions. Mutual personal dislike, however, seems the 
major one. The conflict boiled under the surface and finally erupted on 25 
November when Aung Gyi accused several members of the CC of being crypto 
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communists and demanded their expulsion. Suu Kyi fired back: on 3 December 
she called for extraordinary voting and won this dramatic contention.11 A war of 
words followed and after his defeat Aung Gyi was either expelled from the party or 
resigned by himself.12 Suu Kyi emerged victorious from this debut power struggle 
within the party (and, if Aung Gyi’s accusations were true, she executed her first 
successful purge). She won thanks to her newly formed alliance with Tin Oo, who 
despite being a former general like Aung Gyi, backed her, not him.13 In return, 
Tin Oo seized chairmanship of the party (Suu Kyi became the vice), which set the 
NLD’s functioning mode for the next two decades, with Tin Oo as the nominal 
leader and Suu Kyi as the de facto one – a symbol of the party. Despite initial 
tensions between Tin Oo and Suu Kyi, with time Tin Oo accepted her de facto 
leadership (and his real function as her first deputy), believing that only Aung San’s 
daughter could secure victory. Other party members followed suit. Among them 
was Kyi Maung, another former officer (an ex colonel), who remembered ‘the first 
national liberation’. Now he believed in ‘the second one’, despite his initial reser­
vations about Suu Kyi. Kyi Maung was the only Aung Gyi supporter who stayed 
in the party by switching sides during the dramatic vote on 3 December 1988. He 
mastered the most important skill in a politician’s life: knowing the right moment 
to betray – joining the Suu–Tin camp and thus becoming one of the most 
important party leaders. Other significant members of the ex-commander’s group 
were Aung Shwe (former Ambassador to Australia, Egypt and France) and U Lwin 
(the NLD’s treasurer and former deputy prime minister and finance minister under 
Burma Socialist Programme Party or BSPP). All those ex-military men supported 
Suu Kyi, whose de facto leadership was secured in spring 1989. 
Yet, interfactional tensions remained high. The divisions ran along the lines of 
age (students vs. elder members) and previous membership in the army. In the first 
situation, Suu Kyi backed the students, who gained control of her daily schedule 
and cut many people from access to her, creating resentments that led some 
members to quit.14 The more serious factional tension was, however, between the 
intellectuals and ex-commanders. The former, backed by students, envisioned a 
more assertive policy towards the regime and neither liked nor trusted the latter for 
their past role in the military government, suspecting them of playing both sides by 
informing the SLORC of the party’s intentions and actions. In turn, the ex-com­
manders were unwilling and unable to proceed to all-out confrontation with their 
ex-mother institution and understood that successful transition required a modus 
operandi with the military. Suu Kyi was initially balancing these elements within 
the party, understanding that the party was in a ‘double bind’: the NLD depended 
on the government for organizing some kind of general framework in which a 
democracy could be achieved; on the other hand, the party could not afford to 
disappoint the people who supported it and demanded change.15 
Eventually, around spring/summer of 1989, when relations with the SLORC 
turned sour, Suu Kyi distanced herself from the ex-commanders and sided with the 
radical wing which ensured their dominance within the party.16 Suu Kyi allied 
herself with people like Win Tin, a veteran journalist.17 During the Ne Win 
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period, Win Tin was the voice of what is called the ‘legal opposition’ in autocratic 
countries. It was allegedly Win Tin who introduced Suu Kyi to Henry David 
Thoreau’s civil disobedience ideas – which fitted very well with her hybrid iden­
tity – and, since December 1988, it was he who had masterminded the NLD’s 
confrontational tactics towards the regime.18 As Suu Kyi has conceded, she finally 
realised, probably in early 1989, that the generals were not going to negotiate, and 
she embarked on a long journey to force them to make concessions. If she couldn’t 
make a deal with them, she needed to challenge them. And so she started her 
‘lioness’ tactics. 
Non-violence 
When Suu Kyi co-founded the NLD, she had one major political asset: lineage. 
Now she started working hard to gain another: popular support. She became an 
accessible politician.19 Her hybrid background helped her understand a novelty in 
Burma: that a voter met in person is more likely to support you on the ballot. She 
understood, too, that Rangoon was not enough: in rural countries, one wins 
elections in the countryside. Hence, she made another out-of-the box move: she 
started her campaign trail out there, in provincial Burma. 
Suu Kyi started campaigning on 30 October 1988. She visited regional NLD 
members, opened new branches of the party and held public meetings with local 
people. Everywhere she went, she was given a superstar welcome, with flowers, 
perfumes and standing ovations. People rushed to see Aung San’s daughter and 
were not disappointed. She became “the continuation of a legend”; postcolonial 
Burma’s myth was that if Aung San had not been killed, everything would have 
been perfect, so now people began to believe “that the story could be replayed, 
this time with a happy ending”.20 It was even easier given the fact that she 
resembled her father physically and emulated his behaviour, way of speaking and 
PR methods – for many, she was his reincarnation. A beautiful one at that: during 
the campaign Suu Kyi developed her unique style of dress, with flowers in her hair 
and traditional clothes becoming the trademarks of her public appearances. But it 
was not only public relations – she had something to say; a stark contrast to the 
dreadful speeches made by the generals. During the campaign of 1988/1989, she 
spoke more than a thousand times, quoting her father; introducing little known 
concepts of democracy or human rights in an attractive way; emphasizing the 
importance of unity, discipline and responsibility; and warning about factionalism 
and militarism.21 Suu Kyi often mentioned more trivial matters such as the 
importance of reading books or not shouting at one’s children.22 Apparently, being 
personally affected by some Burmese vices,23 she embarked “on a movement or 
crusade to transform the ‘Burmese mentality’” since, according to Suu Kyi, it was 
“rooted in an authoritarian past” that made dictatorship possible. Conversely, by 
changing the hierarchical patterns of Burmese culture, she hoped to give dawn to 
democracy.24 For people who had been forced to listen to authorities for decades, 
she and her message represented something new and fresh. Step by step her 
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prestige grew; day by day she became the most popular politician in the country. 
She sensed the universal need for change in Burma and made good use of it: for so 
many she became the one who could lead the country out of turmoil. 
In widening her supporter-base, Suu Kyi made another brilliant, unexpected 
move in early 1989: she reached out to ethnic minorities by touring Shan state 
(February) and Kachin state (April). By wearing ethnic clothes, she won their hearts 
and minds. From then on, ethnic minority people would place their hopes on Suu 
Kyi: these illusions would last long, very long. Unfortunately, the ethnic minorities 
did not know that apparently in private Suu Kyi remarked that she looked silly in 
ethnic clothes.25 They did not read her international interviews where she admit­
ted she had little idea about ethnic minorities26; did not know about the NLD’s 
programme on ethnic issues, which kept the privileged status of Bamars; and 
overlooked the NLD’s hegemonic approach towards smaller ethnic parties.27 Most 
importantly, ethnic minorities did not listen carefully to Suu Kyi’s speeches, where 
she clearly expressed ideas that could be summarized in one sentence: democracy 
first and then she would consider their demands.28 All what mattered was that Suu 
Kyi became the first Bamar politician in decades who had seriously noticed them 
and approached them. For them, her actions spoke louder than thousands of 
words. Thanks to this unexpected move, Suu Kyi was becoming a truly national 
leader. 
And one recognized internationally. Suu Kyi with her hybrid heritage, quickly 
understood, as probably the only Burmese politician who did at that time, the 
power of international media. She knew how to handle Western journalists. Either 
genuinely or out of calculation,29 she charmed them with her class, erudition and 
upper-class ‘Englishness’. 
Initially sceptic journalists, within just a few months, ‘fell in love’ with Suu 
Kyi.30 Contrary to most other dissidents, not to mention military leaders, she spoke 
impeccable English and made use of shared cultural codes. That is why, when Suu 
Kyi spoke about democracy, human rights and non-violence, she seemed to share 
their value system (at least they thought so). This is how a great intellectual 
romance between the Western media and Suu Kyi began. For more than two 
decades (too) many journalists had listened to her as to an oracle and acted 
accordingly as her unconscious, unpaid PR. Suu Kyi became their connection 
between Burma and the world. It proved priceless for her political career. 
Initially the regime turned a blind eye to the fact that the NLD’s public gath­
erings breached the provisions of martial law (and other SLORC declarations). 
Perhaps it was the magic of her name or maybe the generals underestimated her, 
hoping that her popularity would eventually wane. Whatever reason, the generals 
initially did not disperse the NLD’s gatherings. They even liberalized conditions of 
martial law, yet they were deaf to her calls for cancelling Order 2/88 prohibiting 
public gatherings. In accordance with this law her meetings were, technically 
speaking, illegal – only the SLORC’s goodwill enabled them to continue. With 
her growing popularity, this tolerance began to shrink: the generals started per­
ceiving her as a threat and became more assertive. By the end of 1988, first 
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warnings were issued, and minor repressions followed: disturbance of meetings, 
arrests of NLD members, prohibition of the NLD ‘fighting peacock’ signs and 
negative PR targeted personally at Suu Kyi. To that Suu Kyi responded brilliantly, 
by introducing novel (or forgotten) tactics into Burmese political life: non-violence. 
This was hybrid policy par excellence, one which encapsulated Suu Kyi’s own 
hybrid heritage. It was foreign-inspired, yet mixed with local traditions (particularly 
of the monks U Ottama and U Wisara). It was appealing to the world and accep­
table to the Burmese. For a moment, it made a difference: this was Suu Kyi’s way 
to escape from the SLORC’s trap. The junta promised elections but did not allow 
an electoral campaign to be conducted. The generals wanted to control the process 
and were unwilling to share power. That is why they kept the provisions of martial 
law such as curfew or prohibition of public gatherings which, if respected, would 
turn an electoral campaign into a series of intellectual discussions confined to pri­
vate houses and party offices. Suu Kyi, an actor much weaker politically, had to 
play along with the rules set by the military while, at the same time she had to 
challenge the structural advantages of the SLORC, manoeuvre herself a political 
space and somehow force generals to give concessions. A call for arms was ruled 
out: if Suu Kyi had called for mass protests or started an uprising, then her move­
ment would have been easily crushed and the regime would find it easy to justify 
such an action. Non-violence seemed a much better option, at least temporarily. 
By switching the field of political contention into a moral sphere and presenting 
her political agenda as stemming from ethical convictions, she made a virtue out of 
necessity. Suu Kyi was able to take “a high moral ground”,31 positioning herself as 
the much more moral candidate and putting the military onto the defensive. 
By non-violence she firmly but peacefully defied the SLORC orders. She 
bypassed regime limitations (prohibition of gatherings of more than five people) by 
ignoring them. She toured the country, attracting 10–15,000-strong crowds, which 
gathered to hear her speak in defiance of the SLORC’s prohibitions and threats. 
The reason she could carry this out, of course, was that she was Aung San’s 
daughter. She had both “the courage of her conviction and her connections”.32 
That was her asset: she competently used the cards she had. By calling upon party 
members and the public to disobey the SLORC regulations, she questioned the 
legitimacy and disparaged the power of the military government.33 Additionally, 
she pacified confrontational elements within the NLD ranks34 and boosted her 
profile both home and abroad. For all these reasons, non-violence was a rational, 
calculated decision; it was the best of the available options. Unsurprisingly, she 
confessed a few years later: “I was attracted to the way of non-violence, but not on 
moral grounds, as some believe. Only on practical, political grounds”.35 By 
non-violence Suu Kyi turned her political weakness into strength. 
Her demonstration of political power came during a painful personal moment: 
her mother’s funeral. Khin Kyi died peacefully in her bed on 27 December 1988. 
We will probably never learn whether there was a mother’s ‘invisible hand’ in 
influencing Suu Kyi’s decision to enter politics. What is certain is that Khin Kyi 
had an enormous impact on her daughter, both intellectually and politically. In 
The lioness 37 
1988, Suu Kyi must have consulted her mother during her first steps into politics. 
Despite Khin Kyi’s terminal illness, she remained conscious and her experience, 
political choices and strong yet difficult bond with her daughter in all probability 
affected Suu. Whatever the influence (or lack of it), Suu Kyi’s mother was now gone. 
Politically, Khin Kyi’s funeral was potentially trouble; the spectre of U Thant’s 
funeral haunted both the regime and the people.36 For once, however, both sides 
managed to cooperate and behaved in a proper way. The regime provided for a 
state funeral and built a mausoleum, while Suu Kyi successfully appealed to 
mourners for restraint: more than 100,000 people marched in respect, without 
causing serious anti-governmental incidents. Moreover, the SLORC leaders came 
in person to the house at University Road 54 to express their sympathies to Suu 
Kyi.37 
Towards confrontation 
The funeral led to a series of unintended consequences. Suu Kyi had demonstrated 
her strength: political maturity, the ability to control the masses and support from 
foreign diplomats. By 1989 Suu Kyi had matured politically, ceased to be an 
‘accidental politician’, developed personal charisma and no small amount of poli­
tical skills.38 After ‘lineage’, she added public support as the second structural 
source of her personal political power. And she knew how to use her popularity 
for her political purposes: to strengthen both her external position (vis-à-vis 
SLORC) and her internal one (vis-à-vis other challengers within the opposition). 
She was able to silence party contesters, who from then on did not dare to criticise 
her in public.39 Wresting with the generals in this shadow boxing match, she had 
to find a middle ground between the radicalization in her own ranks (revenge was 
the emotion of the day among students and many intellectuals) and the tiny 
window of opportunity left by the SLORC. For a long time, she was able to walk 
this tightrope. 
The regime, however, was continuously learning too, and adjusted its behaviour 
accordingly. 
In 1989 negative PR against Suu Kyi intensified, more arrests of opposition 
members followed, a ban on information about the NLD’s events was introduced 
and Suu Kyi’s campaigns were obstructed more heavily. This was particularly the 
case in the Irrawaddy Delta, where Suu Kyi had personal issues with regional 
commander, General Myint Aung. She embarked on three trips there (January, 
March and April 1989) that ended with the ‘Danubyu incident’, which almost cost 
Suu Kyi her life. The 5 April, a long day of nervous contests with soldiers 
obstructing her campaign, ended with a nerve-wracking struggle with a certain 
Captain Myint U. Suu Kyi ignored his orders and threats and moved on, straight 
into the line of soldiers in firing positions. The Captain started counting down and 
when he was just about to give the final order to shoot and kill her, his orders 
were revoked by a senior officer, a Major, who in the last moment came out of the 
crowd and nullified Myint U’s orders. Suu Kyi heard about this later on: by that 
38 The lioness 
moment, she had already passed the line of “shaking” soldiers, who were pointing 
their guns at her, and won this thrilling duel.40 
Suu Kyi proved her extraordinary bravely. She was afraid of nothing, even 
death, and by defying the soldiers demonstrated her determination to fulfil her 
goals. It was her triumph. The ‘Danubyu incident’ made Suu Kyi a legend, and 
became central in Suu Kyi’s celebrity cult. 
Politically, however, her uncompromising stance was a mistake. First, she was 
jointly responsible for causing this situation to develop. She kept coming back to 
the Delta, clearly testing her opponents’ patience and further antagonizing her foe, 
General Myint Aung. If sources (Win Thein, Ma Thanegi) are to be trusted, 
during this memorable day she missed several chances of face-saving solutions, 
provoking Captain Myint U to actions that might have had fatal consequences. 
Had she been stronger politically, that might have made sense. However, given the 
fact that she was weaker, these can be seen as risky, foolhardy and inadequate 
tactics. 
Second, both sides lost control. Among the mutual emotions, ambitions, 
resentments and grudges, chaos reigned supreme, which nearly led to tragedy. It 
was only by the actions of the Major that bloodshed was prevented. This does not 
negate Suu Kyi’s bravery – it was extraordinary – but it does change the political 
assessment of this incident. The behaviour of the Major, who had accompanied the 
NLD all along and showed up at this moment of crisis, proves the existence of the 
‘invisible hand’ of the regime. Seen from a wider perspective, the SLORC might 
have been in the defensive, unsure of how to react to Suu Kyi’s massive public 
support, but it had not lost control over the developments: the generals observed 
the NLD discreetly, infiltrated it and still had the advantage. They controlled the 
political process and, at the end of the day, Suu Kyi needed to strike a deal with 
the Tatmadaw if she wanted to come to power. Naturally, the military was 
unwilling to share power with anyone. However, the art of the deal was how to 
convince them to do so. And that was possible only if the army felt that their 
interests and their security were protected. Strictly speaking, Suu Kyi had to man­
oeuvre herself into a position strong enough to be reckoned with – which she did 
spectacularly – and, at the same time, she had to assure the generals that she was 
not a threat to them. In other words, public and foreign support were only the 
means to a goal, not a goal in themselves. To secure her victory, she needed a deal 
with the Tatmadaw. After Danubyu, however, agreeing terms with the Tatmadaw 
became much more difficult. 
To make matters worse, immediately after coming back home to Rangoon she 
went straight to the British Embassy to inform the world about what happened (via 
the BBC). By doing so, she added insult to injury. She should have defused the 
incident instead of publicly humiliating a politically stronger opponent. Suu Kyi 
did otherwise and consequently she won a battle but lost the war. If Nicollò 
Machiavelli was correct – according to him a successful politician was to be “a fox 
to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves” – then Suu Kyi had proven 
to be a lioness, but not necessarily a fox. 
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Right is not might 
Throughout the first half of 1989, Suu Kyi without respite toured the country and 
hypnotized the crowds. The opposition had gained political maturity and devel­
oped a leader who could address fundamental issues. Her movement was unifying 
“all segments of Burmese society”.41 If the regime thought they would be able to 
manipulate the divided political scene and play off one party against another, those 
hopes were dashed by early 1989. 
As Suu Kyi’s popularity reached its zenith and she became the paramount leader 
of a united opposition, the political reality became clear-cut. On one side there was 
the army, without legitimacy but with a structural advantage and the ultimate 
argument of physical power. On the other, there was the much weaker opposition 
movement, albeit with mass social support. The army had ‘might’, the opposition was 
(morally) right. 
The sides should have struck a deal. It was in their mutual interests. The Tat­
madaw should have been conscious that ruling without legitimacy would be chal­
lenging. The generals could have invited Suu Kyi to govern. Once in power, she 
would have then had to reckon with their institutional advantage and might have 
lost popular support while governing. The NLD for its part should have known 
that some kind of cooperation with the military was necessary to administer the 
country. Suu Kyi should have hampered some party members’ revanchism as she 
understood that, institutionally, the Tatmadaw was irreplaceable if she was to run a 
country. Moreover, the SLORC and the NLD were not that different: many party 
members were former military men. Until June 1989, there was no hostility 
between the two sides: their dislike, resentment and competition were still far from 
hatred. They knew their limits in mutual criticism. They should have come to 
terms. 
It was not to be. 
The SLORC–NLD contest became a zero-sum game. The Tatmadaw defined 
its role as that of a referee who made authoritative and respected choices during a 
crisis. The NLD, empowered by mass public support, did not recognize this self-
imagined role of the army – the party saw itself filling it. It was a recipe for disaster. 
And this meant one thing only: the prevention of confrontation was possible only 
if one side accepted the preconditions of the other. Since no one was willing or 
able to do so, “confrontation was unavoidable”.42 
Various cultural reasons have been cited as causes of the unfolding drama: weak 
mechanisms of conflict solving in Burmese culture; a finite understanding of 
power; the personalization of power; lack of outlet for opposition; or the mor­
alization of Burmese politics.43 These are all valuable yet insufficient explanations. 
Politicians, regardless of geography and cultural differences, have a tendency to act 
pragmatically. Patterns of culture influence policymakers but do not determine 
their actions. Why, then, did it not work out in Burma? 
Both sides are to blame, though their faults are different. On the side of the 
Tatmadaw, it was hubris; on Suu Kyi’s, it was trying to run before she could walk. 
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The generals assumed that since they possessed the ultimate argument, that of 
physical power, they would win anyway, so they did not have to reckon with Suu 
Kyi. History proved them … right, though Burma paid a high price for their 
decision. The country lost two decades to political stalemate, which resulted in 
economic malaise. The Tatmadaw lost on this too (albeit less so). Had the generals 
accommodated Suu Kyi, in the eyes of the world they might have turned out to be 
legitimate leaders as early as 1989 (and being legitimate was important for them for 
prestigious reasons). They could have struck better deals with the outside world 
than they actually did. 
The Tatmadaw did not wish to share power, while the NLD was unwilling to 
continue playing along to the rules set by the junta. This was the NLD’s ultimate 
political mistake. In mid-1989, the NLD already achieved considerable popular 
support that was impossible for the generals to ignore. Now political expediency 
demanded seeking a settlement with the regime. Only a deal with the army would 
have allowed the NLD a chance, albeit slim, to come to power. 
Within the NLD there were people who understood this reality. Chan Aye (a 
CEC member) in a report to party CC proposed an attempt to come to terms with 
the junta. Kyi Maung was of similar mind: “what we must have is a democratically 
elected government. If in exchange we have to guarantee the generals’ security or 
their wealth, never mind: we must give them anything they want”.44 If this is true, 
these words prove that they understood that army officials controlled the political 
process. 
The NLD’s plan for coming to power was to win elections and form a gov­
ernment. This necessitated a type of cooperation, even if technical, with the mili­
tary. It was the Tatmadaw that ruled and administrated the country, held all 
institutions, including the coercive apparatus, and organized elections. A con­
frontational course, advertised by the NLD’s radical wing, meant one scenario. In 
it, the NLD criticised the army and demanded political reckoning with it. In the 
NLD’s imagined scenario, the army would endure it all, allowing elections to 
happen and give power away to its opponents. The army would then renounce its 
almost 30-year political and economic dominance, privileged social position and 
uncountable sinecures, and possibly face lustration and accountability for its past 
crimes. What a perspective! 
To use a football (soccer) metaphor, the NLD’s team was a better one, one 
supported by almost all fans; but the army was both the opposing team and the 
referee at the same time. In such conditions, it would be extremely challenging to 
win. The NLD’s only chance was to buy (bribe) the referee. Unfortunately, after 
initial hesitation Suu Kyi finally succumbed to Win Tin and the students,45 
believing that she could defeat the generals in a fair way (“right is might”). 
Suu Kyi’s idealism and inexperience in politics are usually cited as the reasons for 
her ill-advised decision.46 While not totally disagreeing with these interpretations, I 
propose another explanation. This time, Suu Kyi’s hybridity was her disadvantage. 
After decades of living in the West, she firmly believed in democracy as a non-
alternative system,47 and in doing so she was the hero of her times. The revolution 
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in the Philippines had succeeded three years prior, Eastern Europe’s transformation 
was just around the corner soon to be followed by the USSR’s fall and the end of 
apartheid. Freedom was in the air, but not automatically and not everywhere. 
The point of no return 
Until late May 1989, the regime had been on the defensive, unable to answer Suu 
Kyi’s non-violent tactics successfully. When it finally found a way, the military 
empire struck back in late May/early June 1989. On 31 May, the regime 
announced a new electoral law, which forbade those personally associated with 
foreigners (read: Suu Kyi) to contest elections. In early June, the SLORC declared 
that martial law would not be lifted after the elections and that elected repre­
sentatives would draw up a Constitution that would be endorsed by popular 
referendum. Only then would a transfer of power be possible.48 In other words, 
the army unexpectedly changed the nature of the coming elections, from parlia­
mentary ones to that of a constituent assembly. By doing so, the Tatmadaw 
demonstrated its power as the referee who could change the rules of the current 
game as and when they pleased. Moreover, in mid- and late-June, the junta made 
several shows of force. It introduced a ban on printing anti-SLORC materials; 
changed the international name of the country from Burma to Myanmar; and 
started an anti-NLD and anti-Suu Kyi media campaign. 
The NLD answered rhetorically. The party condemned the decision concerning 
elections; threatened to boycott them; declared it would not respect restrictions; 
rejected the name Myanmar and announced a list of new national holidays. Suu 
Kyi declared that she was not interested in ‘pseudodemocracy’ (read: rejected 
playing along to the rules of the regime).49 Again, she tried to divide the army. She 
returned to her tactics of hoping for a split within the army and, starting in July, 
she once more started personally criticising Ne Win; quite harshly and sometimes 
even ad personam. 50 Her behaviour was either shockingly brave or very foolish. 
The SLORC fired back with Saw Maung’s ‘personal appeal’ to stop breaking 
laws; rejecting talks with the NLD; intensifying personal attacks on Suu Kyi in the 
press; and by arresting the most radical NLD members, including Win Tin (on 4 
July).51 After the aborted attempt to celebrate the anniversary of the demolition of 
the Student Union Building (7 July), on the next day Suu Kyi crossed the red line 
(8 July): she announced the civil disobedience movement. 
Quoting Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Suu Kyi declared her goal as to “defy 
as of duty every order and authority not agreed by the majority”.52 Suu Kyi hoped 
to force concessions from the SLORC by paralyzing the functioning of the state. 
Unfortunately, at the end of the day, most civil servants, publishers and especially 
soldiers complied with the regime.53 The country did not go into a mass strike. 
Consequently, “holding the ‘moral high-ground’ worked for Gandhi and Mandela 
(her models), but whereas the political and social context was favourable for them, 
for her, it was not”.54 Myanmar’s regime – although disliked and with time 
hated – was homemade, their own, Burmese; not colonial (like the British Raj) or 
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racially different (like in South Africa). Autocratic SLORC was unbound by 
democratic rules, which had further enabled Martin Luther King’s victory in the 
USA. The generals were tyrants pure and simple and could turn the tables at any 
time. As Suu Kyi’s foe, General Myint Aung declared, “You can forget about 
democracy. Even if you have an elected government, we will stage a coup 
again”.55 Unfortunately for her, Suu Kyi, a hybrid politician, was too inter­
nationalized in 1989 to understand the political reality in Myanmar. Furthermore, 
she pacified those who tried to make her see reason: when in July 1989, military 
veterans from the ‘ex-commanders’ faction in the NLD objected to Suu Kyi’s civil 
disobedience tactics, she did not mince her words, asking them “if they were fol­
lowers of Aung San or Ne Win”. As one observer noted with disgust, “she was 
basically asking all these ex-military commanders if they were cowards. She should 
not have talked to older people like that. We could only conclude that she was 
very westernized”.56 This remark is telling, for it shows one thing: hybridity was 
both Suu Kyi’s asset and weakness. It was the former because she used non-vio­
lence, out-of-the box (initially) ground-breaking tactics; she popularized break­
through ideas (democracy, human rights); and by reaching to Western media she 
built her international profile. Without being a hybrid politician, she would not 
have achieved all that. Her hybridity helped her make a difference. On the other 
hand, it hindered her too. Both her ex-military party comrades and the members 
of the ruling military establishment considered her too Occidentalized.57 The 
regime used this tool; starting to portray her as an outsider, insufficiently Burmese 
or Buddhist enough, or even as a foreigner, targeting her marriage to an English­
man especially.58 She was able to stylishly rebuff these accusations, in fluent Bur­
mese, by ridiculing them.59 She, too, neutralized accusations of foreignness visually 
by wearing Burmese clothes and renewing the Burmese female tradition of putting 
flowers in her hair.60 Still, not all were convinced. An anecdote from the 2000s 
tells a story of Suu Kyi who during an interview apparently lost “self-control and 
started doing things, which she, as a Burmese woman, should not do”: she was 
“very upset when she saw a picture of Ne Win hanging on the wall, loudly 
expressed her displeasure and ultimately sprang up on a table to take the picture 
down”.61 
These problems prove one theoretical observation: hybrid politicians are often 
considered too Westernized by their own compatriots, while being considered 
‘quintessentially local’ by the West (in Suu Kyi’s case: “foreigner” vs. “Suu Bur­
mese”). Much more importantly here, however, was something different. Politi­
cally, Suu Kyi might have been too internationalized to understand that at the end 
of the day, in this part of the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s (and long 
after), Mao Zedong’s formula was continuously adequate: power still grew out of 
the barrel of a gun. Consequently, she misread the political conditions and lost the 
political confrontation. 
The die was cast on 19 July, Martyr’s Day. Both sides planned their own com­
memorations, with Suu Kyi intending to stage a march of her supporters to the 
Mausoleum. The army prepared itself for riots and more bloodshed, bringing 
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soldiers with live ammunition into the city, putting new restrictions in place and 
introducing a curfew. In short, establishing “a martial law within martial law”.62 
Suu Kyi initially confirmed her march only to cancel it later at 6 AM and calling for 
a boycott of the regime’s ceremony instead. Thanks to this concession nobody was 
killed and the anniversary went by tensely, yet peacefully. Suu Kyi explained her 
stance as unwillingness to bring her people “into the killing field” and called the 
SLORC a “fascist regime” (this label ultimately infuriated the generals).63 These 
harsh statements were clearly aimed at hiding the inconvenient truth: her decision 
was a political concession. While morally praiseworthy (she avoided a bloodbath), 
politically it showed the limitations of her confrontational tactics. If she was ready 
to exchange blows with the regime, she should have been expecting the army to 
behave the way they did – predicting the Tatmadaw’s reaction was not that diffi­
cult. Instead, Suu Kyi toughened her rhetoric and started a war of nerves, only to 
reach a point of no return and pull out in the last moment. Consequently, she won 
morally and lost politically. 
On the next day, the regime confined her to house arrest. 
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4 
THE NON-LEVEL PLAYING FIELD	 
The confinement of Suu Kyi to house arrest set the political scene for the next two 
decades. In this competition between the strong (army) and the weak (Suu Kyi), 
she had two trump cards: popular support and foreign backing. This proved to be 
too little to enable her to come to power, but was enough to prevent her being 
marginalized. The Tatmadaw was politically winning; however, it could not fully 
defeat Suu Kyi. She was losing, but never lost. Consequently, this situation led to a 
prolonged political deadlock. 
The Inya Lake lady 
Suu Kyi’s first house arrest (1989–1995) is well documented. She spoke about it 
eagerly just after being released and afterwards. She was confined to her house, 
separated (with short intervals) from her family and almost cut off from the world 
(radio being her only contact with it). She exercised, read books, played the piano, 
sold furniture and meditated. 
Politically, the house arrest started with her first (and only) hunger strike 
undertaken to protect arrested students – her party members. It ended with a 
compromise (being de facto Suu Kyi’s surrender on honourable terms), negotiated 
by her husband, Michael Aris, with the junta.1 The episode is interesting from both 
feminist and postcolonial perspectives (the generals made a deal with a white, 
Anglo-Saxon, male professor), yet it remains a random one. Aris never again played 
an active role in Suu Kyi’s political life, only a passive (yet dramatic) one. 
The period 1989–1995 marked the junta’s cruel and successful repressions, 
which significantly diminished the NLD’s power and intimidated society. Not all 
party members had (partial) immunity for being the Tatmadaw founder’s daughter. 
Tin Oo, after initial house arrest, was sentenced to hard labour; Maung Thaw Ka 
to a life sentence, where he soon died. A similar fate awaited other imprisoned 
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NLD leaders: Kyi Saung, Boh Set Yaung, Hla Than, Tin Maung Win, Maung Ko, 
Leo Nichols and many others. Throughout the country NLD members and other 
activists were chased, locked up and sentenced to prison and labour camps or to 
battlefields as porters (the list of human rights violations by the regime is long and 
depressing). The junta enforced obedience (restored ‘law and order’, according to 
their vocabulary). The society was terrorized and silenced.2 
A decimated NLD came round from the junta’s blows thanks to Kyi Maung, 
who rebuilt the party. The NLD was allowed to continue their electoral campaign, 
albeit in a much more restricted manner. Although the campaign continued 
without Suu Kyi (who was barred from contesting on grounds of her marriage 
with a foreigner),3 she was symbolically omnipresent, with her face becoming the 
mark of the NLD and the reason for its success.4 The junta’s clumsy criticism of 
Suu Kyi even increased her popularity amongst society. To the regime’s shock and 
disbelief, the NLD won the 27 May 1990 elections by a landslide, securing 392 out 
of 492 (485 contested) mandates in Pyitthu Hluttaw (80 per cent of the seats in 
Hluttaw and 59 per cent of all votes). It was effectively a referendum on the 
Tatmadaw’s rule. 
In this time full of anxiety and emotions, the essential issue was overlooked: 
What kind of elections were they? Was the Hluttaw to become a parliament or a 
constituent assembly? All parties, including the pro-regime NUP, their candidates 
and the gross majority of voters (if not all), believed these were parliamentary 
elections designated to form a government.5 The regime interpreted it otherwise. 
On 27 July Khin Nyunt announced Declaration no. 1/1990 informing, or 
reminding, that the elected Hluttaw representatives will have “the responsibility to 
draw up the constitution”.6 Was it the SLORC’s unwillingness to swallow defeat 
or its inability to communicate the nature of the elections earlier on? A list of 
contradictory statements made by Saw Maung suggests he might have been una­
ware of what kind of elections his junta was organizing. Khin Nyunt’s speeches, on 
the other hand, were consistent on the interpretation of the constituent assembly 
from June 1989 onwards. The SLORC was either internally split over this issue or 
changed the designation of the elections in favour of a constituent assembly 
without being able to communicate it properly.7 
Whatever the answer, politically speaking it does not matter much, as the 
transfer of power could have happened only on the army’s conditions – for that the 
NLD needed a modus operandi together with the Tatmadaw.8 It never achieved it, 
instead capitalizing on the notion of ‘stolen’ elections both at home and abroad. 
Suu Kyi herself, despite her initial statements,9 contributed significantly to convincing 
the world of this interpretation.10 The NLD won this PR battle decisively, pushing 
the junta onto a deep ideological defensive by depriving it of domestic and inter­
national legitimacy. Unfortunately, it was not enough to bring the NLD to power. 
To evoke the football metaphor once again, Myanmar was the non-level playing 
field, where the Tatmadaw was both a player and a referee at the same time. Team 
NLD, despite having its best player (Suu Kyi) sent off, scored a magnificent goal 
after a combined attack. Unfortunately, the referee whistled offside – to the rage of 
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frustrated fans. It did not really matter whether it was an offside or not (no VAR 
available); the match continued and the NLD had to live with the referee. 
The NLD was torn over what to do. Apparently, just after their victory, Kyi 
Maung asked an astonished French press correspondent “what the Party should 
do”, revealing “no game plan at all”.11 One may comment that ad hoc actions are 
typical features of Burmese politics, while lack of forward planning is its plague. 
Kyi Maung chose wisely: a conciliatory approach, arguing against pushing the 
SLORC into a corner.12 This was the only real (although dreadful) option, as it 
might have convinced the SLORC to let the NLD write the Constitution. If 
appeased, the SLORC – which feared that the NLD might declare an interim 
government and “start another crisis like that of 1988”13 – would perhaps transfer 
power in the (very distant) future. Apparently, the ex-commander faction within 
the NLD was ready to accept the military’s governance of the country for a year 
until the Constitution was ready, and then expected the NLD to form a govern­
ment.14 Others, however, did not want to wait. Torn by factional struggle 
between the ex-commanders’ faction (which believed they could strike a deal with 
the SLORC) and the radical faction (which thought otherwise), the NLD was 
seriously split. After a stormy meeting at Rangoon’s Gandhi Hall on 29 July, the 
moderate approach was rejected in favour of a demand to hand over legislative 
power to the victorious party. The party even set up a deadline for the SLORC: 
September 1990. The Gandhi Hall Declaration had devastating consequences: the 
NLD was too weak to secure its demands and had no plan ‘B’,15 while the 
SLORC saw the declaration as “an ultimatum, even an attempted coup”.16 It gave 
the SLORC the pretext to settle affairs their own way: to jail NLD members and 
write the Constitution by themselves. The Tatmadaw arrested Kyi Maung and 
other CEC members, thus breaking the backbone of the party and leaving leader­
ship to “third rung leaders” under Aung Shwe, a former general.17 Without Suu 
Kyi, Tin Oo or even Kyi Maung, the NLD did not function well.18 Shaken by 
deep internal divisions and deprived of real leaders, the NLD became an easy target 
for the SLORC; it made “mince-meat of the divided party”.19 Weak and intimi­
dated, the new leadership of the NLD was forced to accept Declaration 1/1990, 
participate in SLORC’s scheme of a National Convention and even expel Suu Kyi 
from the party. By 1991 the NLD had effectively been neutralized. 
When Suu Kyi was released, she aptly summarized her party’s dilemmas: 
There are some who would argue that if I had not criticised them, they would 
have spoken to me. But they would not even consider speaking to U Aung Shwe, 
who has never criticised them and who has tried his best to be cooperative.20 
Elsewhere she complained about the regime’s rigidity: 
the SLORC has to understand that flexibility is not the same as weakness. And 
rigidity doesn’t mean strength … ‘give and take’ means ‘I give a little, I take a 
little; you give a little, you take a little.’ It doesn’t mean  ‘you give and I take’.21 
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She was correct: the generals believed they did not have to listen to anyone and 
did not need to share power with anybody. Once the SLORC decided to stay 
longer in governance, it postponed any prospects of transferring power. It formed 
the National Convention in 1992, cancelling most of NLD’s mandates (the party 
now had 107 delegates out of 702 representatives in total). The NLD, after stormy 
interparty discussions, accepted this scheme and took part in the (rare) proceedings, 
which proved to be a farce. The army dictated the basic principles of the project 
without considering any other propositions. After 1992, SLORC’s new leader 
Than Shwe sought to establish a Tatmadaw-controlled political system, where any 
civilian government would be checked and balanced by the army, leaving little 
room for independent governmental actions.22 
Thus, Suu Kyi made a good point when she identified the essence of the NLD’s 
predicament: the generals’ uncompromising attitude. It is, of course, easy to be 
wise after an event – her situation was indeed unenviable – but she was partially to 
blame for the deadlock. She did not understand the (unfair) political rules of the 
game: she criticised the junta when she should have negotiated with them and 
under Aung Shwe’s weak lead it was too little, too late for mending fences. Con­
trary to what some say, an attempt at rebellion, marching to release Suu Kyi and 
taking over power immediately after the 1990 elections,23 was not an option: the 
army had shot down the movement in 1988 and they would have done so again in 
1990.24 And, although the alternative – accepting the rules of the SLORC – was 
psychologically, politically and personally next to impossible for the NLD, it 
remained the only, albeit small, way of coming into power. 
Having neutralized the NLD, the SLORC won this battle, yet not completely. 
The generals were unable to marginalize Suu Kyi. However hard they tried to 
diminish Suu Kyi’s importance, to ignore her, or to make people forget about 
her – they failed. Two structural reasons allowed Suu Kyi to remain in the political 
game: public support and foreign backing. 
Although the Tatmadaw effectively terrorized the people, the army had never 
been successful in completely silencing society. Locked in her house at University 
Road 54, Suu Kyi became the personalization of social aims and hopes. In a way, 
the generals inadvertently contributed to her popularity (for locking her up saved 
her from making political mistakes). The Burmese praised, sacralized and elevated 
Suu Kyi to a position above politics, the people’s hero: a female bodhisattva, a  
benevolent nat. 25 It was a grassroots personality cult and, as such, a fascinating case 
study. What matters here most importantly, however, is something different. 
Although Suu Kyi spoke unequivocally against a personalized approach to politics 
many times,26 she achieved her position thanks to her personal features (lineage, 
charisma and perceived correct moral choices in politics). Most importantly, she 
owed her survival in Burmese politics to these very personalized mechanisms. 
The second structural source of Suu Kyi’s political position was foreign backing. 
The early 1990s saw the beginning of Suu Kyi’s popularity in the West. She had 
worked hard to win the support of the West during her entry into politics in 
1988/1989. However, it was only once she was locked in house arrest that she 
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became widely recognized outside Burma. For her stance and proclaimed ideas, she 
received a deluge of awards, the most important being the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1991. This admiration had its serious political implications. With time it translated 
into the West’s political support of Suu Kyi and this, in turn, made it much more 
difficult to marginalize her. 
Although domestic adoration and international recognition came to her without 
her personal contribution, as she was under house arrest, being a skilful politician 
she was able to make use of it. Since the early 1990s, local and foreign support had 
become her two assets in the struggle against the military. Otherwise doomed to be 
sidelined, with this kind of aid she was able to remain in the game. 
These two structural factors forced the generals in 1994 to accept (unsuccessful) 
mediators (Bill Richardson and Rewata Dhamma) and to conduct backstage (even 
if bogus)27 negotiations with her (she had two personal meetings with Khin Nyunt 
and one with Than Shwe, but these attempts came to nothing as both sides were 
entrenched in their own positions). These factors finally led to her release on 10 
July 1995. There are two major interpretations as to why the generals released her: 
the SLORC’s self-conviction of having full control of the political situation and 
Japanese backstage lobbying. 
Right versus might yet again 
Once released, Suu Kyi was laconic and conciliatory in her statements. She met 
Kyi Maung, Tin Oo and Aung Shwe and restarted political activity. Quite contrary 
to international expectations – her release hit the world headlines and sparked hope 
of quick reconciliation – Suu Kyi downplayed the importance of the event; 
probably understanding her release was the regime’s show of strength, not a gesture 
of willingness to compromise. 
Suu Kyi had to somehow force the generals to the negotiating table. In a way, 
the mountain came to the prophet: when news about Suu Kyi’s release reached the 
town, people gathered at the gate of her house to greet her. She climbed to the 
top of the gate and spoke to them over it. She repeated the action on the next day, 
and then again every day. Finally, after a month, she decided to hold weekly rallies, 
with people gathering at the front of her house and Suu Kyi (together with Tin 
Oo and Kyi Maung) speaking to them from over the gate. This is how one of 
1990s’ most unusual political performances came into being. 
Gate rallies were an out-of-the box, brilliant political move that increased Suu 
Kyi’s political profile while circumventing existing regulations forbidding public 
gatherings. It allowed the NLD to reach out to their supporters (bypassing cen­
sorship), simultaneously sending signals to the regime. It boosted Suu Kyi’s inter­
national profile too, as her rallies became political events, if not a tourist attraction. 
Most importantly, the gate gatherings made Suu Kyi even more popular in society. 
Suu Kyi enjoyed this communication. She replied to letters, talked to people, 
laughed, used wordplay, joked and lightly, though clearly, ridiculed the regime; 
and, by “educating the people”, was able to present her various ideas on political, 
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social and economic issues that could be summarized in one sentence: “democracy 
28
first”. 
Compared with what she had preached before her house arrest, her ideas 
underwent significant Buddhisation. Previously only randomly present in her 
speeches, Buddhism now became one of her hallmarks.29 She described her first 
house arrest as a time of spiritual strengthening and there is no reason to doubt it. 
At the same time, it is hard to miss the fact that, upon being released from house 
arrest, Suu Kyi found the regime legitimizing itself through religion. The SLORC 
abandoned Ne Win’s complicated – yet rather distanced – relationship with clergy 
and instead embraced very traditional means of legitimacy, such as building pagodas 
and supporting monasteries. Suu Kyi had to somehow politically balance this 
newly found religiosity of the generals and counter their negative PR campaign, 
which portrayed Suu Kyi as a Westernized renegade. Presenting herself as the purer 
Buddhist, who was religious in public, used Buddhist terms extensively, visited 
monasteries (Thamanya and others), fed monks and listened to their advice (and 
wrote about all this) was a good option.30 In other words, Suu Kyi’s turn towards 
Buddhism was probably both a genuine, personal change of heart as well as a 
politically convenient move. 
Thanks to this all, Suu Kyi politically stitched herself back together. She rebuilt 
her party, becharmed Madeleine Albright (then US Ambassador to the UN) and 
used her political celebrity status to appeal to the world to help her force the 
uncompromising generals to make concessions. Since her post-release calls for talks 
and compromise with the junta were effectively ignored, Suu Kyi resorted to what 
amounted to a ‘nuclear option’ in Burmese conditions. Feeling that she had the 
West’s backing and misled by South Africa’s example, she called for “no aid, trade 
or investment”31 – supporting sanctions on Myanmar.32 Despite partial successes 
(tourism boycott, withdrawal of many global companies, the Unocal case), sanc­
tions failed to bring down the regime for two structural reasons: first, sanctions 
were not universal and only applied fully by Western countries which meant trade, 
including an illegal one with Asian partners, especially China, continued and, 
second, because of the inward-looking nature of the Tatmadaw.33 Sanctions irri­
tated the generals, as they questioned their legitimacy, but could not overthrow 
them; at the same time, sanctions hurt some parts of society (though the primary 
reason for the Burmese people’s plight was the regime’s own mismanagement of 
their country). Suu Kyi either underestimated the social price or calculated it as a 
necessary cost.34 Although she had clear political interest in introducing and keep­
ing sanctions – they helped her remain in the political game – it would be unjust 
to accuse her of consciously supporting harmful policies (for ‘her’ people) for her 
own political gains. Rather, her ‘regime change first’ strategy deluded her (and her 
Western supporters) that regime change was possible. According to them, political 
change had to anticipate deeply needed economic and social reforms, allegedly 
unworkable under the SLORC/SPDC. Unfortunately even then, in the 1990s, 
although not impossible, regime change was improbable.35 Perhaps Suu Kyi’s 
hybridity was partially to blame too. As a hybrid politician Suu Kyi unconsciously 
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overestimated the importance of the Western world. She overlooked the emer­
gence of new Asian powers, especially China, but also Thailand, Singapore and 
Malaysia. Engagement with these countries saved the junta both politically and 
economically (emerging local Asian capitalism, unnoticeable from both Inya Lake 
and the West, gave the generals the means for survival). To Suu Kyi’s disadvantage, 
the West proved to have limited clout here. 
Back then, in the mid-1990s, things seemed to look differently. Thanks to her 
gate rallies and foreign support, Suu Kyi established an illusion of an “alternative 
power centre”.36 Suu Kyi felt strong enough to challenge the regime, which 
remained unwilling to compromise; Suu Kyi again wanted to force them to the 
negotiating table. Thus, she started testing the limits of her allotted political space 
(she repeated this in 2002/2003).37 Consequently, a new phase of confrontation 
commenced from late 1995. This lasted until 2000, when Suu Kyi was put back 
under house arrest. 
This period was characterized by a series of political skirmishes between the 
NLD and the regime against the background of Myanmar’s weakening economic 
situation and building international pressure. In November 1995, the NLD depu­
ties walked out of the National Convention, paralysing its proceedings, in protest 
against the SLORC’s proposals of a Constitution. Starting March 1996, the NLD 
threatened to convene a parliament (more vocally from mid-1998) and on 17 
September 1998 the party called together its own ‘shadow parliament’, which 
symbolically nullified all junta decisions made from 18 September 1988 onwards. 
The regime responded to Suu Kyi’s above-mentioned policies by harassing the 
NLD members, obstructing its events, briefly arresting dissidents and – at times – 
physically assaulting some of them. Censorship intensified as well as did threats and 
brutal ad personam attacks on Suu Kyi in the press. Gate rallies became obstructed 
and finally terminated in September 1996. Nationwide repressions targeting party 
members followed, with many jailed yet again. Suu Kyi was kept confined to 
Yangon and not allowed to travel outside of the city. She tried to break free in 
four publicized stand-offs in the summer of 1998. These ended in two draws 
(negotiated compromises) and two defeats on Suu Kyi’s part. In 2000 Suu Kyi 
again attempted to travel outside of Yangon. She failed once again and was put 
back in de facto (though not de jure) house arrest in September 2000. 
These political tugs-of-war were just another act of the Burmese power play: 
might versus right. The army had power but no authority, whereas Suu Kyi had 
authority but no power. She wanted to force the generals to make concessions and 
in order to do so she conducted a policy of high moral ground: her “politics of 
metta”.38 As she put it in one speech, “we have no power, we have no weapons. 
We also don’t have much money … . What are our foundations? It is Metta”.39 
Given “the unequal distribution of physical power, Suu Kyi could only act sym­
bolically” through this “mix of principles and pragmatic considerations”.40 The aim 
of her benevolent rhetoric was to present the public with an opposition which was 
morally superior. This was based on a hope – desperate if genuine, hypocritical if 
not – that by moral example the opposition would be able to soften the generals 
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and convince them to relinquish their power. In essence, this was “a non-violent 
threat to the generals’ legitimacy”.41 Thus, it was not as idealistic and naïve as it 
might have looked (especially when combined with international sanctions – rather 
hard political measures), but it failed nevertheless, as it did not force the generals to 
compromise. 
Politically, the regime had the upper hand again, but Suu Kyi did not think of 
surrendering. Although the regime was winning in the political realm, it could not 
defeat her fully and so could not enforce its vision of the country. Suu Kyi was in a 
losing position, but she never lost. Being unable to win yet being too strong to 
lose, Suu Kyi had to trust that time was on her side. The generals believed the 
same. Consequently, the sides entrenched their positions and stalemate continued. 
Some had had enough. 
“Renegades and traitors” 
After leaving house arrest, Suu Kyi’s de facto leadership in the NLD remained 
unquestionable. However, as the confrontation with the SPDC (State Peace and 
Development Council, SLORC’s new 1997 name) intensified with little tangible 
results for the NLD, some important NLD members and other Suu Kyi supporters 
started questioning her policies. 
First, there was a group of disillusioned party members who objected to Suu 
Kyi’s unilateral way of decision-making and who favoured a compromise with the 
regime – partial participation in power was better than none, they claimed. Headed 
by Than Tun and Thein Kyi, MPs and former political prisoners, the interparty 
opposition group tried to prevent the National Convention walkout and even later 
demanded a more realistic approach. Suu Kyi shouted at them and carried out an 
open ballot – favouring her, as only few people dared to oppose her openly – and 
won; in January 1997 they were expelled from the party for “disobeying policy” 
and “creating disunity”.42 
Soon, more serious splits followed. Ma Thanegi, Suu Kyi’s personal assistant, was 
the first major figure to defect due to disagreements over the sanctions policy and 
attitude towards SLORC (and apparently over personal issues as well). Even more 
significantly, though much more murky, was Suu Kyi’s split with Kyi Maung, one 
of her closest colleagues (she had named him her “guide, mentor and friend”).43 
Even so, by the end of 1997 they parted ways as the result of differences in their 
approach towards SLORC (Kyi Maung allegedly favoured a more moderate 
stance) and apparently over personal disagreements. Kyi Maung resigned, never 
revealing the reasons of their split, and neither did Suu Kyi, who downplayed his 
role, stating that Kyi Maung had never been her “key adviser”.44 In April 1999, 
another group from the opposition party – 28 MPs strong and headed by Tin Tun 
Maung, a CEC member – called for talks with the regime without Suu Kyi. She 
retaliated by labelling them “lackeys”, accusing them of “colluding” with the junta 
and suspending them from the party.45 Soon after, on 27 May 1999, she gave one 
of her harshest speeches: 
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It is very important for our members to be extra loyal. If we are disloyal at 
times of difficulties we become faithless persons. According to democratic 
principles, everyone has the right to have their own beliefs, to think inde­
pendently and to have freedom of expression. But if one acts disloyally in 
exercising those rights, one is a renegade, a traitor (…). At a time when great 
loyalty is needed, don’t make excuses for disloyalty.46 
And indeed, there was no place for disloyalty within the NLD: all intraparty 
opponents were expelled or silenced (and marginalized). Later, this spread to all 
democratic movements, both inside Myanmar and outside. The unique political 
situation of Myanmar, where all opposition to the regime remained on the 
shoulders of one person, gave rise “to a cultural practice that no one in the 
movement must challenge Daw Suu and her policies”; criticising her or doing 
things she would not approve of became “a taboo for pro-democracy activists”.47 
Inside the NLD, Suu Kyi held the party together with an authoritarian grip, not 
tolerating any criticism, quelling antagonists, eliminating factionalism and making 
the party an appendix to herself. As one onlooker commented: “The party defers 
to her on all things big and small; her view is to be ascertained prior to any deci­
sion” and the CEC members are “incapable of the least action without Daw 
Suu”.48 This, in fact, worked in her personal favour in the 2000s when, locked in 
house arrest, she left the party leadership to a loyal yet incompetent ‘old guard’. 
They resembled “inept caretakers” and did “little more than keeping the party 
alive on a drip”, not being able to function effectively without her.49 As Wikileaks 
revealed in 2010, by the late 2000s the politically weak party was headed by a 
“sclerotic leadership of the elderly NLD ‘Uncles’”, which “frustrated” active 
members. The party was “strictly hierarchical”, where “new ideas are not solicited 
or encouraged from younger members, and the Uncles regularly expel members 
they believe are ‘too active’”. According to these sources, “the Uncles spend end­
less hours discussing their entitlements from the 1990 elections and abstract policy 
which they are in no position to enact”: they hoped the UN would intervene and 
the USD would “invade” to place them in positions of power. At the same time, 
they showed “little concern for the social and economic plight of most Bur­
mese”.50 Unsurprisingly, by the late 2000s the NLD was labelled “a haphazard 
congregation under the guidance of a charismatic leader rather than a properly 
institutionalized political party” being in “critical state”.51 
The family issue 
All the controversies surrounding Suu Kyi were overshadowed by the single most 
tragic aspect of her political struggle: her family drama. In itself worthy of a Sha­
kespearian play, it is an invidious thing to present objectively; hence only a political 
analysis will be offered here. 
When Suu Kyi entered politics, she put it before family. Yet, she most probably 
believed that she would be able to reconcile her public activities with family life. 
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Once her confrontation with the regime escalated however, this proved to be 
impossible. Her family became the target of SLORC’s attacks. Her sons’ Burmese 
passports were withheld while visas for them and for Aris started to become a 
source of political manipulation. By separating her from her family, the generals 
hoped to break her: force her to concessions or, better still, to relinquish political 
activity. 
Her marriage, an important element of her hybrid heritage, was her asset inter­
nationally: Aris’ tireless lobbying convinced many to her cause (and allegedly, it 
was important in securing her Nobel Prize). Their enforced separations won her 
universal sympathy. In Myanmar however, her marriage was a burden. It exposed 
her to xenophobic sentiments among the ruling establishment and beyond. 
Understanding – let alone accepting – Suu Kyi’s hybrid Burmese-ness was too 
much for the generals. They hoped to arouse similar resentments within society, 
stopping at nothing to make this Suu Kyi’s political weak point. After 1995 an 
avalanche of brutal, heinous anti-Suu Kyi PR campaigns commenced: she was 
regularly slandered, vilified and calumniated in regime media outlets as a “traitor”, 
“renegade”, “puppet”, “lackey”, “race destroyer”, “destructionist”, “obstruc­
tionist”, “ogress”, “prostitute”, “witch” and so on.52 
Suu Kyi responded by neutralizing the impact of her marriage to an Englishman. 
She constantly distanced herself from her husband in her interviews; emphasized 
that Myanmar was more important to her than her family; downplayed the per­
sonal costs of her political struggle by presenting the separation from her family as 
irrelevant in comparison with the suffering of other Burmese. She considered 
divorcing Aris due to political reasons (but dropped it); during her house arrest, she 
refrained from correspondence with him and even did not once allow him to stay 
at her home. Since the mid-1990s, she forbade him from speaking to the media; 
finally, when Aris was dying of cancer in 1999, Suu Kyi decided not to bid him 
farewell, fearing that once she left Myanmar the generals would not allow her to 
come back.53 
Her choices must have had enormous personal costs. When judged from a 
purely political perspective however, her actions were a winning strategy of mini­
mizing the damage of a politically incorrect marriage by sacrificing it to her poli­
tical cause. By doing so, Suu Kyi countered the regime’s propaganda, washed away 
the error of her youth in the eyes of many Burmese people and proved that she 
indeed put her country first. At a high personal cost, she turned her political 
weakness into an asset. 
Latterly, in the late 2000s and 2010s, she followed this by building up her 
position as “mother of Myanmar”, who symbolically sacrifices her own needs for 
the good of her new children: the Burmese people.54 This fitted nicely into the 
social archetype of proper behaviour: quitting material comforts for a spiritual 
quest.55 And this, together with her feminine dress and emphatically Burmese 
image compensating her hybridity, was how she bypassed gender limitations and 
other traps set for women in Myanmar politics. She successfully navigated herself 
into a position of a socially acceptable female authority figure.56 
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The celebrity 
By 1989 Suu Kyi had become recognizable to the outside world. House arrest only 
added to her publicity. A combination of factors – non-violence, her charisma, 
popularity, media skills and tragic family story, plus the brutality and PR incom­
petence of SLORC – guaranteed such international fame. The dividing line 
became crystal clear: a courageous, pretty, tragic woman against a bunch of Third 
World despots. Consequently, the political struggle in Myanmar became insepar­
ably linked with Suu Kyi, who dominated the picture for outside world. 
In the early 1990s, a growing Suu Kyi-centred lobbying movement made its first 
gestures and signs of support; starting with an honorary degree at Oxford’s St  
Hugh’s College (1990), via the Thorolf Rafto Prize (1990), up to the Sakharov 
Prize (1990) and, ultimately, the Nobel Peace Prize (1991). The latter was parti­
cularly important, as it contributed significantly to a dominant yet false vision of 
Suu Kyi being a dissident fighting for human rights. Many, if not most, of her 
supporters and lobbyists unconsciously encouraged such a narrative. By her influ­
ential writing, using language, metaphors and ideals widely understandable outside 
of Burma, she was able to convince half the world, the Nobel Committee inclu­
ded,57 that her political struggle for power in Burma represented higher, huma­
nistic values; that it was a quest for good.58 Politically, it was a masterpiece of PR 
and it secured Suu Kyi’s political interests for two decades. As for Myanmar, the 
results were more mixed. The first ever Nobel Prize for a Burmese influenced 
Myanmar politics, though probably not the way the Committee intended and 
hoped. The Prize strengthened Suu Kyi’s position. From then on, the proverbially 
stubborn59 Suu Kyi believed that time was on her side, which made her even more 
inflexible. If she had come to terms with the logic of a non-level playing field 
earlier, Myanmar might not have lost two decades of underdevelopment. On the 
other hand, global admiration perhaps saved Suu Kyi from marginalization projected 
onto her by the junta. 
After the Nobel honour, a deluge of awards, prizes and honorary degrees fol­
lowed. Suu Kyi’s publicity was not limited to the circle of elites – movies, novels, 
albums, plays and posters are the pop culture tributes to Suu Kyi. Interestingly, her 
popularity outside Myanmar, just like inside the country, was a grassroots 
phenomenon.60 
The mainstream narrative of Suu Kyi, as a story of a beautiful woman fighting 
peacefully against a bunch of generals at a high personal cost, was so suggestively 
Hollywoodish that it transformed her story from its political ground into a morality 
tale, a fairy tale. Suu Kyi became Burma’s Gandhi, Burma’s Jean of Arc, an icon, a 
saint, an epitome of the universal battle of good and evil. That made her a factor in 
Western countries’ policies towards Myanmar, which is more she could have ever 
dreamed of in 1988. 
But there was a flip side of her global popularity. These ways of portraying Suu 
Kyi depoliticized her.61 Being locked in house arrest, she could not only make no 
bad moves or mistakes, but she also ceased being seen as a serious politician. It 
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stripped her of her ‘politicalness’. Instead it placed her in the realm of celebrity, 
alongside movie stars, singers and other showbusiness individuals. She was uncon­
sciously expected to behave accordingly, to give a moral example. This celeb­
rification spoke more about the hopes that foreigners projected onto Aung San Suu 
Kyi, than about herself. 
The phenomenon of Suu Kyi’s iconic status has been analysed in several ways, 
by communication theory and iconic presentations62 as well as by feminist 
theory.63 While agreeing with these approaches, I would like to propose another 
way of looking at it: through hybridity and postcolonial theory. Suu Kyi’s deifi­
cation would not be possible if she did not possess the ability to speak to the world 
in a language it understands. Being a hybrid politician, Suu Kyi knew how to win 
the hearts and minds of the West and beyond: she wrote passionate articles about 
non-violence, the compatibility of democracy with Buddhism and brought down 
the house with calls for freedom from fear. Her political ideas were intelligent, 
eclectic; they were a justification of her struggle, which mixed local and interna­
tional legitimization with wit, a sense of humour and literary talent. Although her 
hybrid political philosophy was not the most important aspect of her global pub­
licity – this role certainly went to her dramatic personal story – Suu Kyi’s political 
ideas certainly played their part, even if a subsidiary one. For, in the 1990s and 
2000s, it seemed that Suu Kyi was a perfect, non-Western propagator of democ­
racy, human rights, rule of law and other Western-cum-universal values. When we 
dig into her political ideas, however, we may find that although Suu Kyi and the West 
had been speaking the same language and saying identical things for more than two 
decades, they had something very different in mind. Take democracy for example. 
Suu Kyi’s vision of democracy does have a Western rights-based component. Yet it 
plays a secondary role only. Her idea of democracy is built not on external 
mechanisms or institutions, like in the West, but on very Burmese, Buddhists funda­
mentals (one should start the improvement of the world from one’s own transfor­
mation). It is based on the internal, inward-based moral qualities of an individual, 
who is an agent of societal change. Establishing democracy understood in this way 
necessitates a disciplinarian approach based on unity, responsibilities and sacrifices. 
Consequently, if one then disagrees or disunites, then one is not moral enough. 
That is why Suu Kyi spoke rarely and vaguely about concrete ways of democratic 
governance (institutions, mechanisms, etc.) and more about individual responsi­
bility and the necessity of choosing a leader morally most equipped for governing. 
We may easily dismiss these ideas as hypocrisy – a smokescreen for the power-
hungry and so on. But this would be unjust. There is something much deeper at 
stake here. We should not condemn Suu Kyi for not respecting our values, because 
she has been fighting for her vision of democracy all along. Democracy, as other 
Western-cum-universal values, became so blurred and eclectic in the postcolonial 
world, so much of a hybrid, that it came to be an entity in itself. When Suu Kyi 
wrote that “there will be as many kinds of democracies as there are nations … each 
democratic country will have its own individual characteristics”64 she described this 
phenomenon quite well. 
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The unsuccessful Renaissance Man 
The 2000–2002 informal second house arrest of Suu Kyi is important for a single 
reason. Unlike her other arrests, this one ended thanks to external mediation. The 
United Nations, after a series of depressingly unsuccessful attempts to influence the 
situation in Myanmar, seemed to achieve a breakthrough thanks to its special 
envoy, Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail. 
Razali decidedly hit it off with Suu Kyi, whose hybridity he additionally clearly 
enjoyed.65 He was acceptable as an envoy for the generals too. Perhaps unsurpris­
ingly then, it turned out that Razali’s company won the bid to produce e-passports 
for Myanmar. When criticised for this clear conflict of interests, the undaunted 
diplomat retorted: “I am a Renaissance Man who is able to do different things at 
the same time”.66 
His backstage diplomacy, several unpublicized meetings with Suu Kyi and the 
generals, and between the generals and Suu Kyi, led to some conciliatory gestures 
from both sides, and eventually to Suu Kyi’s release on 6 May 2002. The unwrit­
ten and unspecified deal was feeble from the very beginning and produced only a 
short-lived political thaw. Both sides were unwilling to grant serious concessions. 
The SPDC, now much more firmly in control of the country, demanded accep­
tance of its constitutional scheme and saw the NLD’s role as auxiliary. This is 
because by the early 2000s the generals were strengthened by profits from the 
Yadana gas field project67 and regional trade, and hence no longer feared an 
overthrow. They allowed Suu Kyi to travel and eagerly showed her developmental 
projects (bridges, roads and dams), but were unwilling to seriously share power 
with her. Suu Kyi decisively rejected their plans to be a politically powerless fig­
urehead and demanded that they hand back power to the NLD in accordance with 
the 1990 elections. In short, the regime wanted Suu Kyi to be a figurant, who 
approves of the governmental line; she wanted them to share power. Thus, she 
made ‘a calculated risk’: in order to force them to the negotiating table, she again 
embarked on a nationwide tour in the hope of strengthening her own political 
position by public pressure.68 Again it proved to be a vicious cycle: while her 
popularity reached new highs, prospects of a deal with the regime drew further 
away as the junta saw her actions as undermining the SPDC’s legitimacy. 
Initially the SPDC tolerated her activities, albeit with difficulties starting in 
Autumn 2002. Tensions built during Suu Kyi’s Shan State trip in November. Her 
December Rakhine tour was even more nerve-wracking (it ended with a bizarre 
fire engine incident in Mrauk-U) – with Suu Kyi heralding support for maintain­
ing international sanctions and the junta’s accusations of breaking their unwritten 
agreement. Incidents intensified during Suu Kyi’s next trip – to Chin State (April 
2003). By then, it became clear that the unwritten Suu Kyi–SPDC deal had 
collapsed. 
Suu Kyi’s triumphant tour put the regime back on the defensive – with dire 
consequences. Razali negotiated with Khin Nyunt, leader of the “pragmatic”69 
faction within the regime, which consisted of influential military intelligence 
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personnel as well as a few trained professionals within the army (Hla Min, Thein 
Swe, Win Aung). Being more understanding of international issues, this faction 
favoured striking a deal with Suu Kyi (on the regime’s conditions, naturally) due to 
the poor international standing of Myanmar.70 The opposed ‘hard-line’ faction 
(Maung Aye, Soe Win, Kyi Aung) did not care at all. Neither did they feel the 
need or the will to share any power and did not mind Myanmar’s isolation. Their 
attitude was encapsulated in Soe Win’s January 2003 statement: “the SLORC/SPDC 
not only won’t talk to the NLD but also would never hand over power to the 
NLD”.71 Senior General Than Shwe, who started SLORC/SPDC chairmanship in 
1992 and initially was primus inter pares, became the paramount leader by the late 
1990s. He did so by playing one faction off against another, steadily limiting the 
importance of regional generals and increasing his personal power. Meanwhile, 
Khin Nyunt’s faction, weakened by Ne Win’s imprisonment and then death in 
2002, regained some strength thanks to an unwritten deal with Suu Kyi. They later 
lost their influence again due to Suu Kyi’s 2002/2003 tour. By May 2003 para­
mount leader Than Shwe apparently was convinced by hard-liners that enough 
was enough. 
Consequently, Suu Kyi’s last tour, to Mandalay, Sagaing and Kachin, was beset 
with various incidents. It ended with the dramatic, bloody ‘Depayin massacre’ on 
30 May 2003, which almost cost Suu Kyi her life: her convoy was attacked by a 
violent pro-regime mob that killed more than a dozen (the number 70 is fre­
quently quoted) NLD members in an extremely brutal way. Suu Kyi most prob­
ably survived thanks to her driver (who broke away from the siege) and also to the 
assassins’ incompetence (they did not block all the escape routes).72 However, 
despite this being a plausible explanation for what happened there, the mystery of 
Depayin remains unsolved. 
Whatever the outcome of the junta’s interfactional struggle, after Depayin Suu 
Kyi was arrested, put into Insein prison, then hospital and finally under house 
arrest, where she remained until 2010. It was there that she was taken care of by 
two aids and a physician, and lived a disciplined, half-hermit styled life. Politically 
speaking, the 2002–2003 thaw ended amid widespread international condemna­
tion. Soon after Khin Nyunt’s fall (see below), a hopeless Razali, who had pre­
viously built his position on close relations with him, resigned in January 2006. A 
similar failure awaited his successor, Ibrahim Gambari, as well as other UN officials 
who tried to mediate in Burmese affairs (Ban Ki-moon, Vijay Nambiar) or 
attempted to improve Myanmar’s dramatic human rights record (Paulo Sérgio 
Pinherio, Tomas Ojea Quintana). Myanmar became a “political graveyard” of 
international negotiators.73 
In the mid-2000s, political stalemate in Myanmar persisted. Nothing helped. 
Behind-the-scenes negotiations, international mediations, pressure and incentives 
and even the assassination attempt on Suu Kyi’s life at Depayin did not resolve the 
impasse. The two sides entrenched their positions and Myanmar paid the price, 
losing year after year. 
60 The non-level playing field 
Notes 
1 Aris, “Introduction”, in: Freedom from Fear, pp. xxiii–xxv.	 
2 Christina Fink, Living Silence in Burma. Surviving Under Military Regime (Chiang Mai:	 
Silkworm Books, 2009), pp. 70–73. 
3 “Burmese ban top opposition candidate”, The New York Times, 18 January 1990. 
4 “The vote on 27 May was essentially a personal vote for Aung San Suu Kyi”, Julian 
Hartland-Swann, “Democracy Burmese style – the great illusion?” dispatch, Con­
fidential, FAB 014/6, 1 August 1990 “Internal affairs” FCO, The National Archive, 
Kew. 
5 Tonkin, “The 1990 elections in Myanmar”, p. 47.	 
6 State LORC Declaration No. 1/90 of July 27, 1990, OBL.	 
7 For the latter interpretation and for impressive collection of contemporary sources, see:	 
Derek Tonkin, “The 1990 elections in Myanmar: Broken promises or a failure of 
communication?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 29, no. 1 (April 2007), pp. 33–54 
and other articles by this author. 
8	 “It is certain, therefore, that a transfer of power, if and when it comes, will only be 
conceded on conditions which guarantee the Army’s interests and continuing political 
role”, David H. Colvin, comment of “Democracy Burmese style – the great illusion?” 
dispatch, Confidential, FAB 014/6, 1 August 1990 “Internal affairs” FCO, The National 
Archive, Kew. 
9	 “Whoever is elected will first have to draw up a constitution that will have to be 
adopted before the transfer of power” (1 July 1989), Suu Kyi, “The people want 
freedom”, p. 225. 
10	 Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, pp. 123 and 149 (Letters no. 31 and 37). Suu Kyi’s 
interpretation was accepted globally. 
11	 Quoted in: Tonkin, “The 1990 elections”, pp. 47–48. 
12	 Ibid., p. 49. Kyi Maung told the British Ambassador just after the elections that “they 
were prepared to be generous and flexible”, and “would not at that point put forward 
any conditions”, Julian Hartland-Swann, “Burmese elections: NLD intentions”, Con­
fidential Dispatch 30 May 1990, FAB 014/1, “Internal affairs” FCO, The National 
Archive, Kew. 
13	 Ye Htut, Myanmar’s Political Transition and Lost Opportunities (2010–2016) (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2019), p. 7. 
14	 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The state of pro-democracy movement”, p. 97. 
15	 Ibid. p. 99. 
16	 Derek Tonkin, email correspondence, 4 March 2019. 
17	 Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Struggle, p. 129. 
18	 As the British Ambassador informed, after Kyi Maung’s arrest the party was “in a state of 
shock”, Julian Hartland-Swann to David Colvin, “The NLD after the arrests”, 22  
September 1990, FAB 014/1, “Internal affairs”, FCO, The National Archive, Kew. 
19	 Derek Tonkin, email correspondence, 20 March 2019. 
20	 Clements, The Voice of Hope, p. 185. 
21	 Suu Kyi, “The need for dialogue,” p. 251. 
22	 Ye Htut, Myanmar’s Political Transition, pp. 8–9. 
23	 Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Struggle, p. 130. 
24	 “If the people take to the streets again, the SLORC will again mow them down,” 
Hartland-Swann, “Democracy Burmese style – the great illusion?”. 
25	 Houtman, Mental Culture, pp. 328 and 382. A bodhisattva is an individual on the path to 
becoming a buddha; nats are local, worshipped spirits – a folk religion in Burma. 
26	 Clements, The Voice of Hope, p. 81; Suu Kyi, “The need for dialogue”, in: Freedom from 
Fear, p. 249; Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues with the People, pp. 95, 175 and 323. 
27	 Ye Htut, Myanmar’s Political Transition, p. 14. 
28	 Blum, Teaching Democracy, pp. 31–48; Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, p. 192. Most of her 
speeches were published in: Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues with the People, pp. 18–543. 
The non-level playing field 61 
29	 Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Struggle, pp. 96–98. 
30	 Clements, The Voice of Hope, pp. 48, 55, 119, 144, 189; Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, 
pp 3–19, 161; Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Struggle, pp. 96–98; Houtman, 
Mental Culture, p. 294. 
31	 “Aung San Suu Kyi”, Prospect, 20 July 2001. 
32	 Clements, The Voice of Hope, pp. 25 and 218; Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, pp. 87–89; 
“Suu Kyi urges Britons to boycott Burma”, The Independent, 17 March 1996. She called 
for sanctions already in 1989, “Aung San Suu Kyi calls for trade boycott”, Bangkok Post, 
4 June 1989. 
33	 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps. A Personal History of Burma (New York, NY: 
FSG, 2007), pp. 342–346. 
34	 Clements, The Voice of Hope, pp. 193, 207; Suu Kyi, “The people want freedom”, 
p. 226; “A conversation with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi”, The New York Times, 30  
September 2012; Pederson, Burma Spring, p. 190. 
35	 Thant Myint-U, The Hidden History of Burma, p. 61. 
36	 Zöllner, The Beast and the Beauty, pp. 245–246. 
37	 David Steinberg, “Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. policy toward Burma/Myanmar”, Journal 
of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, no. 3 (2010), pp. 35–59. 
38	 McCarthy, The Political Theory of Tyranny, pp. 168–169. 
39	 Statement by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at the Closing Ceremony of the 9th NLD Party 
Congress, 29 September 1997, OBL. 
40	 Zöllner, The Beast and the Beauty, pp. 269–274. 
41	 McCarthy, The Political Theory of Tyranny, pp. 171–172. 
42	 “How things look inside the NLD”, Asiaweek, 16 July 1999; “Burma caught in a state of 
limbo”, The Nation, 28 April 1998. 
43	 Levy, “Aung San Suu Kyi”; Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, pp. 71–75 and 188–191. 
44	 Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Struggle, p. 90; Levy, “Aung San Suu Kyi”. 
45	 “Aung San Suu Kyi”, Prospect, 20 July 2001; “How things look inside the NLD”. 
46	 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Speech on 27–5-1999, OBL. 
47	 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The state of the pro-democracy movement”, p. 98. 
48	 Ibid., p. 97. 
49	 Ibid. 
50	 Continuing the Pursuit of Democracy in Burma. Confidential. 08RANGOON557_a 14 July 
2008, Wikileaks.Org The “Uncles” were members of the former military faction, which 
gradually lost its influence within the party. This suited Suu Kyi as nobody challenged 
her leadership, but was fatal to the military faction, which then no longer existed in the 
NLD, Derek Tonkin, personal correspondence 15 January 2020. 
51	 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The state of the pro-democracy movement”, p. 97. 
52	 BPS, vol. IX, no. 7, July 1995; BPS, vol. X, no. 6, June 1996; BPS, vol. X, no. 7, July 
1996; BPS, vol. X, no. 10, October 1996; Myanmar Alin, 30 June 1996, BNN; Myanmar 
Alin, 12 July 1999; The New Light of Myanmar, 9 May 1997, BNN; The New Light of 
Myanmar, 21 July 1996, BNN; The New Light of Myanmar, 19 August 1996, BNN; 
“Myanmar news release”, vol. 10, no. 17, 29 July, BNN; Kyemon, 14 October 1996, 
BNN; Houtman, Mental Culture, pp. 27–43, 86, 277–280. 
53	 Clements, The Voice of Hope, pp. 139–147; BPS, vol. IV, no. 7, July 1990; BPS, vol. VI, 
no. 5, May 1992; Victor, The Lady, pp. 82–141; “Dark victory”; Wintle, Perfect Hostage, 
p. 366. 
54 Harriden, The Authority of Influence, pp. 225–227. 
55 Thant Myint-U, The Hidden History of Burma, pp. 42–43. 
56 Sengupta, The Female Voice of Myanmar, pp. 241–243, 323–325. 
57 Francis Sejersted, “The 1991 Nobel Prize for Peace”, in: Freedom from Fear, pp. 228–234. 
58 See e.g. Aung San Suu Kyi, “Please use your liberty to promote ours”, The New York 
Times, 4 February 1997; Aung San Suu Kyi, “Freedom from fear”; “In quest for 
democracy”; “Towards a true refugee”, all in: Freedom from Fear, pp. 167–186; 239–249. 
62 The non-level playing field 
59	 Even she admitted it: ‘I suppose I do have a stubborn streak in me’. “Aung San Suu Kyi 
in the UK”, The Telegraph, 19 June 2012. 
60	 Houtman, Mental Culture, p. 3; Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps, p. 143. 
61	 Lisa Brooten, “The feminization of democracy under siege: The media, “the Lady” of 
Burma, and U.S. foreign policy”, NWSA Journal, vol. 17, no.3 (2005), pp. 134–156. 
62	 Zöllner, The Beast and the Beauty, pp. 195–229 and 277–359. 
63	 Brooten, “The feminization of democracy”, pp. 134–156. 
64	 Suu Kyi, “Empowerment for a culture of peace and development’, in: Freedom from Fear, 
pp. 268–269. 
65	 “Meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi”, The Irrawaddy, 15 April 2007. 
66	 “Razali Ismail, Renaissance Man”, The Wall Street Journal, 16 June 2003. 
67	 The Yadana gas field project, a joint-venture between Burmese, US, French and Thai 
companies, is the extraction of offshore gas that started in mid-1990s. It was notorious 
for human rights abuses (e.g. forced labour). The revenues from Yadana allowed the 
generals to survive (the project was exempted from the Western sanctions). 
68	 “Aung San Suu Kyi takes calculated risk in shifting stance against junta”, AFP, 24 April 
2003. 
69	 Terms hardliners/moderates (pragmatists) should be used with (serious) reservations, 
Kyaw Yin Hlaing “Political impasse in Myanmar,” pp. 23–26. 
70	 “Read this, you dinosaurs!”, Asiaweek, 18 February 2000; Charney, A History of Modern 
Burma, p. 181; Ye Htut, Myanmar’s Political Transition, pp. 18–19. 
71	 “Who is who in junta’s line-up”, The Irrawaddy, 26 August 2003. 
72	 Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre, 4 June 2003, OBL; 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar – Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, UN  
General Assembly, E/CN.4/2004/33, 1 May 2004; Popham, The Lady and the Peacock, 
p. 361. 
73 Aung Zaw, The Face of Resistance, p. 113. 
5 
THE ROADMAP	 
After the Depayin massacre Myanmar entered a dark period of despair, symbolized 
by Suu Kyi’s third and final house arrest, lasting from 2003 until 2010. It was 
during this time, though, that a specific Burmese political transition was planned 
and implemented. The SPDC–NLD political stalemate finally prompted the generals 
to carry on the transition without Suu Kyi: she was bound to be forgotten. 
Aung San Suu Kyi amnesia 
Following Depayin, the regime cracked down on NLD members, placing Suu Kyi, 
Tin Oo and U Lwin under house arrest and jailing many others, shutting down the 
NLD offices and again effectively decapitating the party. International outrage 
commenced, followed by new US sanctions. The SPDC responded by a cabinet 
reshuffle: nominating Khin Nyunt as prime minister (the position previously held 
by Than Shwe) to reduce international pressure. For Khin Nyunt it was a demo­
tion (in the process he lost his Secretary post, having previously been Secretary 
no. 1 in the SPDC), which confirmed his weakening position. He nevertheless 
hoped to restore his standing by conducting a successful foreign policy: improving 
relations with the West.1 Five days after nomination he announced a roadmap to 
democracy, which consisted of seven points: resumption and conclusion of the 
National Convention; drafting a constitution; holding a referendum on it and then 
parliamentary elections; convening the Hluttaw (parliament) and electing a demo­
cratic government.2 The reason for a roadmap was to ensure the Tatmadaw’s 
control over the political process in Myanmar, while the lack of a timetable 
allowed the regime to keep watch over the pace of implementation. 
During his prime ministerial tenure, Khin Nyunt apparently negotiated with Suu 
Kyi in secrecy for the return of the NLD to the National Convention. According 
to Suu Kyi, they were “almost there”: the deal was negotiated by Khin Nyunt’s 
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envoys Kyaw Win, Tin Hlaing, Than Htun and Suu Kyi, but was allegedly rejec­
ted – to Suu Kyi’s anger – by Than Shwe.3 If true, it may mean one thing. It is 
probable that, in the mid-2000s, Suu Kyi had already come to realise that she 
would not be able to force the generals to accept handing power to the NLD; 
instead she would have to come to terms with them, on their conditions. In other 
words, Suu Kyi might have belatedly understood the rules of Myanmar’s non-level 
playing field. Yet the other side was uninterested. Suu Kyi complained that “any­
thing short of capitulation was seen as confrontation”4 by the regime. And she was 
correct. The SPDC thought it could live without her, all disadvantages (lack of 
domestic legitimacy, external condemnation) notwithstanding. Several explanations 
of the Tatmadaw’s uncompromising stance are cited in literature,5 yet the most 
plausible seems to be the legacy of political confrontation in the 1990s/early 2000s. 
The generals were too arrogant to relinquish power, but also the NLD lacked the 
persuasive power to convince them. Instead of mending fences, the NLD acted on 
the contrary: they kept delegitimizing the generals, both domestically and inter­
nationally. As well as calls for sanctions, a model example of the NLD burning 
bridges are its leaders’ interviews and speeches where they openly accused the 
generals of “fear”.6 You do not tell international media and citizens that your 
(stronger) enemies-cum-potential dialogue partners, who furthermore happen to 
be soldiers, are cowards, even if it is true (perhaps especially if it is). The NLD’s 
stance was psychologically and morally understandable – the generals were despots 
with blood on their hands, they terrorized and repressed society and wronged 
many NLD members. Yet they were firmly in control and, as the Machiavellian 
saying goes, “who holds power does not have to apologise to anyone”. The NLD’s 
rhetoric and actions made them fear that losing power equalled retribution. This, 
combined with no dialogue at all, produced a lack of clarity about goals as each 
side kept telling the other what it wanted, which led intransigence on both sides. It 
ended with ‘reciprocal obstinacy’: both sides were unwilling to compromise and 
this turned the political contest into a zero-sum game. Consequently, perhaps the 
biggest problem in Myanmar’s personalized policymaking, was a total lack of trust.7 
The lack of trust was combined with another most important fatal consequence 
of the Tatmadaw–NLD confrontation that had been ongoing since 1988: the 
NLD’s unwillingness to play along with the rules set by the generals. Several of 
Suu Kyi’s conciliatory gestures, both in 1995 and in 2002, amounted to next to 
nothing given her rejection of the military non-level playing field. The generals 
could only have allowed her to rule under their own conditions, yet in the long 
run she wanted to replace them. These were irreconcilable standpoints. Once Than 
Shwe and other SPDC leaders realized Suu Kyi would not abide by the Tatmadaw 
rules, they decided to carry on without her. 
Failure to convince Than Shwe to try and make yet another settlement with 
Suu Kyi foreshadowed the end of Khin Nyunt’s political career. After an unsuc­
cessful attempt to bring the NLD onto the re-conveyed National Convention and 
equally fruitless attempts to reconcile with the USA (where Suu Kyi herself became 
a factor in Washington’s foreign policy in the 2000s),8 Khin Nyunt was purged 
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along with his MI (Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence) on 19 October 
2004.9 The roadmap was halted for a while; as were any ideas of partially sharing 
power. What could be called ‘Aung San Suu Kyi amnesia’ set in among the regime 
10. The SPDC wanted to marginalize her and make society and the world forget 
about her. Because of governmental reasons (regime survival), Than Shwe’s (and 
other generals’) personal animosity towards Suu Kyi, gender biases and her hybrid 
Burmese-ness, so different from their own xenophobic nationalism, the ruling 
generals clearly disliked Suu Kyi as a political opponent.11 
Whatever the reason, their ‘Suu Kyi amnesia’ plan did not quite work; an episode 
on 22 September 2007, when demonstrating monks marched to her house to greet 
her, proved the ineffectiveness of this policy. However, the rulings of the SPDC 
remained seriously unquestioned in the 2000s. Myanmar entered a dark period of 
despair, oblivion, exclusion and prolonged poverty on one hand, with the Tatmadaw’s 
unlimited power, symbolized by their new capital, Naypyidaw, on the other.12 
The 2007 mass protests of monks motivated, or rather hastened, Than Shwe’s 
implementation of a long-term exit plan. In September 2007 he rejuvenated the 
National Convention. A new constitutional project quickly formed. It was almost 
the same to the one first proposed by the Tatmadaw in 1993 which was rejected 
by the NLD. Now, after a decade and a half of stalemate, which had cost Myan­
mar dearly, “Than Shwe pushed through what he and the other generals had 
always had in mind”; he engineered “a very specific transition, to a more diffused 
and popularly acceptable structure”.13 A transformation from direct military rule to 
“something else”: a  “sui generis case”,14 a Burmese “shibboleth of democracy”.15 It 
is debatable whether Than Shwe indeed “was the mastermind of Myanmar’s tran­
sition to democracy”16 (however badly that sounds) or whether the post-2011 
changes went further than he intended.17 The latter is certainly the interpretation 
preferred by Suu Kyi.18 
The proposed constitution was put to a referendum on 10 May 2008, despite 
the fact that Myanmar had been hit by Cyclone Nargis on 2 May 2008 – the worst 
natural disaster in Myanmar history. It devastated the Irrawaddy Delta, killing more 
than 130,000 people, and produced international outcry for the junta’s inability to 
conduct a humanitarian assistance campaign and their initial unwillingness to accept 
foreign help. 
The rigged vote (officially 92 per cent voted ‘yes’) legitimized the 2008 Con­
stitution – the most military-dominated constitution in the world!19 – which 
introduced ‘disciplined democracy’ to Myanmar. By giving the army 25 per cent of 
allocated seats in the National Assembly (a blocking minority, as any amendment 
of the Constitution requires the consent of more than 75 per cent of MPs, 
according to Chapter IV, section 109b); three ministries – defence, border affairs 
and home affairs (Chapter V, section 232 b and ii); one vice president seat (Chapter 
III, section 60 b and c); administrative autonomy (section 343, a and b) and 
majority in the NDSC (National Defence and Security Council, Chapter V, sec­
tion 201), the Constitution ensured the Tatmadaw dominated the political system 
of Myanmar. 
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In name, it was a presidential system. It entrusted the President with substantial 
power, including power to declare emergency in consultation with the NDSC. Just 
in case, it also made certain that the President could not be Suu Kyi, as the Con­
stitution prohibited any formal foreign liaisons of family members (Chapter III, 
section 59, f). An emergency could be declared in case of endangering the Three 
National Causes (non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national 
solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty), where all powers would transfer to the 
commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw (Chapter XI, sections 409–422). Hence, in 
reality, the system ensured the Tatmadaw’s dominance regardless of who was in 
power, military or otherwise. In the best scenario for the Tatmadaw (that is, a 
military-backed government), it provided a cover up of factual military rule; in the 
worst (a military-opposed government), it checked and balanced every civilian 
government decision. The military legally sanctioned its privileged position in 
Myanmar politics, as the ultimate political referee, one ‘above politics’. In a way, 
this Constitution is a political masterpiece for protecting the army’s self-interest. 
Having legitimized its rule by a constitution, the army prepared for another step 
on the roadmap: general elections. Unfortunately for the generals, Suu Kyi’s house 
arrest term was set to expire a year before the elections, which could complicate 
this orchestrated political show. Something needed to be done with her. For­
tunately, a solution came out of the blue, or rather out of the lake. John Yettaw, 
an American with a challenging mental condition, swam (twice) to Suu Kyi’s 
house – in a scene worthy of a Monty Python sketch – which gave the junta a 
pretext to extend Suu Kyi’s house arrest,20 meaning she would be freed only after 
the planned elections. 
However, the Yettaw incident had some unintended consequences: talks com­
menced between the junta and the USA leading to some tentative signs of thaw in 
their relations. Unfortunately, the election issue stood in the way of reconciliation. 
The junta steamrolled their roadmap plan, which left the NLD with an funda­
mental dilemma. The party could either participate in the elections, gaining a 
chance to take part in the real political process but bidding farewell to any 
remaining hopes of resurrecting the results of the 1990 elections. Or they could 
boycott the 2010 elections and risk political marginalization. In was a simple 
choice: finally accepting the non-level playing field or carrying on with dreams to 
force the junta to concessions. 
There was no unanimity in the party. A faction led by Khin Maung Swe and 
Than Nyein (both long-term NLD members, MPs from 1990 and former political 
prisoners) preferred the former, whereas the radical faction under Win Tin 
(released from harsh imprisonment after 19 years) demanded the latter (sticking to 
the 2009 ‘Shwegondine Declaration’). It seems the moderates held the majority, 
clandestinely being backed by Aung Shwe, but it meant next to nothing because 
Suu Kyi decided on a boycott (“Six Points”). In her typical way of handling party 
affairs, Suu Kyi enforced decision making by acclamation, not a secret ballot, 
which ensured nobody dared to oppose her will. Once again she proved skilful in 
keeping full control over the NLD, even from house arrest. 
The roadmap 67 
The NLD announced their boycott of the 2010 elections and was delegalized. 
Khin Maung Swe, together with his supporters, quit the party and founded a new 
one: the National Democratic Force (NDF). Furious with the “traitors”, Suu Kyi 
called the faction “incompatible with democratic process”.21 But she won, not 
them. The NDF contested the unfair elections on 7 November 2010 and received 
only slightly over 2 per cent of the votes, ceasing to matter politically. Although 
there were assertions that the junta had deprived the NDF of victory in some of 
Yangon's important constituencies by falsifying the results of the absentee ballot, in 
reality this would have not changed the outcome much. The Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP), a political wing of the army, would have won 
anyway, perhaps having less than 76 per cent votes but enough to have majority in 
the parliament.22 The generals did not have to invoke Stalin’s formula (“the people 
who count the votes decide everything”), for they themselves had established such 
a non-level playing field that defeating them became next to impossible. 
Suu Kyi was released from her final house arrest a week later (13 November 
2010) and was welcomed by cheering crowds. Despite that, on the international 
stage it was popular at that time to paint her as a marginalized political figure who 
had lost.23 Nevertheless, paraphrasing Mark Twain, the reports of Suu Kyi’s political  
death proved to be grossly exaggerated. 
A new hope 
The 2008 constitution established a Tatmadaw-dominated political system. In 
accordance with their roadmap, a ‘civilianization’ process followed. On 30 March 
2011, the junta dissolved itself and the generals took off their uniforms to take up 
posts in the newly civilian administration. But not all. 
To universal surprise, Than Shwe did not become President, as was widely 
expected, even by the Tatmadaw. Instead he retired and made sure his deputy, 
Maung Aye, did the same. For the presidency he chose his trusted subordinate, 
Thein Sein. This was the second surprise as Thein Sein, a colourless bureaucrat, 
ranked only fourth in the junta behind thura Shwe Mann (no. 3), who was widely 
considered the most probable successor. Shwe Mann, however, was only appeased 
with the post of Speakership of Pyithu Hluttaw (the lower house of the parlia­
ment), leaving him second in the newly civilianized hierarchy. By doing so, Than 
Shwe behaved as if following an autocrat’s textbook: placing an ambitious con­
tender behind a loyal bureaucrat, so that they checked one another, leaving Than 
Shwe to settle their disputes. And – just in case – Than Shwe nominated Min 
Aung Hlaing, another loyal protégée, as the Tatmadaw’s commander-in-chief. 
With his men occupying top posts and balancing one another, and with Suu Kyi 
seemingly outmanoeuvred, Than Shwe could safely retire.24 
For this reason most commentators harboured few illusions. The civilianization 
process seemed a sham transformation: “an old wine in the new bottle”.25 There 
was some progress. Yet that was too little to convince the sceptics. Thus, when 
Thein Sein concededly announced his will to reform, few believed him. The first 
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half of 2011 went by the old way, with tensions between the government and Suu 
Kyi dominating the scene. She was initially unwilling to give the new administra­
tion the benefit of the doubt, criticising the government in interviews with foreign 
media, keeping her position on sanctions and the 1990 elections and irritating the 
USDP with remarks about a Second (or, to be exact, a Third) Panglong.26 The 
government in turn warned, that she and the NLD would “meet their tragic ends” 
if they “keep going the wrong way”, later reminding her that the NLD was 
technically an illegal party.27 It really seemed history would repeat itself again, with 
yet another Suu Kyi–Tatmadaw confrontation just around the corner. 
And yet something would change. The first signs of new winds came with the 
nomination of U Myint, Suu Kyi’s friend, as presidential advisor in April 2011. 
Then the approach towards Suu Kyi softened. She (along with the NLD) took part 
in official Martyr Day’s commemorations (19 July 2011) for the first time in years. 
She met with the regime’s liaison Aung Kyi twice (25 July 2011 and 12 August 
2011) and was allowed to travel to Bago for a political excursion. 
A breakthrough came on 19 August 2011 when Suu Kyi met with Thein Sein 
in Naypyidaw and attended a government-organized economic forum, stealing the 
show.28 All this, quite shockingly, was covered by the Burmese media.29 In a 
country where Suu Kyi’s name had been forbidden for two decades, a picture of 
Thein Sein and Suu Kyi standing behind a portrait of Aung San (in civilian dress) – 
who had also been marginalized – spoke louder than a thousand words. It uni­
vocally meant that Suu Kyi amnesia (and Aung San amnesia as well) was over. 
Words were important too, though. Suu Kyi declared that the meeting “went 
well”, Thein Sein wanted “real change”, and was “somebody who could be 
trusted”.30 
What pre-dated this breakthrough event was behind-the-scenes diplomacy 
between Thein Sein’s administration and Suu Kyi. According to Ye Htut, Thein 
Sein made a decision to reach out to Suu Kyi during a meeting in July 2011 with 
his soon-to-be crucial ministers Soe Thane and Aung Min as well as some mem­
bers of the Myanmar Egress organization. He subsequently sent Aung Kyi, a 
“relations minister”, who had served as liaison between the junta and Suu Kyi in 
2007–2009, to contact her. Contrary to previous cases, when Aung Kyi’s mission 
was for show only, this time it was real: Aung Kyi was to bring Suu Kyi on board. 
Suu Kyi demanded amendments to the election and party registration laws (in 
order to restore the NLD), the opening of the NLD offices in the countryside and 
public acknowledgement that the NLD had won the 1990 elections and the 
SLORC had failed to transfer power. Thein Sein, after consulting Shwe Mann and 
Khin Aung Myint (Speaker of Amyotha Hluttaw, or upper house of the parlia­
ment), agreed, thus paving the way for the 19 August 2011 breakthrough meet­
ing.31 Apparently, the meeting was unconfirmed until the very last moment as 
many NLD members did not want Suu Kyi to go to Naypyidaw, it was organized 
at the last minute.32 Once she got to the capital she “decided on the basis, it is said, 
of an ad hoc agreement reached with Thein Sein”, to enter the political system.33 
If so, this confirms the everlasting importance of ad hockery in Burmese politics. 
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Apparently, what broke the ice between Thein Sein and Suu Kyi was the warm 
reception she received from his family. Thein Sein invited Suu Kyi to his house, 
where his wife and children greeted Suu Kyi cordially. As the story goes, Suu Kyi 
was so delighted she remarked “a husband of such a wonderful woman could not 
be bad”.34 If true, this confirms another truth about Burmese politics: it is all 
personal. 
It also meant one thing. Thein Sein, backed by Shwe Mann, had prevailed over 
‘hardliners’ within the regime for whom Suu Kyi was already “a dead tiger”.35 The 
‘moderates’ understood that bringing Suu Kyi on board was essential, albeit very 
risky, to make the reforms possible by restoring domestic and international legiti­
macy. For hardliners, the reformers “were veering away from the original script”, 
which was to “take things in a reformist direction without going too far” (read: 
without Suu Kyi who “wasn’t meant to be part of the picture at all”).36 Their 
dissent “was based not on a strategic analysis or a clear alternative agenda, but on 
gut instinct”.37 In a hidden, though ‘epic’ battle of wills between reformers and 
hardliners within the regime, by mid-2011 the former gained an upper hand (and 
cemented their dominance by 2012).38 This meant a fundamental adjustment of 
the regime’s policy towards Suu Kyi: from marginalization to co-optation. 
After the Suu Kyi–Thein Sein summit, change was in the air. Myanmar hit the 
headlines on 30 September 2011, when Thein Sein – to Beijing’s shock and dis­
belief – suspended the controversial Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam, citing a pre­
viously unheard of reason: the will the people.39 Meanwhile, the thaw between 
the regime and Suu Kyi intensified. Behind-the-scenes talks between Aung Kyi 
and Suu Kyi continued; press censorship of articles on her (and on her father) was 
lifted, which was the first sign of censorship relaxation until its suspension in 
August 2012. In September Khin Aung Myint said Suu Kyi would be “welcomed” 
if she joined the parliament.40 She made steps to do so. In October Suu Kyi agreed 
to the NLD standing in parliamentary by-elections scheduled for April 2012, thus 
returning to the official fold. Her party was subsequently re-legalized: it was re­
registered in December by electoral commission, with Suu Kyi’s personal presence 
during the procedure. Myanmar hit the international headlines when Hilary Clin­
ton came to visit (29 November – 2 December 2011), being the first US State 
Secretary since John F. Dulles to do so. She had a productive meeting with Thein 
Sein and a cordial one with Suu Kyi.41 Apparently Suu Kyi told Clinton “I don’t 
want to be an icon, I want to be a politician”, to which Clinton pithily replied, 
“Get ready to get attacked”.42 
By late 2011/early 2012 events accelerated even more. Starting from late 2011, 
the presidential envoy and one of Thein Sein’s closest ‘lieutenants’ – Aung Min – 
secured a series of new ceasefire agreements with ethnic guerrilla groups, tem­
porarily breaking the deadlock in ethnic relations. For a while it indeed looked like 
guerrillas would switch guns for laptops.43 On 13 January 2012, Thein Sein’s 
administration released more than 600 of Myanmar’s political prisoners, including 
the most famous ones, such as Min Ko Naing, Htay Kywe, Zaw That Htwe, Khun 
Tun Oo, U Gambira … and Khin Nyunt. By early 2012 Thein Sein had become 
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the unexpected face of Myanmar’s reforms. In the meantime, the society’s mood 
changed considerably. People not only ceased to fear speaking Suu Kyi’s name in 
public, but her face suddenly appeared on street vendor stands in Yangon’s – on 
posters, pictures, photographs, calendars, even trinkets and keyrings.44 For anyone 
who remembered the pre-2011 atmosphere, it was an amazing development. 
When the by-elections in April 2012 were decisively won by the NLD and turned 
out to be free and fair, it was clear to all, Burmese and foreigners alike, that the 
reforms were real. 
Understanding the Burmese Spring 
Why did the generals, after decades of stagnation and irreconcilable isolation, 
decide to initiate reforms? There is no single answer to that question, yet one may 
dare to suggest that it was the (unexpected) outcome of four simultaneous processes 
coupled with one dominant tendency in Burmese politics. 
The first was the Tatmadaw’s planned withdrawal from direct policymaking into 
a comfortable position ‘above politics’. If the Tatmadaw’s declarations are to be 
taken seriously, this was what they had wanted all along since the coup of 1988: 
military leaders constantly emphasized that their rule was temporary (however, 
what this precisely meant was never disclosed as no exact timetable was ever set). 
Yet before 2010, the conditions were not ready for them to withdraw and they 
could have done it only from a position of strength, never weakness. By early 
2011, having marginalized Suu Kyi and contained, though not eliminated, other 
domestic and international threats, the generals felt comfortable enough to pursue 
their long-planned exit strategy. Thus, in the elite-driven, top-down transition 
process “from within” Myanmar, carried out by the Tatmadaw as its key institu­
tion, the generals transformed themselves from praetorians’ into ‘arbitrators’: guardians 
of the political system they established.45 
Another process went hand in hand with this: liberalization within the regime. 
There had always been ‘moderates’ in the junta. Or to be exact people (Khin 
Nyunt, Hla Min, Win Aung, Nyan Win, Aung Lin Htut or Kyaw Thu) who did 
not want to relinquish power but understood the importance of appearances in 
both domestic (and especially) international policymaking. The regime would have 
been less delegitimized domestically, and Myanmar would have been less isolated 
internationally, had the SLORC/SPDC paid a little more than scant attention to 
political decorum. 
The number of more open-minded individuals within the Tatmadaw ranks had 
been increasing; a process that had begun in the 2000s, though it was invisible to 
foreign observers. A gradual replacement of narrow-minded commanders with 
better educated military technocrats proceeded within the middle and high ranks of 
the military administration. It culminated in changes between 2011–2015. With 
Thein Sein, Shwe Mann and Min Aung Hlaing coming to power, accompanied by 
an entourage of reform-minded ministers, legislators and other subordinates (Soe 
Thane, Aung Min, Tin Naing Thein, Hla Tun, Nay Zin Latt, U Myint, Aung Tut 
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Thet, Aung Kyi, Nyan Tun, Ye Htut, Set Aung and others), these elite-driven, 
top-to-bottom reforms became possible. Broad minded individuals within the 
Tatmadaw initiated the process, overcame the ‘hardliners’ (Tin Aung Myint Oo, 
Htay Oo, Zaw Min, Kyaw Hsan, Ko Ko, Aung Thaung, Maung Thaung, Lun Thi 
and others) and became modernizing actors.46 
These internal dynamics within the army and army-based institutions (the 
USDP, the Hluttaw), were accompanied by two processes external to the Tatma­
daw. The first one was small, almost invisible to the outside world. It was the 
process of socio-political change in Myanmar. An inner-system approach of tenta­
tive steps towards reforming the country was initiated by conscious individuals in 
the mid-2000s. There, civilian reformists – Nay Win Maung, Hla Maung Shwe, 
Tin Maung Thann, Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Sonny Nyunt Thein, Kyaw Ni Khin, Ye 
Mya Thu (founders of the Myanmar Egress organization) – were joined by other, 
sometimes very diverse, individuals (Khin Zaw Win, Kyaw Thu, Aye Mya Hlaing, 
Ma Ja Nan Lahtaw, Maung Zarni, etc.) and organizations (e.g. the Shalom and 
Metta Foundations). This phenomenon, which gained momentum after Cyclone 
Nargis, during the 2008 referendum and after the 2010 elections was labelled ‘the 
third force’. In the polarizing political scene of Myanmar, the third force was 
controversial: they were nearly (or bluntly) traitors to the NLD and to the exile 
Burmese community as well as suspicious to the Tatmadaw. Accused of complicity 
with the regime – the very nature of their activity forced them to lean towards the 
junta, not to the politically weak NLD – they nevertheless instilled new ideas into 
the minds of the ruling military class. They prompted change, though we will 
never estimate how much exactly as their influence has been overestimated by 
supporters and underestimated by their opponents. Many of the third force mem­
bers jumped on the bandwagon once reforms kicked in, joining Thein Sein’s 
reformers formally and informally. Together with a group of exiles and/or overseas 
returnees, both Burmese and ethnic minority influencers either incorporated 
themselves into the ranks of Thein Sein’s network as policy advisors or assisted 
informally. Among the Burmese returnees were people such as Thant Myint-U, 
Min Zaw Oo, Aung Naing Oo, Nyo Ohn Myint, Zaw Oo and many others; 
among the ethnic group, Harn Yawnghwe, Lian Sakhong, Naw Zipporah Sein, 
and Ja Nan Lahtaw stood out the most. Together they made a team of reformers, 
who helped Myanmar make a comeback after six decades of military misrule.47 
Finally, the last process, and the only external one, was subsidiary. In the late 
2000s, growing understanding that sanctions did not work began to spread amongst 
Western policymaking circles. However, since sanctions are always easy to intro­
duce and difficult to lift, and because pro-democracy groups continued to exert 
pressure with their pointless, moral support for them, few Western policymakers 
risked changing their policies (after all, it was not their people who suffered). 
Obama’s administration in 2008 admitted to the failure of sanctions and tried to 
reach out to the Burmese junta. Initially this did not work out, but ‘pragmatic 
engagement’ finally paid off once Thein Sein’s reforms started in 2011. Such 
international support strengthened the reformers vis-à-vis hardliners. Although 
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international standing had never been the most important benchmark in the Tat­
madaw’s policymaking, it mattered symbolically. Their pariah status irritated the 
Burmese, military and civilians alike. The possibility of restoring international 
legitimacy was an important, even if secondary, incentive for reforms.48 
All that said, one should be cautious to retrospectively paint a picture of a grand 
scheme of reforms. Politics in general, and Burmese politics in particular, is full of 
ad hockery. It was true with these reforms as well, especially after 2011.49 Visions 
and plans look nice in history textbooks, but the reality is usually much more 
murky. Decisions are driven by particular interests, emotions and hopes, a lack of 
(or insufficiency of) knowledge, short-sightedness, incompetence, and at times 
stupidity, personal sympathies, animosities as well as blind chances. Reforming a 
country, especially one undertaking systemic transition, is like a walk in the dark 
without a clear direction or plan. The bumpy road to post-authoritarianism, full of 
ambiguities, shades of grey and disorientation about its direction, may perhaps be 
fully understood only by those who went through it, in this country or another. 
Furthermore, the Burmese Spring would not have been possible had not Suu 
Kyi decided to give it a chance in mid-2011. The new political circumstances, 
however, put Suu Kyi in a challenging position. She had to take her biggest political 
risk since 1988.50 
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THE POKER GAME	 
By deciding to take part in the 2012 by-elections, Suu Kyi switched her tactics 
from a struggle against the military-dominated system into an attempt to change it 
from within. By doing so, she risked everything. 
Hard choices 
By March 2012 Suu Kyi stepped forth into Myanmar again, starting her new tri­
umphal tour. She designated Kawhmu, a Yangon suburb, as her constituency to 
candidate from. In the West, a candidate who chooses a constituency previously 
seldom frequented would have to strive hard to convince local voters that he/she is 
not a parachute candidate. But in Burmese dynastic, personalized politics, Suu Kyi’s 
choice of Kawhmu was understood by almost all (if not all) villagers as an incred­
ible privilege. She could have singled out any place in Myanmar, but she granted 
them this honour. Consequently, it mattered little that it was the military who had 
undertaken some developmental projects in the village, and that they proved to be 
major ones (the NLD did much less for Kawhmu) in years to come, or that it was a 
USDP candidate who the local community deemed a respectable figure.1 Suu Kyi 
is the mother of Myanmar and the village voted for her in subsequent elections 
ceaselessly. This micro case study shows the electoral logic in Myanmar quite well. 
Back then, in early 2012, the mass enthusiasm that surrounded Suu Kyi’s cam­
paign – as everywhere she went, she attracted huge crowns (average of 10,000 per 
rally)2 – showed that despite 15 years of house arrest, including most of the pre­
vious decade, Suu Kyi was still unquestionably the most popular person in the 
country. Her fame shone brightly once again. The by-elections were just another 
one of her shows. 
Politically, however, Suu Kyi’s breakthrough decision to contest the by-elections 
was a concession. A major, fundamental one. After 23 years of struggle with the 
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generals, she made the best out of a lousy bargain and accepted the Tatmadaw­
enforced rules of the game. What else, if not a concession, was her choice to reject 
the dreams of restoring the results of the 1990 elections? For 20 years, with 
endeavour, persistence bordering on stubbornness, high personal cost, and after 
almost losing her life at least twice (at Danubyu and Depayin), Suu Kyi tried to 
force the generals to transfer power to her party. It never happened. Step by step, 
the Tatmadaw enforced its vision – its roadmap. For so many years, the generals 
could not break her. And now, after all this, she yielded and decided to concede to 
10 per cent of a parliament controlled by the Tatmadaw. In a way she did exactly 
what the NDF (NLD splinters) did, to her outrage, in 2010: she agreed to an 
allotment of political space by the regime instead of demanding a transfer of 
power.3 To use a Hegelian thought, Suu Kyi finally understood that “rational is 
real”. Or, in simpler words, she belatedly accepted the Tatmadaw’s non-level 
playing field. Why? And why so late? Given the fact that the conditions generals 
offered were more or less similar, why did she not accept them in 1989, 1995 or 
2002? For what sake did she waste two decades for both herself and the country? 
We will probably never know why. As one veteran Burma-watcher com­
mented, “no one else can explain except Aung San Suu Kyi herself, why she 
decided to lead her party into the political process under a constitution she had 
denounced as totally unacceptable just two years before”.4 I was unable to get the 
answer from Suu Kyi,5 and on other occasions she offered only vague, quasi-
aphorist comments like: “if you want to bring an end to long-standing conflict, 
you have to be prepared to compromise”,6 or that she operated on the premise of 
“compromise based on principles”,7 or populist remarks (“If I’m going to be used 
for the sake of the nation, that’s fine by me)”.8 Her party was no better at 
explaining. I have been asking this question (‘why?’) to many interlocutors in 
Myanmar and, after 8 years of doing so, I am no nearer to the answer. Some of my 
interviewees pointed out that there was substantial, domestic and international, 
pressure on her to become more flexible. Others said she understood that time was 
running out for her; speculating that she needed to go out on a limb.9 Others still 
pointed to her character, personal instincts and political ambitions: 
Equally important may have been her internal processes, by which I mean her 
character and her political instincts. By character I focus on her hubristic 
conviction that she was born to rule, on her stubbornness, belief in her own 
infallibility and high-handedness. When you combine this with her political 
ambitions, she has shown herself quite capable … of making a complete U-
turn when faced with realities. What was sacred dogma only yesterday can be 
tossed overboard in a trice when other interests come into play. She is not, in 
short, a person for whom principles are enduring, except her own personal 
self-interest.10 
I find all these explanations valuable yet insufficient. This forces us to speculate. 
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Presumably, the combination of the four processes (the Tatmadaw’s planned exit 
strategy; liberalization within the regime; social change; and rapprochement with 
the West) left Suu Kyi with a hard choice. Had she kept her high moral ground 
position (one rising above politics), rejecting the unfair roadmap, she would have 
been marginalized. Politically sidelined – as liberalization would have gone on 
without her (perhaps not as far, but far enough to re-engage with the Western 
world) – Suu Kyi would have been respected only. She would be admired, cer­
tainly (she would have kept her iconic position within and outside Myanmar), yet 
politically of little relevance. A ‘Burmese Dalai Lama’ –  a universally esteemed 
figure yet too powerless to reach set political goals, so to say. 
Being a real politician, Suu Kyi wanted power; so she had to catch the 
momentum before it was lost. She had to board the ‘reform’ train before it was too 
late: it would depart with or without her. Therefore, after 23 years of futile 
struggle to force out the generals, she made a strategic U-turn. Suu Kyi changed 
her tactics from confrontation to cooperation and agreed to function within the 
rules determined by the regime. One should not underestimate this fact: it finally 
allowed Myanmar to break the two-decades-long deadlock. Unsurprisingly, pre­
vious UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon, who remembered the pre-2010 situation in 
Myanmar and Than Shwe’s snubs well, hailed Suu Kyi for her “flexibility and 
wisdom and compromise”.11 
By no means was it surrender, though. Suu Kyi now wanted to change the 
system from within. Her goal was to get to the parliament, later win majority, 
amend the constitution, and gain access to real power.12 That is why she agreed to 
“become part of the new system”; however, “this was meant as an expedient, not 
an endgame”, as she “decided to join the system in the belief that the government 
would not only continue reforms but also reform the constitution itself”.13 In 
short, it was just a modification of means, not objectives. This was pragmatism pure 
and simple and the best reflection of her father. 
A hazardous one. To evoke the football metaphor once again: Suu Kyi restarted 
the match against (ex) generals with no assurance at all that the referee would not 
show her a red card once more or nullify a correctly scored goal yet again. This 
was the single bravest decision in her political life after entering politics in 1988. 
She bet all her cards – her credibility, her influence, her prestige – on it, knowing 
too well she could be outplayed by the (ex) generals. Like a poker player, Suu Kyi 
risked everything. 
Initially, events seemed to confirm her decision. On 1 April 2012, the NLD 
secured a landslide in the by-elections, winning 43 out of 44 contested seats and 
producing nationwide euphoria. Suu Kyi was triumphant: “we even won in the 
military constituencies” – she later boasted during a closed meeting with Poland’s 
Speaker of the Senate – “our candidate won with the military one in Thein Sein’s 
constituency; it means even president’s staff voted for us”.14 She had once again 
proved she held the Burmese people’s hearts and minds. The joy was not even 
spoilt by being reminded of the rules of the game: once elected, Suu Kyi again 
tried to test the limits of the (post) generals’ power by demanding a change to the 
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oath (from ‘protect’ the Constitution to ‘abide by’), but facing their uncompro­
mising stance, she backed down after several days of deadlock. Despite this incident, it 
was a historical moment for her and for the country. 
Even more symbolism awaited her during her debut foreign trip to Thailand (29 
May–3 June 2012) and especially her second one to Europe (13–29 June 2012). 
For the first time since the beginning of her political career, she could leave 
Myanmar without anxiety that she would not be allowed to come back. This fact 
in itself showed how much had changed within barely a year. Her visits to Thai­
land, Switzerland, Norway and the UK, as well as her American follow-up in 
September, were in fact her one grand tour de force. 
In Thailand, Suu Kyi quickly noticed the developmental difference between 
Bangkok and Yangon, visited refugee camps and participated in the World Eco­
nomic Forum; stealing the show by upstaging Thein Sein’s planned visit (the pre­
sident cancelled it fearing less publicity). In Europe, among everlasting fanfares, she 
collected the Nobel Peace Prize and Oxford’s honorary degree, spoke (as the first 
woman from abroad and as the first non-leader of state ever) in the British parlia­
ment, visited the BBC and celebrated her 68th birthday with her family in Oxford. 
Accompanied by a chorus of very American turgid speeches, she picked up the 
Congressional Gold Medal at the Capitol and met President Barrack Obama. This 
was not only her “carpe diem” moment – she described it as “one of (the) most 
moving days of her life”.15 These events also marked the zenith of her global 
influence. Never before (and never after) was she feted so overwhelmingly by 
various members of the international community. For this single moment, her 
hybridity seemed the perfect match between local and international, Burmese and 
Western, Asian and global. Suu Kyi offered the world what it needed: a political 
moralist preaching vaguely enough to touch the hearts and sufficiently shallow 
enough to remain universalist and intelligible. It suited the audience perfectly well. 
As one long-time Myanmar observer commented on the British part of her tour, it 
did not matter much that Suu Kyi did not say anything particularly insightful. This 
was because: “so infatuated were the ruling classes in Britain that what she said was 
less important than the fact that she was able to speak in such excellent English, of 
the old school variety”.16 Not only in Britain but also elsewhere in the West 
impression trumped substance. Suu Kyi was the fairy tale the world wanted to 
believe so much, especially in times of uncertainty. 
The consequences for Myanmar could not be underestimated. After the by-
elections, the West returned to Myanmar, welcomed by it with open arms. 
Beginning in spring 2012, US, Canadian, Australian and EU sanctions were sus­
pended (later lifted) and a ‘gold rush’ commenced. The country was flooded with 
foreign businesspeople, investors, consultants, activists, experts, politicians and 
many, many other believers of the idea of ‘last frontiers’ and ‘El Dorado’. This 
influx of foreign sources and expertise, along with loans, grants, and debt cancel­
lations from top international institutions and member donors, provided the cash 
flow and know-how so deeply needed by Myanmar. “Capital is coming” remarked 
a beaming, philosophically-inclined businessman from the tourism sector, 
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interviewed by me in mid-2012.17 He had reasons for his optimism: tourism sky­
rocketed after lifting the boycott (Suu Kyi had changed her mind on it too). 
In just one year, Myanmar turned from pariah to darling of the international 
community, becoming one of (if not the) most politically-interesting countries in 
the world. Myanmar’s diplomacy reinvigorated to a scale unseen since the 1950s. 
Myanmar’s government initiated a series of economic reforms: floating the kyat 
rate, establishing special economic zones (Dawei, Thilawa, Kyaukphyu), expanding 
and modernizing the banking sector, introducing new laws on microfinance, trade 
unions, foreign investments, farm land, export and import, anti-corruption, central 
banking, telecommunications, minimum wage, anti-money laundering, new tax 
legislation, SMEs. These and many more were just a few of the most important 
reforms enacted in 2011–2015.18 
Yangon quickly transformed (for good and for bad) from a postcolonial 
(charming) backwater into a Bangkok-style pretender, with shopping malls glitter­
ing downtown, advertisements (like Pepsi’s “good to be back”) giving colour to 
the previously greyed streets, and traffic jams becoming the showcase of the town. 
Throughout the country, roads were improved, infrastructure developed, con­
nectivity enhanced and the environment polluted even more. Internet services 
exploded from one of the slowest in the world to being fast and widely available.19 
Sim cards ceased to cost a thousand dollars, WiFi no longer was an unknown word 
and smartphones became accessible to almost everyone (soon Facebook would 
revolutionize Myanmar, again for good and for bad). Socio-political space expan­
ded significantly in the country. Most of the political prisoners were released 
(including ex-members of the regime); exile dissidents were welcomed home; civil 
society, grassroots civil organizations, including humanitarian, educational and 
religious institutions (the latter controversially, as religious extremism soon clouded 
the blue sky of a reforming Myanmar) sprouted in big cities; and political parties 
re-legalised. The 2012 by-elections were free and fair, with the NLD allowed 
(albeit belatedly) to hold mass rallies throughout the country during the campaign 
period (compare with 1989 and especially 2003!). Censorship was eased and then 
formally lifted. But self-censorship remained; in a media dominated by the cronies, 
criticism of the Tatmadaw still reminded any Burmese journalist of entering a mine 
field. Even so, Myanamar media recalled their best 1950s heritage and overtook 
many Southeast Asian neighbours in freedom and quality of media coverage. Dis­
sent and public discussion became tolerated again, exiled media was allowed to 
function (it was a shocking experience to read The Irrawaddy inside Myanmar 
without anxiety) and reports by human rights agencies (AI, HRW and others) 
were no longer blocked. Trade unions and the right to strike and protest publicly, 
including during rallies were reintroduced. This was another shocking develop­
ment. Demonstrations, including those against confiscated land, soared country­
wide (Suu Kyi learned the cons of it for herself it 2013), and although some were 
cracked down upon (student protests in 2015), the balance sheet is incomparable to 
the pre-2011 era. Most importantly, after decades of brutal dictatorship, the people 
of Myanmar were revived and unleashed unprecedented energy. Political 
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discussions in the public sphere (especially in tea houses) became a norm once 
again, with citizens discussing without fear of being overheard or prosecuted. Yet 
the latter aspects did not matter that much. The public majority got a well-
deserved break from politics (which had complicated their lives enough in the last 
six decades). After years of poverty and stagnation, Myanmar could finally reinte­
grate with a rapidly developing Asia and make up for the lost time. That is why, 
obvious cons notwithstanding (unresolved ethnic issues, emerging communal ten­
sions, Buddhist–Muslim violence, the rise of Buddhist extremism and the Tatma­
daw’s entrenchment in various key segments of socio-political life to name just a 
few), the reforms and opening up were positive for Myanmar.20 
For Suu Kyi, however, the balance sheet has been more mixed. 
In search of one brave soldier 
The reconciliation process between the regime and Suu Kyi began with Thein 
Sein and Suu Kyi’s meeting on 19 August 2011. They “decided to cooperate with 
each other in the areas they could and leave the matters they could not then agree 
on with each other for future discussions”.21 The ad hoc decision was constructive 
in this particular moment, yet it concealed two irreconcilable political objectives. 
The regime wanted Suu Kyi to accept the rules of their game and support their 
reforms; she wanted to change the system from within. What they understood as 
her coming to sense with reality, she treated as a concession that needed to be 
reciprocated. 
Initially all went (almost) well. Suu Kyi – to use a Chinese expression– granted 
Thein Sein ‘face’ (gei mian) by saying she believed he wanted reforms, agreeing to 
registering her party, and taking part in the by-elections. They let her campaign 
freely and allowed her to win (by not falsifying and not cancelling the results); they 
also issued her with a passport, allowing her to travel abroad without repercussions. 
It seemed that the process of mending fences was well on its way. 
Yet already back then, the first cracks began to appear. The regime was irritated 
by Suu Kyi’s constant usage of the name Burma instead of Myanmar,22 which 
symbolically signalled her lingering opposition to the political system. Suu Kyi was 
not delighted about lifting sanctions, as she wanted to remove them step by step in 
a quid pro quo with Thein Sein’s administration. Thus, she called for easing, not 
removal, of sanctions and warned against “reckless optimism”23 and about a 
“mirage of success”24; she was half-hearted about foreign investments in Myanmar 
and kept resisting informal pressure exerted upon her by Western governments. 
This was all to no avail. The free and fair by-elections were the drop that broke the 
dam: Western governments lifted sanctions on a much bigger scale than Suu Kyi 
anticipated or apprehended, depriving her of a strong political weapon. She 
noticed the consequences almost overnight: with most of the sanctions lifted, she 
lost the battle over the constitutional oath. Once she realized the game with sanc­
tions was over, she behaved in the way of a true politician: she made a virtue out 
of necessity, presenting sanctions as the reason behind making Burmese reforms 
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possible.25 In a similar manner, she initially tried to oppose Obama’s visit to 
Myanmar in 2012, claiming that it was politically too early for it. However, once it 
became clear that she could not resist the US and other Western countries’ pressure 
to re-engage with Myanmar, she jumped on the bandwagon, securing headway. 
Meetings between Suu Kyi and visiting Western leaders (including Bill Clinton, 
Barack Obama, and David Cameron) overshadowed their formal encounters with 
Thein Sein and his reformers. 
Nevertheless, despite these cracks, the Suu Kyi–Tatmadaw rapprochement con­
tinued. Suu Kyi’s ‘charm offensive’ towards the army was enacted with a clear 
objective in mind. Given the 25 per cent of Tatmadaw delegates in parliament and 
the overall political system of Myanmar making the Tatmadaw a ‘gatekeeper’ for its 
Constitution, Suu Kyi needed to befriend the army if she wanted to amend Article 
57f that barred her from presidency. What Suu Kyi searched for was – to quote her 
own (not very diplomatic) words – “one brave soldier” to support her cause.26 
She did much to win the generals and ex-generals over. “I’m not that bad, they 
should try me first” she told me, adding that they were “nervous about losing the 
grip of power”, but their anxieties were ungrounded, since the NLD “from the 
very beginning wanted reconciliation, not revenge”.27 In her remarks one sees a 
typically authoritarian equation between the leader and the party. Suu Kyi herself, 
indeed, never wanted revenge and did not try to enact it after 2016. But the same 
cannot be honestly said about the NLD. From the very beginning, there had been 
strong revanchist sentiments in the party (talk of “Nurnberg” in 1990!). The 
NLD’s radical wing, although weakened, never ceased to exist. Under Win Tin it 
favoured a much more confrontational stance: non-acceptance of the roadmap, 
continuous call for sanctions and retaliation when chance arose. “Some of us 
would like to push the military into the Bay of Bengal” announced Win Tin, aptly 
summarizing the difference between him and Suu Kyi – “She only wants to push 
them into Kandawgyi Lake”.28 Suu Kyi, to her credit, did much to halt these 
revanchist, politically suicidal, tempers. She pushed her re-engagement with the 
regime vision through (e.g. she enforced her decision to re-register in November 
2011 and to participate in by-elections despite strong opposition from the radicals) 
and kept the party in line. Yet these sentiments never ceased to exist. 
Disciplining the party along the moderate line was just the first step in Suu Kyi’s 
long march to convince the junta into accepting her as Myanmar’s next  political  
leader. Soon more steps followed. At the turn of 2012 and 2013, Suu Kyi sat silent 
during the Tatmadaw’s offensive against the KIA. She offered – to the Kachins’ dis­
appointment – only moral platitudes (“I don’t like any kind of war or violence”).29 
She then accepted hefty donations (totalling the equivalent of US$235,000) from 
former cronies of SPDC (Tay Za, Kyaw Win and Zaw Zaw), generously declaring 
that they should be given a chance; Zaw Zaw reciprocated instantly by arguing: “I 
don’t want to be a bad crony. I want to be a good one”.30 This miraculous 
redemption helped him to get removed from the US sanction’s list in 2016. 
In early 2013 Suu Kyi hit international headlines by declaring a couple of times 
that she remained “fond” of the army; she linked this statements to her declaration 
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of wanting to be a president, leaving no room for misunderstanding.31 She defen­
ded herself against accusations of siding with the army by repeating that she had 
loved the army ever since she stepped into politics. Indeed, the first time she 
declared her fondness towards the Tatmadaw was during her Shwedagon speech 
and those who talked in length with her about it confirm her respect for the Tat­
madaw as an institution (“the army is like sons and daughters of the nation, so the 
army should be treated like the nation”).32 “I still love the army, I hold deep 
respect for it”, she told me in 2015, nonetheless adding: “it is not the problem of 
the army, but the way it has been used. There must be good commands and the 
army should remain professional”.33 What she meant was that the army should stay 
away from politics. One may conclude that Suu Kyi is not against the Tatmadaw 
“per se”.34 Rather, she is against military “usurpers”, who have wrested away the 
power destined for her. “She may dislike certain individuals, but she respects the 
army as an institution and does not want to weaken it”.35 That is why, as she told 
Clinton in 2011, she “can do business with them”.36 
Whatever the reason, by publicly repeating that she “likes the army”, Suu Kyi 
sent a clear political signal in early 2013. And, since actions speak louder than 
words, for the first time ever, Suu Kyi attended the military parade on 27 March 
2013 – the showcase of the Tatmadaw’s might – stirring attention both at home 
and abroad. 
Suu Kyi most probably wanted to reassure the military establishment that she 
would not challenge the status quo, both in domestic and foreign policies. The 
2013 Letpadaung copper mine issue turned out to be the first test of Suu Kyi’s 
rapprochement with the regime (and her leadership skills). Letpadaung mine was 
perhaps a typical case of pre-2010 business and social conditions in Myanmar. Due 
to the joint venture company (the regime’s MEHL and Chinese Wanbao), villagers 
were removed from their lands with little compensation, while investors polluted 
the environment. Since previously this kind of behaviour was the unholy norm, 
few cared (in the establishment) and none dared to protest (in the society). After 
the suspension of the Myitsone Dam project, however, people became bolder, and 
boosted by the newly granted right to strike, protested against the mine. Unfortu­
nately, the villagers learned the limits of their newly acquired rights the hard way: 
after staging protests, they were brutally beaten. As word spread, Letpadaung 
became a national issue. The USDP formed a commission to investigate and invi­
ted Suu Kyi to head the inquiry. With the commission’s final verdict, which 
recommended keeping Chinese investment (under the conditions of compensating 
the villagers and becoming environmentally friendly), Suu Kyi passed the political 
realism and geopolitics test – she met the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar a day 
earlier and declared that Myanmar had to “get along with the neighbouring 
country whether we like it or not”.37 However, she did not pass the test on public 
relations. Foreign policy imperatives did not speak to the people who pleaded: 
“Mother, give us back our mountain!” 38 Suu Kyi, experiencing a novelty – a 
hostile crowd – reverted to anger. She corrected them, quarrelled with the crowd 
and scolded them, which looked quite bad in the eyes of the media.39 
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Other, similar actions reflected Suu Kyi’s strategy of reassuring the generals 
about herself: she distanced herself from the nationwide (failed) student protests in 
2014 and even expelled a NLD veteran who had criticised Buddhist nationalists for 
being in an informal alliance with the regime. By doing all this, Suu Kyi risked her 
credibility in order to convince the generals to amend the Constitution. 
Her search for ‘one brave soldier’ started with Thein Sein. The president initi­
ated changes and he – against the advice of “hardliners”40 within the army – 
brought Suu Kyi on board, understanding that without her the reforms would be a 
challenging, if not impossible, thing to do.41 In turn, she initially praised his will to 
reform the country and apparently hoped he would be her “Burmese Frederick de 
Klerk”.42 Thein Sein returned the favour by going as far as saying he would 
“accept her as president”, suggesting amending the Constitution.43 Initially (in 
2011 and early 2012) their relations were good and there was even a plan to 
nominate her as minister in Thein Sein’s cabinet.44 Another sign of good terms was 
an idea to set up a direct telephone line between them, given the frequency of 
their meetings in 2012.45 Unfortunately, with time, their relationship deteriorated, 
which was clearly visible in the decreasing number of their bilateral meetings 
(officially they held one meeting in 2011, three in 2012, one in 2013, and one in 
2014, not counting multilateral talks).46 Different reasons for the rift are cited. 
Some say Thein Sein “indulged her without conceding anything”,47 was “indeci­
sive or unwilling to cooperate with her”,48 or set a trap for her.49 Others claim it 
was her fault (a ‘change of heart’) based on misunderstandings, different personal­
ities and her leaning towards Shwe Mann.50 In Thein Sein’s eyes, Suu Kyi betrayed 
him: she “did not play a constructive and responsible role” of the “loyal opposi­
tion”, which should support the government in the reforms instead of criticising 
and, especially, siding with his colleague-turned-archenemy, Shwe Mann.51 Suu 
Kyi felt just as betrayed.52 From her perspective Thein Sein got much, thanks to 
her support – domestic and international credibility – yet he gave little in return. 
Disillusioned with Thein Sein, whom she no longer trusted, Suu Kyi around 
mid-2012 took the side of his competitor and rival, thura Shwe Mann, Pyithu 
Hluttaw Speaker. Initially the personal rivalry between Thein Sein and Shwe 
Mann was beneficial for the changes within Myanmar. They competed over which 
of them was the greater reformer. With time (around 2013), however, their 
enmity – “more a personal falling-out than a difference in worldview”53 – 
obstructed the modernization drive.54 Suu Kyi entered this dynamic and sided with 
Shwe Mann. He gave her chairmanship of Hluttaw’s committee of the rule of law, 
which she clearly enjoyed.55 He also “tried hard to make her feel at home in her 
new Naypyitaw surroundings, treating her as a partner, gaining her confidence. 
There was good personal chemistry, something Aung San Suu Kyi never had with 
Thein Sein”.56 By 2013 they openly allied with each other: they met frequently, 
formally and informally, held joint press conferences, declared their political part­
nership as the way to national reconciliation, their representatives voted together 
on several bills in the Hluttaw (e.g. one that increased salaries of MPs) and fore­
closed changing the first-past-the-post voting system (favouring the NLD); Shwe 
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Mann even backed her dream of amending the Constitution, while she called him 
“an ally” in return.57 
For Thein Sein’s camp within the UDSP, all this was prime evidence of Shwe 
Mann’s duplicity. Apparently, in 2011 when Thein Sein faced objection from 
regime hardliners over bringing Suu Kyi in (“giving a dead tiger new life”), Shwe 
Mann backed his decision (“tigers are controlled with the whip in a circus. I can 
control her”). Now he was using her (Suu Kyi “had fallen into a Shwe Mann 
trap”) to upset Thein Sein’s supporters, distance Suu Kyi from Thein Sein, build 
his own profile based on Suu Kyi’s popularity in the media, among the elites and 
society, and possibly secure presidency or other high posts for himself after 2015.58 
On the other hand, the Suu Kyi–Shwe Mann rapprochement seemed to move 
beyond a political marriage of convenience (their continued cooperation after 2016 
might indicate so, too). This must have crossed the red line not only for Thein 
Sein, but apparently for Than Shwe (the old dictator supposedly called Shwe Mann 
“a traitor”) and others in the regime.59 With tacit support from Min Aung Hlaing, 
the Tatmadaw’s commander-in-chief, Thein Sein spectacularly purged Shwe Mann 
and his men from the USDP on 12 August 2015. He did so by seizing the party 
headquarters in Naypyidaw and exiling e.g. Maung Maung Thein, in order to 
prevent “a Shwe Mann–Aung San Suu Kyi coalition from assuming power”.60 
This was a clear signal to other top ranking officers. If they did not understand that 
Suu Kyi could not give them anything they didn’t already have (money, privileges, 
impunity, all guaranteed by status quo), then Shwe Mann’s enforced political 
retirement reminded them of the value of corporal solidarity and the perils of 
breaking away from it. Indeed, Shwe Mann was the closest thing to an ally Suu 
Kyi ever had in the Tatmadaw. But even Shwe Mann, in the peak of his power 
(2013–2015) was unable (or unwilling) to amend the Constitution for her. 
Simultaneously, Suu Kyi had tried to approach the commander-in-chief of the 
Tatmadaw, Min Aung Hlaing, the third (or perhaps the first) political figure in 
post-2011 Myanmar. Suu Kyi, during one of the closed-door meetings in the 
Polish parliament in 2013 said: “the commander-in-chief is the most important 
figure, he decides about everything, he is much more important than the pre­
sident”.61 Min Aung Hlaing initially was reluctant even to meet with Suu Kyi.62 
Eventually he did, meeting with her during few ‘window-dressing’, multilateral 
summits in 2014 and 2015, which ended with inconclusive results for Suu Kyi. 
Hence, despite all her concessions and notwithstanding her alliance with Shwe 
Mann, Suu Kyi proved unable to find her “one brave soldier”.63 
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A POLITICAL TO-BE-OR-NOT-TO-BE	 
Seeing her failure to align with the regime, Suu Kyi did not give up. She tried to 
use her two ace cards once again – popular support and foreign backing – to force 
the ex-generals to change the Constitution. At the same time, while testing the 
limits of the political space allotted to her in the early 2010s in Myanmar, Suu Kyi 
never lost sight of the ultimate goal – the prospect of the 2015 general elections. 
Dreaming of amendments 
The NLD wanted to amend Article 57f, Article 109 and Article 436. During their 
course of action, the NLD concentrated its efforts on changing Article 436, instead 
of 57f, although amendment of 436 would effectively pave way to other changes, 
including 57f.1 Suu Kyi presented amending the Constitution as a citizens’ demo­
cratic right.2 Yet in Burmese conditions, where personal is political3 and vice versa, 
it was all about Suu Kyi wanting to obtain the presidency for herself. She declared 
her desire to become president unequivocally and repeated it a number of times,4 
which was just dotting the ‘i’. From the very beginning, it was evident to all – 
herself, the (ex) generals and the people included – that the campaign for the 
amendment of the Constitution was all about lifting the clause blocking Suu Kyi’s 
presidency, nothing else. In Myanmar, it is all about the leader and her/his mission 
to upgrade the country understood as his/her dominion. The distinction between 
personal and public is blurred, at best. Only the leader, not Myanmar state’s insti­
tutions or their mechanisms, can secure goals important for societal growth: pro­
gress, development, prosperity, standing, etc. This is how it is likely understood by 
Suu Kyi: with all her self-imposed burden of a ‘mission’, ‘duty’, ‘responsibility’ and 
so on, she – and only she – must carry Myanmar’s fate on her shoulders. Only she 
can guarantee success, for this is her country, inherited after her father, and this is a 
personal, a family, issue: she feels an imperative to clean up what the usurpers 
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messed up. And for that, she needs the full power available, which for a civilian in 
post-2010 conditions, happens to be presidency; otherwise her mission of com­
pleting her father’s task and making Myanmar great again cannot be completed. 
This could be the Burmese structural core behind Suu Kyi’s reasoning. Crucially, 
this has been a reciprocal relationship, understood similarly by the other side, the 
people, as well.5 
To amend the Constitution, the NLD joined hands with 88 Student Generation 
leaders and established a joint committee, which – via NLD offices – started col­
lecting signatures of citizens who supported the amendments. From 27 May 2014 
to 19 July 2014, the party staged a campaign of rallies in support of changing the 
Constitution in several Burmese cities (Naypyidaw, Yangon, Mandalay). In the 
speech inaugurating her campaign, Suu Kyi urged the people “to test parliament”,6 
returning to her favourite tactics of testing the limits of space allotted by the 
regime. Throughout the campaign, Suu Kyi came out with outspoken criticism, 
unseen since 2003.7 Six months later, when I interviewed her, she remained quite 
critical: “I supported these so called reforms only at the beginning, and that with 
reservations, but already in 2012 I warned about it. Now the so called reforms 
stalled, if not regressed”.8 
The rallies drew an average of a few thousand supporters; the biggest one in 
Mandalay was estimated at 25,000 people. The NLD, too, collected more than 5 
million signatures. That was a considerable achievement, but too little to frighten 
the regime. The (ex) generals responded by warning Suu Kyi via electoral com­
mission and through lawyers, and by conceding to bogus concessions. In August 
2014, they set up a parliamentarian commission on reviewing the Constitution, 
which did its best not to amend it. On 31 October 2014, just before Obama’s 
second visit, they organized roundtable talks with Suu Kyi and ethnic minorities. 
By doing so, in theory, they answered Suu Kyi’s repeated calls for four-party talks. 
In reality, the regime played a simple trick: by enlarging the number of participants 
in the talks to 14, the (ex) generals stalled deliberations as there were now too 
many actors and too many topics to reach a conclusive statement. Suu Kyi called it 
“just for show”9 and she was right: it resembled pre-2010 actions undertaken in 
order to appease the West. Suu Kyi kept pressuring, at one point even threatening 
to boycott the forthcoming 2015 elections,10 so the regime repeated its tactics of 
apparent concessions, this time organizing six-party talks in April 2015. Again, 
these led to nothing. Despite Suu Kyi being apparently backed by Shwe Mann, 
this was too little to counter the emerging alliance between Thein Sein and Min 
Aung Hlaing. On 25 June 2015, the Hluttaw voted the constitutional amendments 
down, burying Suu Kyi’s hopes. Although the results clearly indicated that many 
USDP members, possibly Shwe Mann supporters, backed the amendments, it was 
not enough to overrule the Tatmadaw’s veto. The ousting of Shwe Mann in 
August 2015 was the last nail to the coffin of the NLD’s hopes to convince the 
regime to let Suu Kyi become President. 
Foreign backing was not enough either. While all those talks and negotiations 
were taking place, Suu Kyi simultaneously used her second trump card: 
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international support. In 2013 and 2014, she undertook several trips abroad (Sin­
gapore, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Australia) ostensibly to collect the fruits 
of her decades of non-violent struggle (to collect the Sakharov Prize and an hon­
orary degree in Sydney, lecture at Sandhurst and at other places). In reality though, 
behind closed doors, she asked international leaders to support her cause of con­
stitutional amendments. But the prevailing intellectual mood in the West was now 
different. Back then, Burma was a success story. Barack Obama, for whom 
Myanmar was the achievement of his “pivot to Asia”, proclaimed gaining a “a new 
partner without having fired a shot”.11 Western governments were not only jos­
tling for lead positions in Myanmar’s market for their companies, but politically 
Myanmar represented much needed good news. Suu Kyi still had red carpet 
receptions worldwide and politicians from left to right jumped to take photos with 
her and compliment her non-violent struggle. Yet, all they offered was moral 
support. Why die for Suu Kyi? 
The Rohingya trap 
There was one more reason for the West’s half-hearted support for Suu Kyi. 
Around 2013/2014 (the exact date is difficult to pinpoint as it was a gradual pro­
cess). Suu Kyi’s image slowly but steadily began sliding from that of an exceptional 
moral icon into that of an ambiguous politician. 
There was one, single reason: her stance on the Rohingya crisis. Communal 
violence erupted in Rakhine (Arakan) state in late May of 2012, though the history 
of the conflict spans decades. May 2012 made the world aware of the long-lasting 
problem of the unrecognized Muslim group, which calls itself the Rohingya and 
that has hostile relations with the Buddhist Rakhine majority in Rakhine state. 
This had started to become a serious problem as early as 1978 during the first 
exodus of the Rohingyas, though effectively it originated in 1942 with communal 
violence between Muslims and Buddhists in World War II and perhaps even prior 
to that with the Muslim colonial migration to Arakan. Widely disliked, if not 
detested by Burmese society, the Rohingya people, after decades of neglect, found 
much sympathy and publicity in the West. From 2012 onwards, the plight of the 
Rohingya dominated international media coverage of Myanmar, overshadowing 
the (better, but still sorry) state of the Buddhist Rakhines’ existence. To this the 
Burmese reacted with disbelief and anger. They perceived such global news cov­
erage of Myanmar as biased and one-sided. International, Western and Middle 
Eastern criticism of Myanmar’s stance on the Rohingya united the society in an 
anti-Muslim stance. This was coupled with re-emerging communal tensions, 
especially between Buddhists and Muslims. These hostilities reignited all the more 
after the easing of decades of an iron-clad authoritarian grip – in some cases with 
dire consequences. The Burmese proved to be ill-equipped to resist the twin pla­
gues of fake news and hate speech. Both of these phenomena went viral on Bur­
mese Facebook, contributing to a continuation of violence in Rakhine (October 
2012, September 2013) and, in 2013, to Buddhist–Muslim communal clashes and 
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anti-Muslim pogroms in ‘Myanmar proper’ (Meikhtila, Okkan, Mandalay, 
Moenyo, Letpadan, Gyobingauk, Kantbalu) and Shan State (Lashio). 
The creeping Islamophobia sweeping through Myanmar, the xenophobic turn 
in some Burmese Buddhist groups and the ‘siege mentality’ atmosphere had taken 
their toll on Suu Kyi’s stance. With the crucial 2015 elections approaching, 
speaking out in support of the Rohingya people equalled committing political 
suicide in Myanmar. On the other hand, Suu Kyi, as a hybrid politician, was surely 
aware of the human rights-based intellectual climate in the West and its con­
sequences: Westerners had certain presumptions based on her iconic image, and 
expected her to behave in a certain way. And even if at the beginning she was 
somehow unconscious of the scale of problem, she was quickly reminded of her 
ordained role as ‘the conscience of a country’. The first demands for her to use her 
moral leadership to solve the Rohingya problem started to pop up in mid-2012. 
Initially, they were quite innocent but with time, as the Rohingya issue became 
the most highlighted problem of Myanmar, they gained momentum. This was very 
bad news for Suu Kyi. Speaking out in favour of the Rohingya meant jeopardizing 
her popular support; not doing so equalled the risk of losing external backing. It 
was a real ‘Rohingya trap’. 
Suu Kyi did her best to avoid the trap. She did not say a word in support of the 
Rohingya nor did she ever use this politically incorrect name inside Myanmar. At 
the same time, she never called them by the term ‘Bengali’ – a derogative in 
Myanmar – either. In accordance with the finest eristic methods, she generalized, 
digressing from the Rohingya’s plight into broader issues: peace, reconciliation, 
rule of law as well as calls against violence and prejudice. This she coupled with her 
favourite psychological explanations (violence motivated by fear).12 The Nobel 
Laureate self-pitied herself by posing as an impartial figure who, by representing the 
middle way, became a victim of this situation.13 
Suu Kyi’s balancing act was what one may expect from a realist politician. 
Whatever she would have said, would have been bad. A realist politician in such a 
situation tries to say nothing much about anything and/or presents the issue in a 
vague, murky way, so that no one can accuse him/her of anything. Thus, Suu Kyi 
passed her test on Realpolitik-type prudence, yet did not escape criticism from 
both sides. 
She was accused of sympathizing with Muslims by some in Myanmar and 
‘Photoshopped’ pictures depicting her dressed in a hijab went viral on Burmese 
Facebook.14 Many passed on this fake news without even checking it, including – 
ironically – the wife of Thein Sein’s minister of information, Ye Htut (known as 
the “Facebook minister” due to his fondness of using social media).15 Bazaar 
rumours (and now Facebook posts) spread about her alleged personal liaisons with 
Muslims. An old accusation – of Suu Kyi being not Buddhist and Burmese 
enough – also resurfaced. This time, it re-emerged in the mouths of Buddhist 
nationalists, grouped in the Ma Ba Tha (Protection of Race and Religion) associa­
tion: an offspring of the 969 movement which was responsible for Buddhist– 
Muslim violence in 2012 and for the xenophobic turn of some segments of 
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Burmese society. According to the mouthpiece of the movement, Ashin Wirathu, 
who is an (infamous) twenty-first century equivalent of a ‘political monk’, if Suu 
Kyi “became the president, the governance would be in chaos. Racial and religious 
conflict would deteriorate”.16 On another occasion, he suggested that Suu Kyi was 
‘surrounded’ by Muslims (read: not Buddhist enough).17 Wirathu’s criticism – a 
moderate one in his case, as he was capable of far worse remarks – must be 
understood in the context of his lobbying for a set of nationalist, discriminatory 
laws. These were later known as the four “Protection of race and religion” bills, for 
which he wanted to secure Suu Kyi’s consent. Ma Ba Tha was surprised and dis­
pleased that Suu Kyi’s NLD did not support the four laws. Suu Kyi did not 
approve them and faced accusations from Ma Ba Tha of being “too focused on 
human rights” and too soft on protecting “race and religion” (read: on 
Buddhism).18 
The relations between the NLD and Wirathu deteriorated so much before the 
elections that Win Htein (a close aid of Suu Kyi) said Wirathu “should go to 
hell”.19 Disappointed with the NLD, the Buddhist radicals sided with Thein Sein’s 
wing of the USDP (Htay Oo, Tin Naing Thein, Khin Yi, Myat Hein, Ye Htut 
and others), reinforcing popular rumours that the regime was behind the Buddhist 
nationalist movement from the very beginning. Although in Myanmar it was 
popular, if not universal, to ascribe the military’s hand (or hardliners’ hand within 
the military) to founding and leading the Ma Ba Tha movement, there is no 
undeniable proof of that, only indications (albeit strong)20 and conventional 
wisdom. An unholy alliance, however, between the USDP and Ma Ba Tha did 
indeed take place from at least 2015 onwards. It was consecrated by the Thein Sein 
administration’s support for the four laws, adopted in September 2015 (two months 
before the elections) and Wirathu’s call to vote for the USDP in the November 
2015 elections. 
Suu Kyi was well aware of what was going on. She told me in February 2015: 
“the president is tactically supporting the extremists, that is why he is so popular”, 
adding, in her classic moralistic way, that “we cannot support their actions, we 
would not win by compromising our values. We could, but we don’t want to”.21 
If we look past the high moral ground of her remarks, what Suu Kyi said and did 
was simple: she refused to play the regime’s game. The regime wanted “to force 
her into a position where she has to make a pro-Rohingya public statement, that 
could damage her popularity”.22 Given the overall atmosphere in Myanmar, 
“standing up for human rights” meant “siding with the Muslims and not support­
ing the place of Buddhism in the nation”,23 which was a suicidal move from a 
political perspective. Suu Kyi realized what would happen if she supported the 
Rohingyas. Ultimately, she chose silence, then ambiguity … and was proven right 
in Myanmar. She won the elections by a landslide, despite criticism from Buddhist 
radicals. 
Thus, Suu Kyi’s stance was just secure enough to keep her first trump card – 
public support. Nevertheless, maintaining foreign support – her other ace – proved 
to be much more problematic. Yesterday’s foreign advocates did not buy her 
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Realpolitik logic. As political realism has never been a guide for human rights 
groups and likeminded mainstream media in the West (previously they would not 
have supported Suu Kyi otherwise), Western human rights groups and journalists 
witnessed “the moral giant” becoming “a calculating politician”.24 And this was 
just a token of things to come. 
Suu Kyi, who evidently wanted to keep foreign support, as she must have 
gotten used to – if not taken for granted – the universal admiration flowing from 
abroad, reacted to this new tendency with irritation and incomprehension. “Some 
NGOs think they can decide everything. They are so strong to have their own 
policies” she told me, adding that, in her opinion, “there should be a joint effort to 
build a whole new society” (under her escort, naturally). When I inquired about 
her stance on the accusations of her recently becoming a politician, she did not 
mince words: “I’ve always been a politician. I was born a politician. What do these 
journalists think I was doing all along in these 27 years? If Mandela and Havel 
could have been politicians while being in prison, … why not me?”25 At other 
occasions she expressed similar sentiments.26 
Naturally, she was correct. It is fair to admit that she described herself as a poli­
tician as early as 20 years ago.27 This is all true. Yet such strong statements did not 
help her. Deconstructing her status as an icon was not the game she should have 
played. Her Western backers supported her, not because she was a politician (even 
if an honest one) but because she was considered ‘the beacon of hope’ of a better 
world. If it turned out she was not a beacon, then why support her? The world 
was not Myanmar, where (the majority of the) people worshiped her for just being 
Aung San’s daughter and being worthy of his legacy. In the West, she was admired 
for what people believed she represented. This is a fundamental difference. She 
should have been aware of it. 
Or perhaps on the contrary? Suu Kyi might have come to realize that her iconic 
status brought her more bad than good. Perchance she was frustrated that global 
admiration did not translate into political influence within Myanmar. Imaginably, 
she grasped that she could not gain power in Myanmar with the help of the 
Western media. Or maybe she was just tired of having to meet all those foreigners 
(and answering their identical questions). Or perhaps, it was all of these factors 
combined. 
Whatever the reason, starting from around 2012/2013 (as it was a process, it is 
hard to pinpoint a date) Suu Kyi ceased to be an accessible politician, stonewalling 
herself from wanted and unwanted visitors alike. Most of these protective measures 
were taken by her secretary, dr. Tin Mar Aung, a member of her inner circle. It 
did not win her or Suu Kyi many friends. If Western journalists fell in love with 
Suu Kyi at the cusp of the 1980s and in the 1990s, now their love affair slowly but 
irreversibly came to an end. Again, this was not in Suu Kyi’s interest – she lost her 
ability (and/or the will) to handle journalists, and this had consequences. Leniency 
ended, as many people turned their backs on Suu Kyi and started taking notice of 
things previously overlooked. Fortunately for the Nobel Laureate, inside Myanmar 
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she still has the indulgence of the media. Globally however, even if much of the 
foreign criticism originated from bruised egos, there was something to it. 
The incompetence of Suu Kyi’s staff has become proverbial.28 It has led to ser­
ious consequences at times. During her 2012 trip to Thailand, Suu Kyi’s staff forgot 
to inform of their plans not only to the Thai hosts but also … to president Thein 
Sein. Once he learned (from the media) that Suu Kyi would be visiting there, he 
cancelled his trip.29 Who knows, maybe this was yet another nail in the coffin for 
Suu Kyi and Thein Sein’s relationship? Or perhaps it was the very first? 
Thein Sein was hardly the last leader affected by her staff’s poor management. 
The list of inadvertently (or otherwise) discouraged figures is long. If not answering 
the Dalai Lama’s letter, demanding the president of Mongolia’s, Tsakhiagiin 
Elbegdorj, CV or offhandedly handling the president of Maldives, Mohamed 
Nasheed, was rude, senseless (but perhaps politically inconsequential), then not 
honouring George Soros, who supported Suu Kyi’s movement financially for 
many years, was reckless.30 
As a consequence of this kind of behaviour, complaints about the NLD’s 
incompetencies became common by mid-2010. Suu Kyi’s personal staff was small, 
inefficient, disorganized and overworked. Foreign friends tried to suggest to Suu 
Kyi that a certain level of division of labour was not only beneficial but was 
required in the modern world. To no avail. Suu Kyi hired a personal assistant, Tin 
Mar Aung, only in late 2012. The Rakhine assistant brought a certain level of 
organization into Suu Kyi’s schedule, but this came at the price of becoming her 
only gatekeeper, which made Tin Mar Aung (and, by extension, Suu Kyi) many 
enemies.31 It did not change Suu Kyi’s habit of micromanaging everything by 
herself however, which resulted in her being “overworked, struggling to delegate 
power and not always getting accurate information about the day-to-day decisions 
within the party”.32 Furthermore, the NLD itself was hardly a model organization 
either. 
Cadres (not) deciding everything 
Burmese political parties are organizationally and structurally weak. They usually 
function as appendixes to their leaders. This is true for all Burmese parties, 
regardless of their ideological goals: democracy, unity, solidarity, development or 
otherwise. The NLD is not an exception here. 
When Suu Kyi was finally released in 2010, the NLD seemed more of a relic 
than a battle-hardened political party ready for another clash. The party’s 2012 by-
elections programme was built on three important – but vague – issues: rule of law, 
internal peace and constitutional amendments. Yet the party did not develop a 
detailed approach to more concrete issues, such as the ethnic conundrum, their 
relationship with the Tatmadaw, the role of the private sector, foreign investors 
and the government in the development process.33 Ideologically, the NLD was just 
the extension of Suu Kyi, who after getting to parliament and indulging in Nay­
pyidaw politicking paid less and less attention to her own party.34 
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No serious refreshment of member cadres commenced. Although Suu Kyi 
accepted some young members into the party after 2011, they were not admitted 
into decision-making positions and were kept away from her inner circle (the latter 
even narrowed). Party leadership remained in the hands of Suu Kyi’s loyal veterans 
of the anti-regime struggle. This caused some unrest,35 yet did not influence Suu 
Kyi’s policymaking. During the NLD’s first congress in March 2013 – which 
confirmed Suu Kyi’s official leadership in the party – Aung San Suu Kyi hand­
picked members of the Central Committee (120) and the Central Executive 
Committee, which now expanded from 7 to 15.36 She chose individuals on the 
basis of “their past performance, current contributions to the party and their 
potential leadership skills”.37 Only four new members (Aung Soe, Myo Aung, 
Phyu Phyu Thinn and Zaw Bwe) were included into the CEC (and some of them 
were only auxiliary members); the ratio of new members vs old ones remained 1 to 
3. By doing so, Suu Kyi “dashed” hopes, that “some ‘younger blood’ would be 
included in the NLD leadership”, but she explained, it was “impossible to leave the 
old, experienced members behind”.38 In intra-party policymaking everything 
continued in the old way: in Suu Kyi’s authoritarian “my-way-or-the-highway 
approach to managing her party”.39 All decisions were made unilaterally by her, 
based on her own assessments, their loyalty (her most valued quality in politics),40 
their previous contributions and, sometimes, competencies. She rarely valued other 
people’s advice.41 The structure of the NLD recalls the Leninist model of demo­
cratic centralism. It is top-down, hierarchical, centralized, non-transparent, inac­
cessible, inflexible, personalized, intolerant of internal dissidents and prone to 
factionalism (not unlike her father’s AFPFL).42 Because of this, the NLD was called 
“little more than a club of Suu Kyi loyalists” unable and unwilling “to reach out to 
other influential groups in Burmese society”; a club which “failed to rise above the 
level of amateurish management, with poor public relations and even worse 
mechanisms for attracting and cultivating real political talent”.43 Before the 2012 
by-elections, Suu Kyi personally chose candidates seemingly based on “how much 
time they had spent in jail”.44 
This situation repeated itself on a much grander scale before the general elections 
in 2015. Suu Kyi rejected nominations of many local leaders and veteran democ­
racy activists (e.g. Myo Khin), which were proposed by provincial NLD branches, 
putting her trusted candidates in their place. This decision produced rare public 
criticism (Suu Kyi predictably expelled defiant members from her party) and some 
defections (e.g. Khin Phone Wai, Kyi Min, Ko Mya Aye). She, too, crossed out 
some distinctive figures, such as Nyo Nyo Thin or Ko Ko Gyi (and other 88 
Student Generation candidates), deeming them potentially disloyal and trou­
blemaking, and – just in case – scrapped all Muslim candidates. Additionally, as a 
sign of things to come, she forbade the NLD candidates from speaking to the media.45 
Replying to a long unseen criticism of her decision, Suu Kyi reminded the 
people of Myanmar about the rules of her game; she came out with her very own 
pure and simple understanding of democracy: “the responsibility of the people is 
simply to vote for the party, not the name of the candidate”.46 
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For some, Suu Kyi’s autocratic style was proof of her disconnection with the 
West. As one Australian Burma watcher summarized already in 2014, 
Suu Kyi is not a democratic person. The West really wanted her to be but she 
is known to be rather despotic, bad at taking advice and intolerant of dissent. 
She no doubt has a vision for her country, but I don’t think that vision cor­
responds to the West’s vision or rather visions for Burma. She speaks impec­
cable English and may have lived in a democratic country but I think her 
politics is a continuation of her father’s independence struggle and that struggle 
is inherently anti-Western and promotes a localized version of democracy, 
which diverges greatly from both the definition and practice of democracy 
around the free world.47 
Another observer added a similar interpretation: 
Suu Kyi is not a Westernized Burmese, a global citizen, but a continuator of 
Anglicised postcolonial elites, who thinks about Myanmar the colonial way. 
We seem to think that she is just like we – she speaks impeccable English and 
she has royal manners – but it is a mask only. Inside there, she thinks the 
colonial way. What proves it, is her condescending attitude towards sub­
ordinates and servants; she unconsciously replicates colonial patterns, this is 
how she was brought up.48 
While not agreeing with some of these judgments, these observations are in line 
with what is, in this book, conceptualised as postcolonial hybridity. That is why in 
her party policy style, Suu Kyi is closer to figures such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Zuli­
fikar and Benazir Bhutto or Sirimavo Bandaranaike, than to Western equivalents. 
The inability to build a team of competent staff and the lack of qualified assis­
tants remains the NLD’s ultimate weakness – and this exposes Suu Kyi’s biggest 
post-2010 political conundrum. The elimination of competent, yet potentially 
undevoted collaborators continues to secure Suu Kyi’s paramount position. 
Nevertheless, if “cadres decide everything” (as Stalin put it), her ability to produce 
long-term reforms is structurally hampered by the incompetent, understaffed NLD. 
Suu Kyi cannot micromanage and do everything personally. 
On the other hand, fortunately for her, cadres do not decide electoral victory in 
Myanmar. 
The plebiscite 
The November 2015 general elections were Suu Kyi’s to-be-or-not-to-be in pol­
itics. If she did not win these elections, she would be marginalized and all her 
concessions would be in vain. She needed to win, and win decisively. It was the 
necessary yet insufficient precondition of her coming to power. In Suu Kyi’s long 
march to political power, winning the November 2015 general elections was key. 
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She needed to secure at least 67 per cent of the seats in both houses of the Hluttaw 
(or 329 seats). Only this guaranteed a majority, which would enable outvoting 
military MPs and other deputies (the USDP; other parties) in all but constitutional 
matters. Yet even such potentially spectacular results were just a prelude to nego­
tiations with the (ex) military establishment. The ex-junta establishment may or 
may not have allowed her to come in to power. However, to sit at the negotiating 
table at all, Suu Kyi needed to score a landslide victory. 
In the months leading up to elections, the outcome did not seem obvious at all. 
Most importantly, there was no guarantee that the elections would take place. 
Furthermore, opposing parties were not sure whether or not the regime would rig 
the vote or, more probably, just cancel the results yet again. Finally, the NLD’s 
success was not guaranteed automatically. Criticism and dissatisfaction grew as the 
elections approached. Suu Kyi lost many supporters due to her heavy-handedness 
in ruling the party, her controversial alliance with Shwe Mann, her unwillingness 
to form a coalition of democratic forces and negligence of ethnic parties. Voices of 
many Burmese people breaking the informal self-censorship on criticising Suu Kyi 
started to emerge. Critics stated that Suu Kyi was turning friends into enemies, 
lacked strategic thinking or forward planning, was detached and did not understand 
the ordinary people of Myanmar. This conjoined with dissatisfaction among 
Yangon elites, as many members of the Burmese ‘middle class’ were quite dis­
appointed with her and became disillusioned much quicker than the rest of 
society.49 It was obvious that Suu Kyi enjoyed unrivalled popularity – people once 
again flocked to her rallies in mass numbers during the 2015 campaign – but it was 
far from certain whether this would prove enough to secure the needed 67 per 
cent. Given the logic of Myanmar’s non-level playing field, the USDP started from 
a better position: the military appointed 166 MPs were their natural allies. The 
USDP did not have to win the elections, they just needed to score enough to 
block the NLD’s majority. Thein Sein’s party had at least three strong trump cards. 
The president’s reforms, though incomplete and not fully successful, had made a 
breakthrough. Moreover, the regime had finally made some progress in settling 
ethnic issues. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Thein Sein formed a con­
temporary nationalist equivalent to ‘two wheels of dhamma’ with Ma Ba Tha. This 
had enormous potential to influence the electoral results, or at least spoil the 
NLD’s victory. The generals and ex-generals had most probably wanted and hoped 
to see a divided Hluttaw, where the NLD would be at worst a primus inter pares and 
at best would sink among the many other parties. However, if they indeed thought 
so, they repeated the same mistake as in 1990. 
When I asked her whether she was afraid of becoming part of a perpetual 
opposition to the system, Suu Kyi replied: 
They will not marginalize us, they will not make it. We will not be forever in 
opposition, we will finally win, the people support us. Go to the marketplaces, 
see how many my father and mine pictures are there. And how many pictures 
of Than Shwe or Thein Sein are there?50 
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She was correct. 
When she started her long struggle to come to power within-the-system, she 
made many concessions needed to make her electoral victory possible. In her view 
these were “relatively trivial matters that can be addressed once she and her party 
are in power”.51 She was again right. She won and nothing else mattered. All her 
political concessions paid off. 
Although the NLD became intellectually shallow, with many party members 
becoming politically impotent, Suu Kyi turned her party into an effective political 
machine concentrated on winning polls. The NLD’s 2015 campaign was profes­
sional.52 It was a Burmese-styled version of electoral campaigns in Western 
countries. 
The NLD’s 2015 manifesto was neither sophisticated nor realistic. It promised a 
fool’s paradise: the amendment of the Constitution, national reconciliation, rule of 
law and the end of corruption. Additionally, they promised things that mattered to 
all people: improvement of the economy, health care, education etc. The party fell 
short on details of how to achieve these goals. It was, as always, vague. All in all, it 
did not matter. The NLD’s slogan spoke volumes: “time to change”. With such a 
catchphrase, the NLD could do without any programme, as this motto effectively 
made the elections a plebiscite on the previous military rule. 
Suu Kyi cut off all independent candidates and surrounded herself with yes-men. 
Again, it mattered next to nothing. It was she who bore the biggest responsibility. 
Tirelessly travelling from one part of the country to another during their campaign, 
she stretched herself to the limits in order to ensure that the elections followed 
precolonial patterns of electing Maha-Sammata.53 In Myanmar, where the political 
is personal, elections were a referendum on Suu Kyi herself – she saw to that her­
self. Aung San’s daughter triumphed, proving once again that she is the mother of 
the nation. This unique, unclear to foreigners, Burmese relationship between the 
ruler and the ruled, based on karmic logic, expectations of proper, moral behaviour 
and an ineffable ‘something else’, guaranteed a thunderous victory for her and her 
party. 
In the fully free elections, the NLD won by a landslide, securing 79.4 per cent of 
contested seats in the two-chamber national legislature (255 seats in Pyithu Hlut­
taw, 135 in Amyotha Hluttaw and 496 in regional Hluttaws), or 57 per cent of the 
popular vote. The NLD knocked out its competitors: the USDP and smaller par­
ties. Suu Kyi won almost everywhere. In cities more than in the countryside. She 
succeeded in Myanmar proper more than in ethnic minority regions. She made 
headway there too, however, except for in Rakhine. Minority groups also saw a 
chance of removing the (post) military establishment from power through the 
elections. This trumped all reservations they might have had about the NLD. At 
the end of the day, the elections proved to be a dual, interconnected plebiscite: a 
plebiscite on Suu Kyi as a leader and on the military rule. 
The jubilant Suu Kyi knew, however, that this spectacular triumph was just a 
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THE STATE COUNSELLOR	 
Politically speaking, the NLD’s electoral triumph was not the turning point in Suu 
Kyi’s road to power. The breakthrough was achieved afterwards, in a series of 
behind-closed-doors meetings between Aung San Suu Kyi and high-ranking (ex) 
generals. 
Above the president 
The extent of the NLD’s victory was a surprise to all, including the NLD, who 
expected to win, but by a lesser margin. Knocked out, the USDP was totally 
shocked: this was not what they forecasted in their darkest dreams. Top leaders – 
Htay Oo, Aung Min, and many others – lost their seats (Shwe Mann, contending 
as an independent, lost too). Nobody anticipated such an outcome. None was 
prepared. What happened afterwards was classic Burmese political ad hockery. 
After coming round, the regime succumbed to internal finger-pointing while 
representing itself as well-mannered to the public. Thein Sein and Min Aung 
Hlaing congratulated the NLD on its victory and announced that they would 
respect the results. Despite internal disunity, the regime was politically beaten but 
not broken. The fact that now the Tatmadaw itself (not any proxy party) would be 
the opposition to the NLD, was not ideal, but it was tolerable. Because of the 
biased Constitution, the Tatmadaw could check and balance every government 
and, in the worst case, it could topple it, too, if the government misbehaved 
(Myanmar is always one coup away from a military government). Though 
empowered, the NLD still had to cooperate and cohabitate with them anyway. 
The spectre of 1990 haunted Myanmar. The lack of trust – Suu Kyi and the (ex) 
generals did not speak to one another frequently in the period leading up to elec­
tions – might have led to a grave repetition of history (many the NLD members 
indeed feared it). Fortunately, lessons had been learnt on both sides. The NLD 
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understood it needed to convince the regime to relinquish power by means of 
confidence building measures and thus assuring the former generals that retribution 
was not an option. The military realized that the NLD in power was not the end 
of the world; it did not threaten the Tatmadaw, just enforced the need for military 
forces to be watchful. 
Suu Kyi called for reconciliation and univocally rejected ‘Nurembergs’, and the 
(ex) generals agreed to meet her.1 In a series of behind-the-scenes talks in early 
December 2015, Suu Kyi met with both Thein Sein and Min Aung Hlaing (2 
December 2015) and – crucially – with Than Shwe (4 December 2015). Appar­
ently, she used Than Shwe’s beloved grandson Nay Shwe Thway Aung2 as well as 
Shwe Mann as go-betweens to secure a meeting with the former dictator. This 
confirmed rumours that Than Shwe, although he had withdrawn from everyday 
politics, was still the person consulted when landmark decisions were at stake – 
loyalty within the Tatmadaw did not expire with retirement. The negotiations 
between Suu Kyi and the (ex) generals remained – and still remain – secret: no 
media were present and no communiqués were published, and the exact details 
(what was discussed and what was agreed on) are still unknown. Aside from smiles 
for the press and short remarks, most was revealed by Nay Shwe Thway Aung. He 
posted on Facebook about the Than Shwe – Suu Kyi meeting. It was supposed to 
last 2 hours and the ex-dictator was said to have declared “It is the truth that she 
will become the future leader of the country. I will support her with all of my 
efforts”. Accompanying this post was a picture of a 5,000 kyat banknote, signed by 
Than Shwe, Thein Sein and Suu Kyi, with a vague explanation: “The significance 
of this note is … they signed only before they became the head of the country or 
while they were head of the country”.3 And, that was it. Apart from this myster­
ious banknote story – worth a James Clavell novel – nothing more was elaborated 
on. 
Thus, it is unknown what decisions were made. Suu Kyi and the (ex) generals 
must have agreed on basic principles of cooperation; the regime endorsed a transfer 
of power to the NLD. Whether it was a transitional pact4 however, is more 
doubtful. It was rather an ad hoc, unwritten short-term deal, with a general 
understanding that the NLD would take over power and respect the Tatmadaw’s 
red lines, without concrete details, which would have to be worked out later in 
practice. Despite the fact that there was no tradition of systemic transformation in 
Myanmar, the process went by relatively smoothly and enabled a peaceful transfer 
of power. It was an achievement Myanmar should be proud of, especially when 
compared with 1990. 
However, it does not mean there were no strains. The whole process was 
shrouded in mystery and the unknown, which enhanced uncertainty and allowed 
conspiracy theories to flourish. Whatever Suu Kyi and the (ex) generals decided 
on – and it seemed that they agreed on a transfer of power, but not on constitu­
tional amendments – Suu Kyi tried to push the limits of this unwritten deal. Suu 
Kyi was empowered by her newly gained conviction that the NLD would be 
allowed to take governance. The long period of transition of power between 
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elections in November and formally taking office in February/March 2016 – a 
Burmese equivalent of political horse trading5 – gave the NLD extra time to 
negotiate a settlement. The Nobel Laureate knew the stakes were much higher for 
the Tatmadaw to stage a coup after a period of reforms. She tried to manoeuvre 
herself as much as possible in these favourable circumstances. By late January/early 
February 2016 Suu Kyi seemed to go all in: she tried to secure presidency for 
herself, despite the Tatmadaw’s veto. 
The first eligible date for a presidential election (the President is elected by the 
Hluttaw) was 8 February 2016. Just a few days earlier, Myanmar was electrified by 
news that Suu Kyi wanted to circumvent the constitutional limitations. The Tat­
madaw, however, was opposed. After that, the presidential nomination was post­
poned. Suu Kyi negotiated hard – where, how and with whom is again 
unknown – while society, diplomats, commentators and investors held their 
breaths. Anything was possible, including a coup. From the Tatmadaw’s point of 
view, amending the Constitution was a bridge too far. Facing the Tatmadaw’s 
opposition, Suu Kyi backed down and returned to her previous idea – first 
revealed just before the 2015 elections (“I already made plans”) – of her being 
“above the President”,6 nominating a proxy. 
Who would that be? The rumoured list included, among others, Suu Kyi’s 
physician Tin Myo Win, Tin Oo, U Lwin’s daughter Su Su Lwin and her husband 
Htin Kyaw, as well as Tin Mar Aung. It was a hard choice for Suu Kyi. In poli­
tics – especially in Burmese politics – one could never be sure of anything (read: 
anyone); she needed to pick an unambitious candidate. She did, placing her trust in 
Htin Kyaw, a respectable intellectual from a good family (his father was a popular 
writer), who was a retired economist and civil servant and Suu Kyi’s long 
acquaintance – though not her driver as some media announced.7 Htin Kyaw was 
an NLD veteran, with good connections (his father-in-law, U Lwin, was the 
NLD’s founding member and one of the party’s ‘uncles’). Only briefly arrested in 
2000, Htin Kyaw harboured less ill-feelings towards the Tatmadaw than other 
NLD members (read: he was acceptable to the army). Along with the NLD-
nominated vice-president Henry Van Thio – a Chin – the choice of Htin Kyaw 
who is half-Mon from his paternal side was a symbolic (even if empty) gesture 
towards ethnic minorities. All in all, Suu Kyi chose wisely. From his first inaugural 
speech (during his swearing-in on 30 March 2016 he mentioned Suu Kyi)8 until 
his resignation in March 2018, Htin Kyaw was a loyal, unambitious protégée, who 
executed his ceremonial duties with grace. A perfect puppet. 
Suu Kyi, however, was unsatisfied. The Tatmadaw’s veto over her presidency 
spoiled the fun. She still hoped to bring the military round – apparently she con­
vinced Htin Kyaw that his term would be a short one, as she would be able to 
persuade the Tatmadaw to allow her to assume the office herself9 – but in the 
meantime she kept concentrating the power in her hands. As rumoured, she 
became foreign minister. This was not at all because of her interest in foreign 
affairs. As it later turned out, her ministerial tenure was very modest, with only 
sporadic trips abroad, to such extent that a new Ministry of International 
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Cooperation was founded in 2018; its minister took over the duties of a foreign 
minister in all but name. Suu Kyi needed to be foreign minister to be a member of 
the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), potentially a powerful 
council. According to the Constitution, the President in extraordinary circum­
stances, after consulting with the NDSC, could declare an emergency and hand 
over power to the army (read: reintroduce military rule). Therefore, Suu Kyi 
needed to be on the NDSC to keep an eye on the army; a consideration that 
trumped any potential negative consequences such as the resulting inefficiency of 
the foreign ministry. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was, however, not her 
only portfolio entry. She took seats in three other ministries as well: the Pre­
sidential Office (to have an eye on the president), the Ministry of Education (a 
logical choice given her ‘educating the nation’ agenda) and the Ministry of Elec­
tricity and Energy. The last one was intriguing – Suu Kyi is not a trained techni­
cian but she probably realized the importance of the energy problem in Myanmar 
(read: she wanted to deal with it herself). Later she relinquished the last two posts 
because in the meantime she had carried out a brilliant move that checkmated the 
military and stunned the public. During the new parliament’s first session on 30 
March 2016, in its first legislative initiative, the NLD proposed a bill that cir­
cumvented constitutional limitations placed on Suu Kyi. It did so by introducing a 
new post of State Counsellor with power effectively exceeding that of the Pre­
sident (the right to oversee the President’s office, determine foreign policy and 
coordinate decision-making between the executive and the legislative). The bill 
was formulated precisely with Suu Kyi in mind (it even mentioned her by name) 
and proposed a period equalling that of the President’s term. The bill indirectly 
circumvented the Constitution as it did not contradict any causes; it simply filled a 
loophole. Suu Kyi outplayed the military establishment in style. This chancellor-
style post was a bold political move, an outstanding piece of ad hoc tactical man­
oeuvring (allegedly, the NLD lawyers invented it in the last moment when it 
became clear that Suu Kyi would not be allowed to become President).10 The 
army was taken aback; military MPs stood up and protested – military leaders 
apparently were impressed by Suu Kyi’s shrewdness in private though11 – but were 
outvoted; the bill was passed and quickly signed by the President (6 April 2016). 
Suu Kyi had secured a position not only above the President but above the 
emerging political system as well. She was not, however, above the army. In a 
country where power was personalized, it made sense. It showed that in a world of 
backstage Burmese politics, Suu Kyi was a skilful player, at least when it came to 
tactical games. If she was equally capable in long-term strategies, in competent 
governance or in improving people’s lives, she would be a stateswoman. 
All’s well that begins well 
To paraphrase Suu Kyi’s remarks from 1996,12 her government started off with a 
lot of metta from both inside and outside the country. The Burmese believed that 
electing Suu Kyi – the proper heir – would make things right in their country. 
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Foreigners believed pretty much the same (although from a different standpoint) 
and for a while, forgot about some of the reservations they held about her. 
Goodwill helped to overlook the disconsolate reality on the ground as well as 
the first warning signs. The NLD government faced the monumental challenge of 
reforming a deeply dysfunctional state and uniting a torn country. Despite Thein 
Sein’s legacy, Myanmar was still (and still is) an underdeveloped country with deep 
structural obstacles, such as ethnic tensions; an unstable economy; and a lack of 
adequate structures and institutions (e.g. ineffective bureaucracy).13 Reforming 
Myanmar after six decades of the Tatmadaw’s misrule was a Herculean task for 
anybody. 
Yet the NLD made their life even harder by “creating many of their own pro­
blems”.14 The NLD promised many things they could not deliver. Pledging to 
achieve national reconciliation with ethnic minorities was “evidence of monu­
mental hubris” given the scale of problems and the necessity of bringing the Tat­
madaw and their enemies on board.15 Even in the most optimistic scenario, it was 
going to be a long process, certainly not one completed in one term. Promising to 
be able to fix it quickly was imprudent, at best. Secondly, amending the Con­
stitution had been Suu Kyi’s number one dream, yet “to put in Machiavellian 
terms: why indeed would armed men obey unarmed ones?”16 Again, it required 
much time, patience, concessions and its final outcome was uncertain. Thirdly, 
ending corruption. Although, to her credit, Suu Kyi was (and still is) a clean poli­
tician herself and did her best to keep her government clean, too,17 corruption did 
occur. To purge the party, barely after a year in power she forced the resignation 
of her Mon chief minister, Min Min Oo, and in 2019 she spectacularly sacked and 
arrested her Tanintharyi chief minister, Lei Lei Maw (a member of the NLD’s 
CEC). But rooting out cultural patterns is a task for generation(s). In Southeast 
Asia, so far only Singapore has managed to root out corruption. And Myanmar – 
despite all of Suu Kyi’s declarations to catch up and overtake it18 – is not 
Singapore. 
After taking over power, two of Suu Kyi’s ministers – finance minister Kyaw 
Win and commerce minister Thant Myint – were caught holding fake diplomas 
from non-existing universities.19 Her cabinet members – mostly the NLD veterans, 
ex-generals (from Shwe Mann’s faction) and retired bureaucrats – were quite old; 
averaging above 70 in years (Suu Kyi was 71 then), making it the oldest govern­
ment in modern Burmese history.20 It was not a bad thing per se – though an 
ironic twist of history given Suu Kyi’s opposition to Nu’s octogenarian ‘govern­
ment’ in 1988. However, their lack of competence in law-making or executive 
experience raised questions: “they had little understanding of how a democracy 
worked in practice”.21 Nobody doubted their benign intentions, but do good 
people automatically make a good government? Myanmar was to learn the answer 
soon enough. Curiously, too, they were all men. Again, certain cultural norms 
favoured that – Myanmar is not Canada, men held more offices – but the gov­
ernmental structure did little to help the cause of Burmese female political 
representatives.22 
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Most importantly, when the NLD took over, the party seemed … unprepared 
to govern.23 They had no strategy, no reform plan, and few, if any, detailed or 
articulated policies to be implemented, even on the most fundamental issues: “it 
was almost as if the party’s overriding goal was to win government, and little 
thought had been given to what might follow after that”.24 There were two rea­
sons for this. Firstly, the NLD members were unsure to the last moment that 
power would be theirs; some even feared arrest when entering parliament.25 In a 
way, it recalled precolonial times, when a wungyi (minister) summoned to the 
palace could have expected a promotion or execution; and everything in between. 
The USDP government did not make the NLD’s life easier, either. By obstruc­
tionist policies (not handing over documents or forbidding civil servants from 
talking to the incoming team) and overspending the budget in its last months in 
power, the USDP made transition more difficult.26 Secondly, ill-preparation was a 
logical result of the dominance of ad hockery in Burmese politics. Although ad hoc 
actions, even such spectacular ones as the State Counsellor bill, could secure tactical 
goals and impress spectators, they did not work well in articulating and implementing 
medium and long-term policies. 
Suu Kyi made a bad situation even worse by rejecting many of the non-NLD 
staff. Out of distrust she dismantled the microcosmos of think thanks and analytical 
centres, the ‘brain’ of Thein Sein’s reforms. Staffed by reform-minded military and 
former third force members, Suu Kyi viewed them as enemies or traitors at worst, 
or suspicious and insufficiently loyal at best. The same applied to civil society 
organizations not associated with the NLD, exiles and other individuals. With these 
NLD-exclusive HR policies, Suu Kyi went overboard when she dismissed many 
competent, qualified and eager to work for her people – and wasted their energy.27 
Had Suu Kyi already possessed an abundance of qualified personnel, this might 
have made sense. But she did not. Her shortage of qualified candidates was pre­
viously evident and was probably the real reason behind reducing the number of 
ministries from 36 to 23 (efficiency of government was quoted).28 Thus, the 
spectre of Stalin’s cadres formula would haunt Suu Kyi for a long time. 
In mid-2016, however, all these things were unnoticed or overshadowed. 
Enthusiasm and optimism trumped everything. Initially enthusiasm and optimism 
seemed validated. Suu Kyi spoke much about national reconciliation (read: NLD– 
Tatmadaw reconciliation) and she meant it. She went above and beyond to reas­
sure the Tatmadaw to rest easy. Her government increased Myanmar’s defence 
budget to 14 per cent of the annual budget.29 She started mending fences with 
Min Aung Hlaing. Thanks to these actions, the perception of Suu Kyi within the 
Tatmadaw started changing from “a formidable threat” into “a pragmatic leader”.30 
Critics claimed that gestures such as Suu Kyi visiting the Defence Services Museum 
in Naypyidaw (a personal guided tour with Min Aung Hlaing) or inviting Min 
Aung Hlaing to both public and private commemorations of Martyr Day were 
done in order to convince the Tatmadaw of lifting the veto of her presidency.31 
Even so, it was a good thing: anything that soothed the military’s fears and anxi­
eties brought Myanmar a step further to separation of the military from politics. If 
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the result was the NLD’s over-cautiousness – tolerance to criticism of the Tatma­
daw decreased significantly, with media freedom becoming the first casualty of 
that – it was a necessary price to pay. The army’s cooperation, or at least a lack of 
disturbance by them, was the first precondition to rule Myanmar effectively and 
resolve pressing issues. 
Already by 2016 Suu Kyi had begun to tackle the single most difficult problem 
faced by Myanmar: the ethnic conundrum. Decades of brutal civil war had built a 
wall of distrust and a conflict economy benefitting local Tatmadaw commanders, 
Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and Myanmar’s neighbours. Since 1948 no 
government had been able to successfully resolve this Gordian knot, or indeed 
even where to begin. Politically and historically speaking, the Bamar majority is 
too strong (and too unwilling) to share power and privileges, and yet it is too weak 
to enforce its vision of society completely. An exclusive nation-building project 
beyond Burmese dominance had never come into existence; there was no Myan­
mar-styled ‘unity in diversity’. No Burmese leader ever resolved this problem, 
Aung San included. His Panglong conference was a step in the right direction, yet 
it was incomplete, hardly sufficient and never materialized – instead of solving the 
ethnic issue, Panglong became a myth.32 Suu Kyi wanted to build upon this myth, 
or rather establish ethnic peace in the country for the first time. Policymaking 
based on mythmaking is not a bad thing per se providing that politicians do not 
believe in the myths (Suu Kyi probably does believe in the Panglong myth because 
she over-idolizes her father). Judging by her public statements,33 she seemed to 
have hoped that simply repeating a Panglong conference in a new form would 
pave way to ethnic reconciliation. Consequently, she called a second – though 
chronologically third – Panglong conference, named the 21st Century Panglong. 
To her credit, she was able to bring representatives from almost all EAOs to the 
conference. To secure such a feat, she travelled to Beijing, and Zhongnanhai 
ordered its informal, covert clients, such as the China-bordering Wa minority, to 
appear in Naypyidaw.34 When the 21st Century Panglong kicked off in style on 31 
August 2016, there was much optimism. 
Unfortunately, after a few days of discussions, it turned out that bringing all the 
actors to one conference, though needed, did not provide the necessary conditions 
to end seven decades of ethnic strife. Expecting the opposite was naïve, given the 
conflicting agendas of so many stake-holders, some of whom were quite unwilling 
to compromise (the Wa left on the second day of the conference citing protocolary 
issues and reinforcing doubts about the militant Wa’s intentions).35 However, Suu 
Kyi believed in two things from the beginning. First, she could do it alone. 
Second, she could do better than Thein Sein’s new ceasefire agenda. Thus upon 
taking office, she dissolved the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) and dismissed Aung 
Min’s negotiation team (including their contacts and influence), instead nominating 
her trusted physician Tin Myo Win to negotiate with ethnic minority peoples.36 
While this idea should not immediately be rejected, as personal communication 
channels are an essential condition of peace-making on Myanmar soil, Tin Myo 
Win’s lack of know-how in dealing with ethnic issues proved a hindrance. 
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Coupled with the NLD leader’s unnecessary rejection of the institutional experi­
ence gathered by the MPC, this complicated Suu Kyi’s task instead of easing it. 
Most importantly, however, Suu Kyi did not seem to be able to propose a way out 
of the fundamental, structural contradiction between the Tatmadaw’s priority 
(demanding ethnic armies to disarm and demobilize) and the EAOs’ federal agenda. 
Although in her defence one may say that it requires a political genius to resolve 
this ethnic issue, the result of her actions – failure – still stands. Her Panglong 
conference did not produce results. To save face, it was rebranded as a cyclical 
event (it convened twice more, in 2017 and in 2018, still inconclusively). Soon 
new clashes dashed hopes for a quick reconciliation and the idea of a miraculous 
ethnic issue-solving conference was conveniently forgotten. 
Back then, however, in mid-2016, power transition and governance were still so 
far, so good (or at least not so bad). The lack of substance coming from the 
Panglong Conference was overshadowed by Suu Kyi’s stylish foreign policy. Soon 
after, she travelled to Washington. During her symbolical farewell visit – the last 
one with Obama and the final one as a democracy icon – she managed to have 
economic sanctions on Myanmar lifted. History came full circle: these sanctions 
were introduced mostly due to Suu Kyi and now it was she who secured their 
cancellation. It was an unequivocally positive outcome for Myanmar. Suu Kyi 
made it happen just in time. Soon Hillary Clinton lost the elections, which 
brought forth a Myanmar-disinterested Trump presidency. But even in post-2016 
USA, Suu Kyi did not achieve bad results: she was criticised much less in the USA 
about her stance on the Rohingya issue than elsewhere in the West.37 US media, 
especially liberal ones, were no less disapproving of her actions in 2017 than other 
Western outlets, but, crucially, American politicians remained much more 
constrained in their responses. Keeping many of her American friends despite 
deteriorating circumstances remains her achievement. 
More importantly, in the longer perspective, Suu Kyi mended fences with 
Beijing, re-approaching Myanmar’s top neighbour after post-Myitsone uneasiness. 
The process had already begun when Suu Kyi was in opposition: she flew to 
Beijing for the first time in June 2015 and, since assuming power, regularly con­
tinues to call on the Zhongnanhai ‘court’ accompanied by an entourage of minis­
ters and deputies. If for the West, Suu Kyi’s apparent transformation from a 
democracy icon into a Realpolitik player was a painful, shocking metamorphosis, 
then for China, it was the opposite: back to normal. For China, it was a sign of 
Suu Kyi’s political maturity: she came back to her senses, left behind her demo­
cratic illusions of youth and returned to their Asian traditional model of policy-
making. She became a responsible partner with whom one could do business. One 
only needs to wait for the Chinese to award Suu Kyi with the Confucius Prize for 
this transition process to be complete. Additionally, there was a dynastic link: for 
Xi Jinping, the leader of princeling faction, Suu Kyi is the closest a foreigner can 
get to be on par with a Chinese leader. The son of Mao’s moderate ‘lieutenant’ 
and the daughter of Burma’s independence father understand one another without 
words. 
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China reached out to the NLD too and provided kudos-hungry NLD members 
with what the Middle Country did best: red carpet receptions during sponsored 
trips, seminars, conferences and other events, with compliments announced in 
public, sweet offers whispered into their ears and red envelopes given as reimbur­
sement. This Chinese-styled ‘soft power’ significantly improved China’s bad image 
in Myanmar, or at least diminished its PR losses abroad. Moreover, dropping the 
Myitsone case and concentrating on the Kyaukpyu pipeline and economic zone as 
well as on other investment issues, all helped Beijing restore grounds for Chinese 
influence in Myanmar after Thein Sein’s ‘turmoil’. The process empowered Suu 
Kyi as well: from then on, she could count on China – in the UN Security 
Council for example – which would prove to be personally priceless for her while 
also being beneficial for Myanmar. “A tender gourd among cactuses” – as Nu 
called Burma in 1954 – cannot change its geography and has to live well with 
China while struggling not to fall into neo-colonial dependency. Whoever man­
ages this delicate balancing act – Suu Kyi has done so far – fulfils Burmese national 
interests. 
The other cactus proved welcoming, too. Although falling behind China in 
importance and influence in Myanmar, India had ambitions to catch up. Its Act 
East policy – a new incarnation of Look East – is yet to materialize, but there is 
mutual understanding, though no excitement, between Modi and Suu Kyi. Modi 
would be the last person to criticise Suu Kyi on the grounds of human rights 
abuses. India’s invisible influence was apparently instrumental in convincing Ban­
gladesh to accept Rohingyas fleeing persecution in 2017; a hypothetically firmer 
stance from Dhaka might have complicated the situation even further. Regardless 
of the reason, at the end of the day, Suu Kyi enjoyed friendly relations with both 
of Myanmar’s big neighbours. Good for her, and good for Myanmar. 
Wooing Japan was successful, too. Suu Kyi seemed to have found common 
issues with Abe. Japan is eager to restore its dominant position in Myanmar, or at 
lessen the political distance between itself and China. Japanese investments (Thi­
lawa and beyond), coupled with assistance and diplomatic support, were important 
to Suu Kyi. She was not alone vis-à-vis the West – the recent remarks of the 
Japanese Ambassador supporting Myanmar’s stance on ICJ was good evidence of 
that38 – and she was not at the mercy of China. She could balance Beijing against 
Tokyo, looking out for her and Myanmar’s best interests. 
Additionally, good relations with Seoul, Bangkok and Singapore (and not bad 
with Jakarta) compensated the complicated relations with the West and even more 
complicated relationship with Kuala Lumpur. All in all, the balance of Suu Kyi’s 
foreign policy is positive. 
The ARSA and other political earthquakes 
On 24 August 2016 an earthquake struck Myanmar damaging many (ill-restored) 
temples in Bagan. In a country where such signs were traditionally interpreted as 
forewarnings of problems to come, it was considered a bad omen. 
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And indeed, between Autumn 2016 and Autumn 2017, Suu Kyi experienced 
her worst period, with mounting domestic-cum-international problems. In 
November 2016, Burmese military and police posts in Northern Shan State were 
attacked by forces from a new EAO alliance – called the Northern Alliance (NA) – 
consisting of Kachin’s KIA, the Arakan Army (AA), Kokang’s MNDAA and 
Palaung’s TNLA (informally backed by UWSA). The Alliance launched a coordi­
nated offensive, inflicting heavy losses upon the Tatmadaw and provoking its sub­
sequent counteroffensive. Effectively they sent Suu Kyi’s Panglong idea packing. 
Since then, the situation in Shan, Kachin and Rakhine states has deteriorated , with 
alternating periods of fighting and negotiations. Moreover, the EAOs generally 
preferred to deal directly with the Tatmadaw and bypass a helpless Suu Kyi alto­
gether. She herself noticeably sided with the Tatmadaw’s position on ethnic issues, 
reaching a “cynical simpatico” with the army.39 Regardless of who was more to 
blame, the result is evident: the demise of 21st Century Panglong. At the end of 
the day Suu Kyi not only did not achieve more than Thein Sein’s NCA, she 
actually achieved even less. 
A little earlier, in October 2016, for Suu Kyi an even worse political catastrophe 
commenced on the western edge of Myanmar. On 9 October 2016 a new 
Rohingya guerrilla group, ARSA – onerous to fight with due to their use of civi­
lian outfits – attacked Burmese military posts in Rakhine by surprise, prompting 
severe retaliation. Enraged, the Tatmadaw reverted to a version of its traditional 
‘four cuts’ tactics to strike back at ARSA and punish the Rohingya community 
collectively. Although successful in military terms, the tactics came with a price. It 
was no longer the 1960s and the (Western) world reacted with strong diplomatic 
condemnation centred, predictably but unfairly, on Suu Kyi. Criticism, much 
harsher than there had been pre-2015 – including from fellow Nobel Peace Prize 
laureates – was apparently a shock for her. “She’s angry (…) she doesn’t ‘get it’ 
why the world doesn’t understand” one source revealed; Suu Kyi instantly sensed 
danger for her cabinet: she warned Western diplomats that establishing a UN Fact 
Finding Mission on Rohingya would “bring down her government”.40 In her 
mind, she did her best: she appointed the Kofi Annan Commission and tried to 
manoeuvre the Rakhine minefield. It was not quite so easy – she made several 
diplomatic mistakes while implementing her (inconsequential and incompetent) 
Rakhine policies – but her actions were indeed rational from a Burmese perspec­
tive. She could not allow herself to alienate the Tatmadaw as it potentially would 
be politically fatal to her. Additionally, the first cracks between her and Min Aung 
Hlaing appeared (despite the Tatmadaw’s wish, the NLD was unwilling to convene 
a NDSC, fearing it might lead to coup).41 Furthermore, Suu Kyi could not stand 
up against her (anti-Rohingya) nation and lose her major trump card: popular 
support. She had to walk an ever more swinging tightrope in the rapidly deteriorating 
atmosphere. 
On 29 January 2017, a prominent NLD Muslim lawyer (a constitutionalist and 
one of the authors of the State Counsellor bill), Ko Ni, was killed in broad day­
light; shot while waiting (with his grandson in his hands) in front of a taxi stand 
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before Yangon’s Mingaladon airport. This brutal, macabre and blatant murder 
triggered an avalanche of speculations and theories – some elements within the 
Tatmadaw were considered probable though unproven accomplices. Regardless of 
whether Ko Ni was killed for being a Muslim or for being a constitutionalist (or 
for both), the assassination “sent NLD reeling”, as it seemed to confirm their worst 
fears: fears of the old regime’s schemes and plots to overthrow them.42 Certainly, it 
deprived the NLD of one of its brightest (and most independent) minds. Suc­
cumbing to the anti-Muslim atmosphere, Suu Kyi did not attend Ko Ni’s funeral, 
making yet another personal sacrifice, aka choice, in service of her political cause. 
By 2017, the first signs of disappointment with what the NLD had done, or 
rather had not done, emerged in society and (especially) abroad. The NLD came to 
power with the overarching slogan “time for change”, yet little had changed after 
the first one and half years (and thereafter) of its governance. Sweeping reforms 
modernizing the country never materialized. Their top goals of national reconci­
liation, peace, achieving constitutional amendments and economic development 
were not realized. The unimpressive progress on these issues undercut the NLD’s 
credibility. Expectations were always too high, if not impossible to meet – “we are 
not magicians” Suu Kyi’s spokesman Zaw Htay pleaded43 – but the party had done 
little to tone down the optimistic promises it had made during its electoral cam­
paign. The April 2017 by-elections marked the first political warning to Suu Kyi. 
The NLD won, but only modestly (securing 9 out of 19 contested seats), suffering 
a telling defeat in ethnic minority areas. History repeated itself in the 2018 by-
elections when the NLD won 7 out of 13 seats (54 per cent). 
Many groups were disenchanted for different reasons. The business community 
complained about the NLD’s inability to formulate concrete plans or strategies. A 
long awaited NLD-backed economic programme was finally published in June 
2016, yet it satisfied few. The NLD undermined investors’ confidence with 
bureaucratic delays or arbitrary and contradictory administrative and legislative 
measures, which led to the slowdown of economic growth and decrease in FDI 
inflow. This was coupled with the kyat’s loss in value, soaring prices, and energy 
blackouts which all affected ordinary people’s lives. “Economy is clearly not this 
government’s top priority”, one manager summarized.44 
Ethnic minorities expressed their grievances for what they saw as Suu Kyi 
patronizing them. Previous charges of condescending remarks, endorsing Burman-
centric historiography and using Burmese Buddhist cultural symbols,45 were now 
joined by accusations of not listening to ethnic voices, neglecting their feelings and 
dominating administration cadres (the NLD nominated all chief ministers even in 
regions where they did not win).46 In early 2017, in an event that symbolically 
spoke volumes, Mons staged a protest against naming a new bridge in Mawlamyaing 
after Aung San. Suu Kyi’s Panglong on her turn, suffered from heavy moral 
rhetoric and few specifics: Suu Kyi neglected personal diplomacy, while she kept 
preaching and sloganeering to EAOs about values, which did little to win their 
trust.47 Gen. Gun Maw, KIA’s vice leader, told me a few words, which summarize 
The State Counsellor 111 
ethnic peoples’ feelings quite well: “we can’t say she helps the ethnic minority 
peoples just because she dresses in their clothes. That’s much too little”.48 
Ethnic minorities were hardly the last dissatisfied group. Many Burmese disliked 
Suu Kyi’s ‘Tatmadaw first’ policy. Alignment with military interests and making 
concessions towards the army in key areas resulted in her following the footsteps of 
the old regime in many ways.49 If this argument seems a bit detached from reality – 
Suu Kyi had to appease the Tatmadaw in order to remain in power at all – then 
let’s just say that, at the end of the day, there was little difference between the old 
regime and the new NLD one. 
Democrats, both Burmese (and especially Western) expressed concerns about the 
insufficiency of democracy in the NLD’s governance. Suu Kyi banned the NLD 
MPs from talking to the media (“iron rules”),50 forbade public criticism of her or 
her party, and limited debates, MPs’ initiative and democratic practices within 
Hluttaw. The NLD did not undo the old system of repression. It kept previous 
laws (e.g. Telecommunication Law, section 66 d) and imposed some new restric­
tions on journalists and citizens. Occasionally, it reverted to censorship and arrests 
of critics for their remarks in media and on Facebook.51 
The NLD’s rule meant a “reduction in the country’s degree of authoritarianism, 
not a qualitative change to its political system”.52 This probably had to do with the 
simple fact that, unlike the USDP, the NLD did not have to prove its ‘democratic 
credentials’, they just took their legitimacy for granted.53 
The harshest criticism came from abroad as a result of the treatment of the 
Rohingya people and because of the NLD government’s defensive narrative 
towards foreign criticism, mirroring SLORC/SPDC’s approach. In an ironic twist 
of fate, the 26 years (1989–2015) of Suu Kyi’s calls for exerting pressure on the 
government came to haunt her now, as the world continued to pressure Myan­
mar’s government – this time hers. Again, it was just a prelude of what was to 
come. 
To make matters worse, to paraphrase an Eastern European catchphrase, the 
NLD had been “heroically overcoming self-created difficulties”. If the concentra­
tion of power in the hands of Suu Kyi made political sense, then her over-
centralisation and governance practices led to serious administrative deficiencies. 
Aside from being the State Counsellor and two ministers at once, at the beginning 
of her rule Suu Kyi chaired two important sub-cabinet committees (security, 
tranquillity and rule of law; economic affairs). Later the number increased to 
around 30 committees, important ones and less so (like the BRI committee). Her 
autocracy; tendency to micromanage everything (in a ‘schoolmarm’ style – she 
introduced a performance evaluation report system for subordinates); the need for 
her consent to every decision, big or small; her want to vet every bill before its 
submission to parliament; and her unwillingness to delegate authority to others, all 
led to her inability to cope with many tasks, which led to bureaucratic and legis­
lative inertia and administrative inefficiency.54 Her lack of inclusiveness towards 
outside groups (ethnic organizations, civil society groups, grassroots activists and 
others) resulted in their perception of negligence. They felt unwelcome; she rarely 
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met with local media and even less frequently with civil society, instead coordi­
nating policies from only within her own inner circle of the NLD veterans, key 
bureaucrats, diplomats and ex-officers.55 Her tokenism and tendency towards 
moral preaching; propensity to defy public grievances (protests were either ignored 
or suppressed); poor PR communication; a puritan streak (that led to the unpop­
ular and ultimately revoked decision of restricting the purchase of betel) and her 
concentration on symbolic yet cosmetic issues (anti-litter campaign), all took the 
shine off of her.56 Suu Kyi recognized this, offering what was interpreted as a sort 
of self-criticism. In reality, it was an intelligent neutralisation of accusations. During 
her anniversary speech, where she defended herself (“One year is not a very long 
period”), she offered to “step aside” if the people found her work unsatisfactory.57 
Suu Kyi knew her nation well and so she was well aware that goodwill towards 
her had not eroded so much by then as to seriously trouble her. If each new 
government in the world had a proverbial 100 days of immunity, then in Myan­
mar, Suu Kyi had 1000 days. People complained, but did not rebel against the 
mother of their nation. In 2016 and 2017, I frequently heard: “give her time”, 
together with “the military disturbs her and conspires against her” (blaming the old 
regime became the favourite excuse of the NLD supporters). The latter claim, 
although unsubstantiated,58 showed one tendency: “while the hoped-for change 
has not taken place yet, no one wants a return to authoritarian rule – not even the 
army itself”.59 
Besides, the NLD government was not a total disaster. Firstly, it survived, which 
was not an obvious thing at all at the beginning of 2016. Secondly, it normalized 
relations with the Tatmadaw and consolidated administrative power, by founding a 
modus operandi with bureaucratic nomenclature.60 It lifted US sanctions and 
improved, albeit modestly, Myanmar’s infrastructure, education and health services; 
it reduced rural poverty (a bit); it started the restructuration of state banks and 
enterprises, undertook financial and legal reforms and exercised fiscal restraint.61 All 
in all, the balance sheet of the NLD government was negative in August 2017, but 
it was not a total failure. It still did not risk repeating the fate of Nu’s Pyidawtha 
plan, which promised miracles and ended up becoming an object of jokes in 
society. There was widespread hope that Suu Kyi would still be able to make 
things right. 
And then ARSA attacked again. 
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FALL FROM GRACE	 
With the Rohingya crisis, Suu Kyi hit a brick wall. Until now, she had been trying 
to keep her twin trump cards of domestic support and foreign backing. The latter 
was eroding, but until September 2017 there were still illusions, hopes (that she 
would combat the Rohingya issue) and goodwill in the West, which prevented 
people from crossing her out. After September 2017, due to the scale of the crisis, 
these considerations ended. To the global public, Suu Kyi became the villain – the 
fallen icon. 
The Rohingya crisis 
On 24 August 2017 the Annan Commission officially submitted its report: a 
compromise, which offered the Rohingya a path to citizenship (by revisiting the 
1982 law), while not using the name ‘Rohingya’ in the document.1 The NLD 
accepted the report. However, the next day, ARSA attacked 30 military and police 
facilities in Rakhine state, effectively sabotaging the Annan Commission’s efforts 
and triggering the worst ever retaliation from the Tatmadaw. Tired of waiting for 
NDSC to be conveyed, Min Aung Hlaing allowed his field commanders (Aung 
Kyaw Zaw, Maung Maung Soe, Khin Maung Soe and others) to act as they 
pleased. They did so; pushing ARSA back to Bangladesh along with approximately 
700,000 civilians, committing ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity with 
“genocidal intent”2 along the way. In the West, a passive Suu Kyi was blamed for 
the tragedy: the crisis was a game changer in her relations with the West. 
Apparently, the situation blew in up Suu Kyi’s face: she was hardly prepared for 
it. Since the very beginning of global media attention on Rakhine, Suu Kyi con­
sidered it a secondary issue compared to more important priorities. From the 
moment she had assumed leadership, not much had changed. She simply swept the 
Rakhine problem under the rug so that the issue did not disturb her policymaking 
116 Fall from grace 
in Naypyidaw. True, she appointed the Annan Commission, but thought that that 
alone would take care of the problem. As Ye Min Zaw told me, “she had a good 
plan with the Commission, but she played it out badly”.3 Suu Kyi did not invest 
much of her domestic capital into convincing the Rakhines and the Rohingyas 
about the Annan Commission’s intentions. She visited the region only once and 
met only with selected representatives, local ‘yes men’. In August 2017, her long­
time negligence and disinterest in the Rakhine issue backfired.4 The crisis over­
whelmed her, proving that in a watershed moment she failed to act as a successful 
stateswoman. 
Incompetent and taken by surprise, Suu Kyi “mishandled the crisis”.5 She was 
overshadowed by the Tatmadaw. The army did what it pleased without asking (or 
perhaps even informing) Suu Kyi. Once the unprecedented scale of the tragedy 
became globally evident, media attention concentrated on Suu Kyi, not on the 
army. The “Man bites dog” motif worked again. A brutal army massacring mino­
rities in a Global Southern country was not news: the world knows too many of 
such stories. Besides, who could pronounce and remember Min Aung Hlaing’s or  
Maung Maung Soe’s names? However, a genocide in a country governed by a 
famous Nobel Peace Laureate was definitely news. Western and Middle Eastern 
media were quick to condemn Suu Kyi (although it was not she who was killing 
Rohingya people), repeating their well-known accusations with a double-barrelled 
fury. 
The deluge of criticism forced Suu Kyi to react. In her speech on 19 September 
2017 Suu Kyi played dumb. She claimed that her government did not know the 
reasons behind the Rohingyas’ flight (“we want to find out why this exodus is 
happening”) and that the human rights violations would be “addressed in accor­
dance with strict norms of justice”.6 Her tactics were intelligent, if desperate: after 
all, it would be much better to be portrayed as a detached from reality ruler, than 
as a powerless leader. She, too, downplayed the direct causes of the Rohingyas’ 
exodus by placing the crisis in a wider context of more important domestic prio­
rities, including the economic development of Rakhine. This was not incorrect in 
a wider sense, yet it was badly timed. While media showed satellite images of 
scorched villages and footage of hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing the Naf 
river, the foreign public demanded actions to help them, not Suu Kyi outlying 
developmental strategies for the region. The NLD’s leader either underestimated 
the problems of Rakhine once again or spoke the way she did to enhance the false 
image of an ill-informed politician. 
These image-protecting measures were to no avail. After that fatal speech she 
was condemned even more for her words and (in)action. It completed the process 
of her ‘fall from grace’. This did not mean she lost all friends in the West – some 
influential characters, such as Mitch McConnell and Boris Johnson remained. 
Furthermore, till this day, she has better contact (and understanding) with Christine 
Burgener, the Special Envoy to the UNSG, than with Yanghee Lee, the former 
UN’s Special Rapporteur on Myanmar. And she received much more under­
standing from Western politicians, than from Western media; reactions from 
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politicians and diplomats concerning her actions to the Rohingya crisis have been 
much more constrained than those of the media. In a way, by using her contacts in 
the West, she was able to reduce and neutralise negative political responses towards 
the Rohingya crisis.7 If not for her, the world’s political reaction might have been 
even harsher given what happened in Rakhine. But thanks to her backstage 
diplomacy, the criticism on Myanmar, albeit rhetorically harsh, remained symbolic 
and confined to the media sphere. 
Nevertheless, that said, from now on associating with Suu Kyi became a burden, 
not a boost, for any Western politician. If previously Suu Kyi was the person to 
have a photo with, it now became fashionable to condemn her and distance one­
self from her, especially among certain activist groups and their supporters. Their 
pressure prompted such actions as the futile attempts to take away her Nobel Peace 
Prize, revoking prestigious international awards and Canadian honourable citizen­
ship and – in a very academic styled gesture – removing Suu Kyi’s portrait from 
her Oxford College’s hall of fame. Although these were only symbolic gestures – it 
would have been far worse for Suu Kyi if Mitch McConnell had removed her 
picture from his office – when it came to Suu Kyi’s until-now second trump card, 
unequivocal foreign support, it was game over. 
There was no global understanding for the following issues she had to consider. 
First, even now, there is widespread abhorrence towards the Rohingya people in 
Burmese society. These feelings stem from several issues: the colonial legacy of 
anti-Indian sentiment; as a consequence of the postcolonial bloodbath in Rakhine; 
and the anxiety towards ‘encroaching’ Islam and the fear of Islamic terrorism. 
These and other factors make the Rohingya – their very name a centre for dis­
pute – the scapegoat for all the social and political ills of Myanmar. I suspect every 
Burma scholar has a personal collection of anti-Rohingya remarks heard from 
people in Myanmar. I certainly do. Comments ranging from “dump them all into 
sea”, via historical findings (“they are not from this land, they came here”) to  
philosophical questions (“is it possible to Burmanize Rohingya?”).8 
This atmosphere alone would force any politician to take these public sentiments 
into consideration: why (politically) die for the Rohingya? Unfortunately, in 
August/September 2017, hysteria about the “Islamist terrorist threat” reached its 
climax. It was no longer just a “multidimensional disconnect”9 between responses 
inside and outside Myanmar. Burmese reactions were “not only different but dia­
metrically opposed” to Western ones.10 If it was all about “the most persecuted 
minority in the world”, expelled en masse amid crimes against humanity in the 
West, then in Myanmar it was reported as a Burmese version of 9/11.11 The cir­
cumstances were such that society was (and still is) not only understanding, but 
openly supportive, of the Tatmadaw’s stern measures – on this issue “the military 
and the wider public find themselves blissfully aligned”.12 On top of that, Suu Kyi 
still needed to have public backing to balance the army’s position. If she went 
against the feelings of her people, she would commit a spectacular political seppuku. 
Second, and combined with the first issue, was Suu Kyi’s imperative not to rattle 
the Tatmadaw if she wanted her government to continue to exist. In private she 
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was supposedly angry at the Tatmadaw – about the army deciding to resolve the 
Rohingya problem by force and not peacefully as she herself preferred.13 Even so, 
her relationship with the Tatmadaw was too precarious to risk it for the Rohingya 
minority. Given the Tatmadaw and the people’s shared resentment of the Rohin­
gya, Suu Kyi’s hypothetical support for these Muslims would be like scoring a 
spectacular own goal. At best it would lead to a significant decrease in her support 
causing a deterioration in her position vis-à-vis the Tatmadaw; at worst it could 
even justify an anti-Suu Kyi coup. 
Third, she did not necessarily disagree with the public sentiments. While accus­
ing Suu Kyi of Islamophobia is unfair, she nevertheless seemed to share many 
anxieties of her compatriots (albeit in a softer form). Already in 1979 she had 
spoken publicly about the “dislike of Muslims” within society and the “irrational 
fear” of the Muslims “swamping the Burmese”. She referred to societal distaste of 
ritual killings, commenting that “in Burma it was alright to cut a man’s throat, but 
to do the same to an animal was a heinous crime”.14 Even if she did it with irony, 
she did not distance herself from it. In 2013 she said there was a “climate of fear” 
originating from “worldwide perception that global Muslim power is very great”.15 
Apparently she held a “not-unfounded sense” that “aggressive and chauvinistic 
voices within the international Muslim community … have deliberately fuelled a 
hate campaign against her”.16 In the early 2010s she told the Polish Ambassador 
“look what Islam has done to India”, meaning: Myanmar did not want to experi­
ence the same problems of communal discord and conflict.17 If true, this means she 
was not against Islam per se, but in Myanmar would rather keep at arm’s length. 
Over one million Rohingya with their Bengali origin (regardless of whether their 
ancestors were Mrauk-U’s captives or colonial or postcolonial immigrants) did not 
fit this worldview well. It did not mean she deliberately wanted to harm them or 
harboured ill-feelings towards them. No, nothing personal here. But it is easier to 
toss away foreigners (perceived or real) than compatriots. Suu Kyi most probably 
does not consider the Rohingya as fellow Burmese (but as Bangladeshis).18 From 
her perspective, reforming and upgrading her country mattered much more than 
their plight (however sorry). She was “not a Mother Teresa”19; Myanmar, and her 
conviction that she was indispensable to it, was much more important than 
improving the world. If the Rohingya had to be sacrificed for Burma’s greater 
good, so be it. Suu Kyi was able to give up her husband, children and so many 
friends and loyal supporters for her cause, now she did the same to a million of 
unwanted foreigners. 
It seemed fair enough to the Burmese (it still does even now) but not to the 
(Western) world. No one expected her to behave like that. Of all people, Suu Kyi 
was supposed to support repressed minorities. She was supposed to take moral 
leadership and prevent massacres like, say, Gandhi, who saved Muslims in 1947 
Calcutta. Suu Kyi failed dramatically. This was the first, fundamental reason for 
condemning her. Her stance remains indefensible from a liberal-internationalist 
point of view. 
Fall from grace 119 
The second fundamental reason behind denouncing her is much more personal. 
Since she left house arrest in 2010, Westerners “would simply love to see her 
revert to her role as icon of democracy, rising above party politics, and even 
offering the unfortunate Rohingya a modicum of support”, as Derek Tonkin cor­
rectly summarized.20 Suu Kyi was expected to give hope, call for peace in the 
world and give advice on how to live life fully – something akin to the Dalai 
Lama. She did the opposite: she chose the fully ambiguous road of ‘politicalness’. 
And she spectacularly spoiled the fun. This explains what Andrew Selth called “the 
extreme nature” of some criticism, “often highly personal (in) tone” of analysis and 
with a “strong sense of loss, even betrayal” – especially among human rights acti­
vists – who “feel badly let down” by someone who was supposed to be “different 
from other politicians”. Consequently, critics in Selth’s view behaved as “spurned 
lovers”: “lashing out with extra force against someone once held dear, giving par­
ticularly sharp edge to their comments”.21 Today’s condemnations of Suu Kyi – 
just like her previous idealisation – tell more about the commentators and their 
hopes projected onto her than about Suu Kyi herself. 
It shows, too, the negative consequences of the celebrification of politics. It is 
the flip side of earlier depoliticization, which later rebounds. Criticism of Suu Kyi 
operated (and still operates) on the same logical basis as media attention that follows 
movie stars, singers and other celebrities: from praise to condemnation. This was 
simply the media’s melodramatic soap opera called ‘the icon’s fall’, a second season 
to the previous series, ‘the beacon of hope’. 
Finally, and most importantly for this book, it shows the delusions and delu­
siveness of postcolonial hybridity. Suu Kyi was considered ‘ours’, ‘Western’, etc., 
and expected to follow Western values and patterns accordingly. International 
audiences understood that her goal was to ensure civic rights so that everyone in 
Myanmar could live a dignified life, unrepressed by authorities. This was the reason 
international supporters backed Suu Kyi, not because she fought for power (why 
should they care about her otherwise?). If she bailed out on her most repressed 
people, relinquishing the goals she (allegedly) had been fighting for, then she was 
betraying previously set values. Suu Kyi responded to these accusations by 
emphasising that she has been a politician all along (meaning: back off, don’t 
expect an activist’s behaviour). This is true; she had acted like a politician from the 
start, a certain level of opportunism22 in courting the Western world (e.g. in her 
initial charming stance towards journalists) notwithstanding. Yet, from a Western 
perspective, this is a weak justification. Being a politician does not absolve one 
from respecting human rights. A politician should use their power to fight for 
them. 
But from the start, these were not necessary her values or ideas. 
Suu Kyi understands the way the Western world operates and wants to imple­
ment some – not all – of its civilizational achievements into Myanmar. But she is 
not Western, she is a hybrid politician, someone inbetween worlds. The funda­
mental misunderstanding between the Western perception of her and reality had 
much to do with the fact that Suu Kyi had been socialised in the UK, speaks 
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impeccable English and knows European cultural patterns, leading to many to take 
for granted that she shared the values of the Western world. Yet, the similarity was 
only surface level – in phraseology, declarations, slogans. Deeper inside, there lies 
the uncomfortable truth, that human rights, democracy, rule of law etc., matter 
differently to the Burmese than to Westerners. Suu Kyi, to her credit, never suc­
cumbed to talk of ‘Asian values’, yet in one thing she was quite similar to many 
Asian elites (who reject human rights while valuing Western education). She 
understood Western-cum-universal values as ways to improve her country, not as 
autotelic values. Since the beginning of her career, she looked for external ideas to 
reform Myanmar: to use what is needed and discard what is not. So, when a 
decisive moment came and universalist values clashed with domestic (personal) 
interests, she chose the latter. The Rohingya crisis spectacularly showed that, for 
Suu Kyi, human rights had their limits when Myanmar’s and Burmans’ (and her 
personal) interests were at stake. Human rights mattered very much when she was 
in opposition; when she came to power, however, emphasizing them would do 
more harm than good to her interests.23 In short, her country (and her role in it) 
came first; universal values – second. 
From a liberal internationalist perspective, national reconciliation should apply to 
all people living in Myanmar, regardless of whether they are part of the Burmese 
nation or not. In postcolonial Myanmar, however, where colonial categories were 
and still are based on a hierarchical concept of taingyintha 24 and where ethnic 
designations were tied to issues of national unity,25 the Rohingyas not belonging to 
the nation was (and still is) an essential issue. These colonial categories decided 
about the life and death of a community over one million strong. The fact that she 
still does not consider the Rohingya a ‘Burmese people’ –like the vast majority of 
her nation – is just as important to her political choices as her Realpolitik impera­
tives. Suu Kyi was no more immune to this post-mortem symbolic colonial violence 
than her nation. 
Finally, the Rohingya issue is precisely the point where her postcolonial hybrid 
path and the liberal universalist West spectacularly diverge. The issue itself shows 
the limits of hybrid policymaking. For two decades Suu Kyi skilfully navigated the 
stormy waters of both Burmese and international politics, capably connecting two 
aspects of her heritage for her own political good … until the crisis broke out. It 
became a turning point: she had to choose between Myanmar and the world. 
Picking one meant losing the other. Her unenviable choice had consequences. Suu 
Kyi’s fall from grace had finally deprived the leader of one of her twin aces – 
unequivocal foreign support. Although she played it cool in public, referring to the 
Buddhist law of annica, or impermanence (she stated, that: “actually, nothing is 
surprising, because opinions change and world opinions change like any other 
opinion”),26 she must have been aware that this was a serious setback for her. Truly 
her foundation was shaken. She had to bid farewell not only to the international 
admiration she got used to and to valuable political support but also, most impor­
tantly, she lost the leverage she had over the (ex) generals. Now some (though not 
all) foreign friends, like Bill Richardson, were turning into enemies. 
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However, not all was lost. She received a political blessing in disguise. 
Ms Suu Kyi goes to The Hague 
Western and Middle Eastern criticism of Suu Kyi finds little understanding in 
Myanmar. For the majority of the Burmese, Suu Kyi is the mother of nation, who 
sacrificed herself for the Motherland. Down with those, who would raise their 
hands against the mother! “We stand with Aung San Suu Kyi!”, they rallied. The 
Burmese reacted with anger and rejection of foreign criticism to a scale much 
larger than in 2012 or 2016. For Suu Kyi, who was weakened by her so-so gov­
ernance, this was a new revving of the engine, so desperately needed to stay in 
power. She successfully positioned herself as the protector of her country against 
foreign aggressors. Convenient battle lines were set: she as the leader of Myanmar 
vs. the hostile world. 
Intriguingly, by not allowing the UN’s fact finding mission and rejecting its 
report as well as bluntly dismissing international accusations (she rejected some 
accusations as “fake news” and a “huge iceberg of misinformation”)27 and calls for 
accountability, Suu Kyi mirrored SLORC/SPDC’s pre-2011 actions and phra­
seology. Before, it was she who called for pressure and sanctions to influence the 
regime; now the international community used the same tactics against her. In this 
example of political bad karma – the Rohingya issue as “Suu Kyi’s nemesis”28 – 
there is an important difference however. The military regime’s message did not 
receive traction neither at home nor abroad. It did not resonate in society due to 
the Tatmadaw’s insufficient legitimacy. This time, Suu Kyi’s narrative was shrugged 
off in the West, too – it even enhanced condemnation of the Peace Nobel 
Laureate – yet it found perfect understanding and support at home. No more was 
needed. A Burmese version of ‘rallying around the flag’ provided Suu Kyi with 
both long-lasting domestic support and became a convenient excuse for her partial 
competence at governance. The more foreign media slanders her over the years, 
the more Suu Kyi’s popularity blossoms at home. With Myanmar constantly 
attacked, condemned and vilified from abroad, nobody (or few at best) inside the 
country ask questions about tangible results of Suu Kyi’s governance. All unite 
behind the symbolic mother of their nation. Those who did not do so, like two 
Reuters’ journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo (2019 Pulitzer Prize winners, who 
uncovered the mass murder of Rohingya in Inn Din and spent more than 500 days 
in jail), faced ostracism and misunderstanding. Even if in private conversations the 
Burmese agreed that the Reuters’ journalists were set up by the Tatmadaw-con­
trolled police,29 the majority (Yangon elites and individual cases excluding) con­
sidered them (at best) little more than traitors. The nation and the leader were 
almost single-minded about that too. For Suu Kyi, who could have granted them 
amnesty much earlier and did so only after lengthy outside pressure, they “must 
suffer for the glory of Burma”.30 In yet another example of hybridity, her stance 
mirrored governance in colonial times, where, although some freedoms were ulti­
mately granted to colonies, those who crossed the red lines of colonial security 
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landed in jail. Suu Kyi’s restrictions on freedom of speech could be interpreted the 
same way. Just as in colonial times, when “doctrines of liberty” could not be 
“transferred nor applied to the East” until “a higher order of general civilization”31 
permitted it, full implementation of these freedoms had also not as yet happened in 
Myanmar. Up until now, political expediency had not allowed for it. 
Paradoxically, then, the nature of Western and Middle Eastern criticism over the 
Rohingya issue favoured Suu Kyi in the local context. Condemnation, directed at 
the country and at Suu Kyi, and not at the real culprits – the Tatmadaw – united 
the Burmese in a ‘siege mentality’. Media logic (accusing a Nobel Laureate) kept 
the Suu Kyi-centric narrative about Myanmar. For two decades Suu Kyi’s dom­
inance in coverage of Myanmar tremendously helped her political cause … and, it 
is still favourable for her even now. As long as she remains the main target of 
criticism, she can play the convenient role of a nation’s shield. 
This was best seen when Myanmar was accused of committing genocide against 
the Rohingya people by Gambia at the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague in November 2019. In a rare spectacle of unapparent political outcomes 
(not often does a Peace Nobel Prize Laureate defend their policies against accusa­
tions of genocide and even less often do such accusations serve their own interests) 
Suu Kyi once again showed her political talents. The Laureate, known for her 
quick-thinking skills and brilliant out-of-the-box ad hoc actions, announced she 
would personally defend her country at The Hague, although she did not have to 
do it. By doing so, however, she turned this process into a ‘we’ versus ‘them’ issue 
and stationed herself as the symbolic protector of her country against evil foreign­
ers. Additionally, she made her trip to The Hague a political show: media covered 
her every move and her defence speech was broadcast on live TV. A huge screen 
constructed near the town hall in Yangon also showed the live transmission. Pro-
Suu Kyi rallies spontaneously sprouted in Yangon and other cities: the Burmese 
united once again behind the mother defending their country. Consequently, her 
popularity reached new highs. Unveiling a year before (another bevy of) crucial 
elections, the ICJ case was heaven-sent for Suu Kyi. 
Against these benefits, the cons – another deluge of international criticism (the 
new season of ‘the icon’s fall’ media series) – mattered little. After initial (well­
hidden) personal gloom over the loss of Western support (she acted withdrawn and 
retreated),32 Suu Kyi reconciled herself with Western criticism. As for the West, 
critics noted “she has given up trying”, while in the past they stated “she cared for 
her adulation”, now she no longer needed this as she knew that “their infatuation 
has given way to disillusion”; she just did not see “how she can possibly get back 
into general Western favour, and neither does she wish to”.33 Instead she found 
new admirers: Asians. At present, she feels “a lot more secure in an Asian envir­
onment. She is as at home in Singapore and Beijing today as she used to be in 
Oxford and London, but isn’t any more. She has simply swapped her intellectual 
base”; she “can say what she likes around Asia, and no one will contradict her”.34 
This new arrangement is more than enough compensation. 
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Gains in popularity were not the only benefits from the ICJ for Suu Kyi. As in 
the Chinese game weiqi (or Go), she played various moves at the same time. She 
protected the army internationally, gaining the Tatmadaw’s reluctant appreciation, 
while domestically checkmating it at the same time. By taking control of the 
defence process, she could now use it as leverage against the Tatmadaw in crucial 
negotiations for constitutional amendments (her dream of presidency!) or, at worst, 
to limit the Tatmadaw’s influence. She pushed the USDP onto the defensive and 
dominated the political scene, significantly empowering her civilian government 
vis-à-vis the Tatmadaw.35 In short, it was a win–win for her. 
Finally, by going to The Hague Court Suu Kyi proved once again her hybridity. 
There was much talk of how she had Burmanized (or re-Burmanized) herself since 
she came back to Myanmar in 1988: she allegedly changed and tossed away her 
universalist heritage. But when a political chance arose, she presented a vivid 
understanding of how the world functions. She gathered a good team of lawyers, 
headed by William Schabas, she knew what to say and what to write,36 and she 
had (and still has) good tactics. They were based on inaccuracies in the UN fact 
finding mission report, difficulties of proving genocide, the long-running pace of 
the process (which favoured Myanmar) and, if all fails, the necessity of the UN 
Security Council enforcing the ICJ’s verdict on a member state. In short, Suu Kyi, 
a hybrid politician, had not forgotten her international skills at all. Yet another 
example of her cautiously navigating international waters can be found in her June 
2019 trip to Hungary to meet Victor Orbán: she was deliberately ‘cocking a snook’ 
at her erstwhile liberal supporters by meeting with the ‘bad guy’ of the liberal 
West. 
In the meantime, she did not forget her domestic skills either, particularly her 
ability to keep her subordinates on a short leash. 
The cadres’ reshuffle 
On 21 March 2018 president Htin Kyaw unexpectedly resigned a few days before 
his second anniversary. The news caught analysts off guard, once again proving 
how little insight there was (and still is) into Suu Kyi’s decision-making process. 
Initially Htin Kyaw’s deteriorating health was interpreted as the main reason for his 
resignation. He visited clinics during his foreign trips. During Pope Francis’s 2017 
pilgrimage to Myanmar – a barely concealed diplomacy effort to resolve the 
Rohingya issue – Htin Kyaw was fragile, even though few noted it (they rather 
focused on whether Pope Francis would use the name Rohingya). Journalists only 
later took notice of his condition, prompting Suu Kyi – in her unique style (“we 
have the first lady who will take care of him”) – to deny speculations.37 By doing 
so, Suu Kyi proved once again the adequacy of Prince Alexander Gorchakov’s 
maxim (“I don’t believe in news that has not been denied”), as indeed Htin Kyaw 
resigned soon after. 
However, if health was the reason for his resignation, it was only partially true. 
His exasperation with being a ceremonial president treated offhandedly by Suu Kyi 
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was probably more significant.38 International criticism of Myanmar might have 
taken its toll too. It is not comfortable to be the president of a country accused of 
genocide (especially if one is a gentleman with traditional values). For all this 
speculation, the main reason was possibly different. When Suu Kyi nominated 
Htin Kyaw she did so hoping that it would be a temporary solution until she 
attained the Tatmadaw’s consent to amend to Cconstitution.39 Given the army’s 
unwillingness to change the charter, the ‘above the President’ mechanism, instead 
of being an interim measure, proved to be much more durable. Now Suu Kyi 
decided to place another subordinate on the presidential seat. 
There was a bit of uneasiness with the replacement process. According to the 
Constitution, when a President resigns his duties are taken over by the first Vice 
President, who in this case happened to be gen. Myint Swe, a hardliner nominated 
by the Tatmadaw. The NLD’s nightmare scenario was that Myint Swe, while 
acting president, could convene meetings of the NDSC and declare an emergency 
(read: stage a legal coup). Nothing of the sort happened. The transition went 
smoothly and Htin Kyaw was replaced by another of Suu Kyi’s loyalists, Win 
Myint. A lawyer and an NLD veteran (MP from 1990, 2012 and 2015 and Pyithu 
Hluttaw Speaker since 2016), Win Myint knew the price of the struggle against 
the regime. In a personal story mirroring Suu Kyi’s own drama, Win Myint also 
faced the dilemma of family vs. politics. When he was in jail for dissident activity, 
his only son became terminally ill and the military intelligence offered him a pact 
with the devil: release in return for relinquishing politics. He refused and was 
doomed to never see his son again. In Suu Kyi’s eyes, Win Myint passed ‘the 
ability to sacrifice for the cause’ test,40 along with the loyalty and trust tests,41 
which are the essential requirement for her subordinates. Win Myint, 5 years 
younger than Htin Kyaw, is more energetic – he’s a real politician, not an intel­
lectual – but, crucially, he is no less loyal to the NLD leader.42 Just like his pre­
decessor, Win Myint is her yes man. This verifies, for the second time, that Suu 
Kyi chose the correct candidate for a ceremonial presidency, showing once again 
that she continues to prudently pick the members of her inner circle. 
Along with this presidential reshuffle, the NLD underwent reorganization. 
Immediately prior to assuming presidency (30 March 2018), Win Myint was 
nominated as vice chairman no. 1, while Mandalay chief minister, Zaw Myint 
Maung (known as the NLD’s most dynamic minister along with Yangon chief 
minister Phyo Min Thein) was given the position of vice chairman no. 2. At the 
time, both new deputies were 66 years old. Another veteran, Win Htein (76 years 
old), who rigorously made sure members towed the party line, was moved to 
honourable retirement, becoming a member of the NLD’s board of patrons.43 
Myo Nyunt and Zaw Myint Maung were nominated to be NLD spokespersons. 
This restructuring marked an important intra-party reshuffle. When Suu Kyi 
became State Counsellor, she left party issues to five members of the secretariat 
(Win Htein, Win Myint, Zaw Myint Maung, Nyan Win, and Hantha Myint), 
which resulted in many tensions. From now on Zaw Myint Maung was respon­
sible for managing everyday party affairs while Win Myint was responsible for state 
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administration.44 This reconfiguration of the NLD was completed during the 
NLD’s second congress (23–24 June 2018) when the party expanded CEC mem­
bers from 15 to 2145 and CC members from 106 to 148 (plus 30 alternate mem­
bers, totalling 178 members). Yet, not much changed in intra-party politicking. 
Initial steps to “cultivate and infuse fresh ideas into the party faltered leaving 
younger members frustrated”.46 Dissident voices were repressed as usual: three 
MPS were suspended and two (Thet Thet Khine and Kyaw Zeya) spectacularly 
sacked (from the NLD’s Yangon township committee) for open criticism of party 
policies.47 During the 2018 Congress, CEC members were this time chosen by 
secret ballot, but apparently delegates “received a closed letter listing the people 
they should vote for”. Furthermore, there were no illusions that one of the 
objectives of the Congress was to “follow the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi”.48 
The cadres’ reshuffle, especially the nomination of the NLD vice chairmen, was 
widely interpreted as Suu Kyi’s succession strategy. This may well be so, but one 
must be cautious to remember that any one of Suu Kyi’s subordinates may fall out 
of favour at any time and lose their strong position overnight. As was reported, Suu 
Kyi “disposes of them without a twinge of conscience, if it suited her whims; 
loyalty meant nothing”.49 Or rather, it is a reminder that loyalty in the NLD works 
only one way: the subordinate must be staunchly loyal to Suu Kyi, but she does 
not have to be grateful at all.50 This happened to Tin Mar Aung, the all powerful 
personal assistant of Suu Kyi, who had already fallen from grace in the first year of 
Suu Kyi’s rule.51 Currently, Suu Kyi’s inner circle consists of CEC members – 
some more powerful, like Win Myint, Zaw Myint Maung, Tin Myo Win, others 
less so. Additional members like Htin Kyaw and his wife Su Su Lwin, Pyone Mo 
Ei (wife of Tin Myo Win), Ohmar Moe Myint (Michael Moe Myint’s wife), 
security advisor Thaung Tun, construction minister Win Khaing, minister Kyaw 
Tin Swe (serving in her office), and probably some others also make up the 
number of individuals ‘in the know’.52 In addition, there are some foreign con­
sultants both formal (Sean Turnell) and informal (Robert Cooper, Lord Ara Darzi 
etc.).53 Yet, all of these individuals have but an auxiliary voice. Suu Kyi consults 
her inner circle, but decides on her own and she always has the last word in every 
committee (especially in important ones such as the NLD’s economic committee) 
and every decision she deems important. When she chairs TV-broadcasted public 
meetings with her ministers and other subordinates, she emulates (albeit in softer 
form) Vladimir Putin’s style of roasting subordinates for their incompetency, which 
enhances the image of her intellectual and political paramountcy. There is only one 
leader. Even if labelling Suu Kyi as a Burmese ‘Duce’54 is morally unfair, in terms of 
describing her governing style, it is quite an adequate designation. 
The Burmese twins 
Since coming to power, Suu Kyi has had to walk on thin ice: to rule without 
alienating the Tatmadaw. Otherwise her government would be doomed. She has 
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managed this; mending fences with the Tatmadaw (read: political survival) remains 
her most important political achievement. At the same time, she has tried to limit 
the influence of the Tatmadaw without provoking it. This rational consideration 
trumped every other aspect of her governance. Consequently, the NLD’s actions 
implemented a Burmese version of ‘crab tactics’, with steps forward, backward and 
to the side, depending on the situation. After five years of governance, the NLD 
and the Tatmadaw seemed to reach a certain level of understanding, if not devel­
oped a shared worldview. At the end of the day, the family quarrel in Burmese 
politics – the more than two decades-long political struggle between a father’s 
daughter and (successors of) a father’s comrades – finally dimmed. 
At the beginning of its rule, the NLD was all about caution: it did all it could to 
block any criticism directed at the Tatmadaw from both within party ranks and 
from society; it did not dare touch the Tatmadaw’s privileges; and it kept the 
military-era bureaucracy intact, despite modest attempts to infuse new blood into 
the state apparatus. The NLD’s policy became a necessity, too, given Suu Kyi’s 
distrust of Thein Sein’s reformers and wariness of almost anyone outside the NLD. 
Consequently, she had to rely on the existing state bureaucracy in everyday gov­
ernance. In many units there was only one NLD member: the minister or director, 
with no administrative experience. The result was predictable for anyone at least 
partially acquainted with the work of any bureaucratic structure anywhere: 
nomenklatura swallowed the NLD, not the other way round. After a few years in 
power, the “NLD was caught up the vortex of Naypyidaw”.55 
This is not to say the NLD did nothing over the years to replace the military-era 
cadres. It cautiously pushed its men (rarely women) up the ladder and secured 
some noticeable achievements. In early 2019 the General Administration Depart­
ment, the administrative ‘brain’ of the Burmese state (which manages the whole 
administration of the state – more than 30,000 civil servants – down to township 
levels), was transferred from military oversight (Home Ministry) to a civilian one 
(Cabinet Office), marking “the big victory of Aung San Suu Kyi”.56 The NLD also 
managed to introduce legislation enforcing soldiers to vote in town and not in 
barracks. The NLD, too, limited the Tatmadaw’s influence in many aspects of 
everyday life that are invisible to foreigners. To give just two examples: in the 
1990s the Burmese had to rely on low-quality palm oil imported by UMEC while 
Yangoners had to travel by the Ma Hta Tha poor public transportation supervised 
by UMEC’s daughter company, Bandula. Currently the public no longer has to 
rely on UMEC or other military-affiliated business for the palm oil and Yangoners 
travel by the – still criticised but considerably better – YBS Bus service.57 There are 
many more examples of such tiny issues that make life more bearable for the 
Burmese. Overall, in many aspects of socio-political life, the Tatmadaw was 
‘tamed’ to civilian governance.58 
These little steps that keep limiting the Tatmadaw’s omnipresence have been 
possible thanks to the fact that “the generals do not want to run Myanmar – at least 
not directly”.59 The generals initiated reforms and allowed for the opening up of 
Myanmar. They did not anticipate the scale of Thein Sein’s reforms and they were 
Fall from grace 127 
outplayed by Suu Kyi’s State Counsellor bill, but these are ultimately minor, sec­
ondary issues. The generals want to protect the Tatmadaw (and its interests, 
including economic ones) and its political centrality, and they could respond 
should their Three National Causes be endangered. But otherwise they are fine 
with leaving governance to civilians, providing they respect the Tatmadaw’s red 
lines. Naturally, it would be better if a military proxy, like the USDP, was in 
power, but a NLD that behaves in a non-confrontational manner towards the 
Tatmadaw is tolerated: “within those bounds they want the NLD government to 
succeed as they share many of its goals”.60 They all want their country to be 
successful, prosperous and globally respected. 
None of these goals has so far materialized. The Rohingya crisis tarnished 
Myanmar’s image, hampered reforms and complicated the geopolitical situation. 
But again, for some actors it had a positive side. The generals saw that Suu Kyi – 
whom they had always suspected of siding with foreign interests at the cost of 
Burmese ones – chose to defend Myanmar (and them by extension). This was her 
acid test in their eyes. In this regard, the Rohingya crisis was a positive breakthrough 
for the Suu Kyi – Tatmadaw relationship. 
It does not mean there are no tensions left. The Suu Kyi – Min Aung Hlaing 
relationship is workable, but nothing more: it is formal and distant.61 Recently, it 
became more formal and even more distant.62 They are, after all, political compe­
titors and the general suspects Suu Kyi’s hand in Facebook’s blockade of his (and 
other military associated) accounts (the 2018 take down of the generals’ accounts 
was perhaps the first ever Western sanction that really hurt them). As for Suu Kyi, 
behind the façade of a (enforced) “Tatmadaw first” policy, she “is still seething that 
the Tatmadaw are preventing her from becoming President, where she would play 
a more ceremonial and less confrontational role than in her present status under the 
contrived designation of State Counsellor”.63 Suu Kyi’s 2018 declaration in Sin­
gapore that her relationship with the army “is not that bad” should be read con­
versely (“it could be better”), while her description of her three cabinet generals as 
“rather sweet”64 was ironic (which was lost to many Westerners), if not a Hello 
Kitty-styled Asian infantilization. Yet these problems are manageable. Despite 
“mutual distrust, and at times rising tension” between Suu Kyi and the army, “at 
the end of the day, the former political prisoners and their erstwhile captors had 
found a way to work together”.65 Nowadays the Tatmadaw sees the NLD as 
“decidedly less threatening than it had been a few years before, and far removed 
from its revolutionary origins”.66 Time did its part: during the five years, neither 
did the Tatmadaw try to topple the NLD nor did the NLD dismantle the military-
constructed system (it only infused adjustments). Previously, political differences 
overshadowed clearly visible similarities. Among the commonalities are: that both 
Suu Kyi and the army emphasize the importance of unity, discipline and respon­
sibilities; they use moralistic rhetoric to cover their political actions and silence/ 
criticise political opponents; moreover they are personalistic, hierarchical, and 
reactionary by nature.67 One could say, that “the Tatmadaw have found that they 
need her in order to maintain their status and influence as much as she needs 
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them”; they “need to keep her onside, and she needs them to survive”; and the 
Tatmadaw “can still cope with her, and she with them”.68 At this time, political 
expediency plus perhaps growing “similar nationalist leanings” and a “shared 
Naypyidaw view of the world”69 trump past and present differences. The Tatma­
daw and the NLD may not like one another and staunchly compete for power 
against each other, yet they grudgingly respect each other and need one another, as 
they represent “twin authoritarianisms”,70 or, simply, they are Burmese political 
twins. 
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CONCLUSION: A BALANCE SHEET	 
March 2020 marked the fifth year of Suu Kyi’s governance.1 She has suffered more 
failures, than scored gains, retained domestic supporters and disappointed foreign 
fans. She has not changed much in Myanmar. Her rule has not been a success; on 
the other hand, it has not been a disaster. Most importantly, she has survived in 
power and likely will remain at the helm. So – to paraphrase a Chinese saying – as 
long as she lives, she can do better. 
Let’s start from the personal; in Suu Kyi’s case, political is personal. Aung San Suu 
Kyi still dominates Myanmar politically. She is the most powerful politician, who 
controls all aspects of governance but for security and the Tatmadaw’s economic  
satrapies (in other words: she influences all sectors she can). Every important decision 
must get her approval. Never mind collateral damage such as administrative delays, 
what matters is that she has oversight. She is feared in the government by civil ser­
vants and yet she is adored in the society, particularly by party members. If indeed 
she believes she “was born to rule”,2 she has reasons to be satisfied. Moreover, she is 
still the beloved mother of the nation, even if less so than five years ago. She still 
personifies hope, which holds the Burmese together as a society.3 Although this is a 
factor one cannot simply measure or evaluate, it is not irrelevant. 
Her image continues to be a commercial brand that glamorizes pictures, calen­
dars, keyrings and souvenirs from Myanmar. Her father is back on banknotes, sirens 
yet again sound at 10:37 on every 19 July, his new monuments dot the country 
and his myth is alive and well. Suu Kyi’s personal political ideology – that this is all 
her duty to the people,4 that she wants to finish her father’s job and make Burma 
free and democratic, that whatever she does, she does for the people at her own 
personal expense5 – is widely accepted as truth, even among some intellectuals.6 It 
is a story of the mother of Myanmar, who does everything for the children and 
tries her best to prepare them to live in adulthood (if they fail, however, it will be 
their fault, not hers).7 Every success is hers, whereas failures fall on the Tatmadaw, 
132 Conclusion: A balance sheet 
structural problems, hostile foreigners, karma, bad luck, force majeure (or all com­
bined), but rarely on her. Even if more and more Burmese people criticise her, she 
still holds a certain amount of immunity. 
From this perspective, her situation does not seem bad. If even a veteran critical 
expert admits that she “is a woman of destiny, and she knows that she is. Suu Kyi 
has spent all her time striving ever since her return to Myanmar in March 1988 and 
who can deny that in her own way she has been successful?”8 – then it is indeed 
not bad at all. In such a case, there are no ‘four lives’ of Aung San Suu Kyi,9 but 
only two: the unfulfilled one before politics and the proper political one. 
Yet there is a thorn in her side. She is still not the President. Even if her critics 
sometimes go too far in claiming that “she is obsessed about presidency, about 
formal aspects of power”,10 her need to achieve the ultimate post is unmistakable. 
Becoming State Counsellor was a smart move, but it “sounds silly” to the world: it 
“grates with many whenever they hear the designation and is a symbol of the limits 
of her power, for Counsellors are but Advisers, and she aspires to be more than 
this”.11 She will be faced with a hard battle in her continuing attempt to change 
the Constitution, yet given the fact that she is proverbially stubborn, she is unlikely 
to crack. As Tonkin stated: “she wants to be President, she can live unhappily 
without the final accolade, but this is not likely to stop her striving, by means fair 
and foul, to achieve the ultimate prize. This is maybe what keeps her going”.12 
For Myanmar, however, the balance sheet is much more mixed. 
Structural problems and negative factors independent from Suu Kyi (US–China 
trade war) notwithstanding, she has not delivered well on the economy. Growth 
has slowed down, FDI and business confidence has fallen, tourist arrivals have 
stagnated. Furthermore, the real estate market is now in trouble. Myanmar’s 
banking system remains weak, despite some achievements of her government in 
cleaning it up. The country still ranks low in doing business: 165th in 2019 (worse 
than Laos or Cambodia and a world apart from India at 63rd).13 The NLD gov­
ernment has failed to execute key reforms and will not do so now because of 
electoral logic. The key impediments of doing business in Myanmar – land access, 
access to utilities, finance and human capital – have remained the same, not 
improving much during the NLD’s rule. Little of the NLD’s 2016 economic 
programme has been achieved.14 
An ill-disposed devil’s advocate may say that at least Suu Kyi no longer questions 
people’s commitment to the free market.15 Her previous economic ideas were 
quite detached from reality.16 Apparently, she “historically held the view that she 
was lukewarm about foreign investment at all”; allegedly she “even went so far on 
one occasion to say she hoped there might never be any further foreign investment 
in her country”.17 For similar reasons, she disliked tourism, once declaring that 
“providing a smiling service to foreign visitors was demeaning to Burmese”, which 
really revealed “her innate anti-colonialism”.18 At present, to her credit, at least she 
does not disturb the economic sphere. 
Yet she does not help it much either. She has some competent ministers and 
advisors, both Burmese and Western, but she has proven unable and/or unwilling 
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to change the bad business environment. It affects all companies. Investors refrain 
from entering the country or pull out. Businesspeople complain endlessly about the 
insufficiency of reforms, lack of economic direction (never ending debates on 
whether to boost tourism or liberalise the retail/wholesale sector?), bureaucratic 
inertia (e.g. the electricity tariff structure), economic nationalism, the regulatory 
environment (lack of clarity in mining, oil and gas sector regulations), problems 
with labour contracts, inadequacy of judicial independence, or existing protec­
tionist policies. The final complaint makes a good case study. In domestic air 
transportation, the transport ministry rejected foreign airlines – sorry, no Air Asia 
flights to Bagan – in order to shield the crony-controlled, domestic airlines. 
Healthcare, retail banking and shipping also remain heavily protected. The insur­
ance market has not opened up yet (which caused Samsung Life to withdraw from 
Myanmar).19 
Almost every sector of governance has been in need of drastic reforms and increased 
resources. Even so, not much has happened in these past five years. Reforms are 
hampered by the logic of political transformation (the ‘let the sleeping dogs lie’ policy) 
and by its dual role in the administration – the policy makes much sense in the 
political sphere, but what is good for politics is not necessarily good for economics. 
Plus there is something else. No vision. In the NLD’s Myanmar, just as in the 
Tatmadaw’s Myanmar, there is not only a lack of a comprehensive economic 
agenda, but worse – there is little if any developmental vision. If at all, it is to 
follow their neighbours in moving towards a state-dominated capitalism based on 
export-oriented industrialization. Unfortunately, neoliberal prescriptions clash with 
bureaucratic habits and socialist leanings, producing chaos, not fusion. Besides, with 
changing patterns of global economy, very soon “the ladder of export-oriented 
growth … may be a ladder to nowhere”.20 
It is fair to admit that all these hindrances are not necessarily and not exclusively 
the fault of Suu Kyi’s cabinet. Deep structural problems, a legacy of the Tatma­
daw’s rule and a worsening global economic climate, would affect every govern­
ment. Additionally, there are cultural aspects: capitalism has never been popular 
among the Burmese people, and they have yet to master the hard skills of navi­
gating the stormy waters of global economics. So, these are indeed extenuating 
circumstances. 
This, however, does not absolve Suu Kyi from her own political mistakes. She 
did not have to promise things she could not deliver. She declared a ‘peace first’ 
policy and predictably failed. The situation is now worse than in 2015. This is also 
the case with the hoped for constitutional amendments. Achieving them was 
impossible from the outset and expectedly she was unable to do anything. In the 
same manner she promised to end corruption and – although she still strives to 
accomplish this goal – success is far, far away.21 Most importantly, she campaigned 
to introduce change, but her rule is anything but change. It is a modification of 
military rule, not a fundamental transformation. 
The people of Myanmar expected better government services and lower costs of 
living. The former did not materialize, the latter is debatable. Suu Kyi, however, 
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does not take responsibility for that. She shies away from everyday governance. She 
is hardly seen or heard, and even if she (rarely) addresses the public, she does not 
lower herself to the level of everyday, mundane issues. Instead, the State Council­
lor offers pedagogical moral preaching about the duties and responsibilities of the 
citizens, something that takes priority over rights ; that is, about the responsibility 
of each individual – not the government – to make change.22 Her rule “was never 
about (the) government solving people’s problems”, instead she offered “a life story 
as an example for others to follow”.23 This is very much a convenient agenda for 
her: she can levitate ‘above politics’ and keep her iconic position within Myanmar, 
but her heavy-handedness and micromanaging style have produced administrative 
inertia. Many problems lie unresolved as challenges sit in a long queue of issues to 
be dealt with exclusively by her. 
If her governance is a story of disappointment, then why does she remain so 
popular in Myanmar? From her acclaim it would seem, at least according to norms 
of electoral democracy, that she has done a good job, whereas the evidence is to 
the contrary. Why then? How does a leader who governs badly (or so-so at best) 
continue to enjoy widespread popular support? 
I think there are four possible mutually nonexclusive explanations. 
The first two are irrational, at least from a Western perspective. Deep-seated 
Burmese Buddhist cultural patterns, or Maha-Sammata’s style of democracy, come 
first. The Burmese people expect their leaders to be moral. Efficiency comes 
second, if at all. Suu Kyi, all her vices notwithstanding, is obviously much more 
moral than any Tatmadaw general, present or former. The second irrational 
explanation concerns the ‘mother of the nation’ approach. One does not expect a 
mother to deliver concrete results. The symbolic bond between Burmese society 
and their leader gives her immunity, at least temporarily, from delivering results. 
Nevertheless, one should be cautious when using these two explanations, as in 
political science often “what cannot be explained in terms of rationality or logic is 
expelled into the realm of culture”.24 That is why I prefer the other two rational 
explanations. The third explication would be that the Burmese people have not yet 
forgotten the nightmare of the previous military rule. However disappointed they 
may be with Suu Kyi’s governance, she is still preferable compared to the return of 
military rule – whether in civilian dress or in uniform. She is at worst a lesser evil 
than the Tatmadaw, and at best a hope that still unites society. 
Finally, the last explanation is that her governance is paradoxically not that bad 
(although that is not much by her merit). Critics admit that she has not disrupted 
the wider process, started during Thein Sein’s governance, of Myanmar’s opening 
up to the world – to external commercial influences, global connectivity and cyber 
revolution. The people of Myanmar live a better life. Some are much better off, 
many a little better; they can travel abroad and are no longer cut off from the 
world. Suu Kyi’s successes are here “almost by default”, as Tonkin admits, “it is not 
that she has taken any brave decisions, but rather that she has allowed things to 
happen – she was never all that much interested in detail”.25 But, she kept “the 
dreaded hand of the Tatmadaw at bay from the people’s daily lives”: at present 
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there are fewer arrests – even if these are more often reported than previously – 
and people “no longer have to watch their words when chatting in the tea­
shops”.26 In this regard, her NLD cabinet is a primum non nocere government, which 
continues the positive momentum started during Thein Sein (without admitting 
it). Supporters argue that there has been developmental progress: better infra­
structure (new and improved roads), electrification (access to the grid has reached 
around 70 per cent of the population), and progress (albeit modest) in education 
and healthcare (there is greater spending on these sectors in the budget at least). 
Additionally, there is social progress: less corruption, more transparency (“we can 
criticize the government but not to the military”), a much reduced network of the 
Tatmadaw in civil administration, strengthened CSOs and more empowered 
people who still hope for better in the future.27 This hope, perhaps, is most 
important, as it allows civilians to move forward despite everything.28 Overall, 
even with the obvious hindrances and disappointments, “things are moving in the 
right direction in terms of Asian-style democracy”.29 
For these and other reasons, the NLD will most likely win the 2020 elections 
providing no extraordinary things, such as electoral fraud or a new coup, happen 
(these are not impossible, but unlikely). The ‘boomerang’ question that keeps 
coming back is whether the NLD will score 67 per cent of the seats (or 329 seats) 
in the Hluttaw? The party is doing its best to achieve that. Unable to repeat its 
2015 “change” slogan (“change 2.0” is ruled out), their plan concentrated on 
promising constitutional amendments in the hopes of capitalizing on the dislike of 
the Tatmadaw in society. To achieve this, the NLD established a parliamentary 
commission to amend the constitution, which irritated the military and predictably 
led to nothing30. But at least the policy created an impression of determination: it 
was all about chasing the rabbit, not catching it. Amending the Constitution is 
always an adequate electoral slogan in Myanmar, making it a rational winning 
electoral strategy. 
By making accusations about Myanmar at the ICJ, Gambia provided the second 
electoral engine. The rallying around the flag effect should secure the NLD’s vic­
tory: the longer and fiercer the world attacks Myanmar (and Suu Kyi), the better 
her electoral prospects. By doing so, they succour her to win elections. In yet 
another twist of fate, the West – which had assisted Suu Kyi for two decades – 
helps her politically yet again, this time by condemning her. The irony is that it is 
now China that internationally defends Suu Kyi against the West, in a direct 
reversal of the pre-2011 situation. Chinese support however does not matter as 
much in terms of electoral victory. Suu Kyi’s problem, though, is not with the 
West. Nor is it with the Buddhist radicals. She neutralised them, at least for now, 
by outlawing Ma Ba Tha and making Wirathu a fugitive. Dealing with them 
remains one of her big achievements, although one that is little seen and not 
appreciated from outside. Her predicament is not even with lesser parties (the ‘new 
third force’, ‘People’s party’ or others), as they will be trumped. Her problem is 
with the ethnic minorities. It is highly unlikely that they will vote for her en masse 
again: they will not make the same mistake twice. Even so, she hopes to achieve 
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partial support and is gambling on the belief that the ethnic vote will be divided. 
She is working hard to achieve this split in the vote.31 The first-past-the-post 
electoral system favours her party, so even with modest support from the Kayins 
(Karens), Chins, perhaps some Mon and Kachins, maybe Shans (but certainly not 
Rakhines and probably not Kayahs), she can still manage to get 67 per cent overall. 
No more is needed. 
Therefore, the most likely post-2020 scenario is a continuation of her rule. 
Some claim she will then challenge the army to secure her place in history,32 yet 
this is rather unlikely. More plausible is the continuation of careful tactics to gra­
dually remove the Tatmadaw from power and influence. Maybe she will be able to 
persuade the military to allow her presidency – she will certainly try hard – but 
again, this scenario is rather less probable. And even if she somehow manages to do 
so, this will not change much in the overall assessment of her rule in Myanmar. So 
far, her governance’s score is modest and disappointing though not disastrous. 
Perhaps the biggest achievement is that she has inadvertently reduced domestic and 
international expectations: no one waits for miracles now and that is good for 
Myanmar.33 The country and its leader deserve to be assessed fairly in rational 
terms, not by fairy-tale-style categories. 
Disappointment with Suu Kyi is now nearly totally in the West. For more than 
25 years Suu Kyi and the West spoke the same language, albeit with the same 
words having different meanings. And then came the shock and disbelief that a 
genocide might have occurred in a country ruled by a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate. 
But blaming her for it would be unfair. Claiming that she purposely misguided her 
foreign supporters and outplayed the West for two decades would be incorrect. 
One cannot say that she consciously cheated half of the world. The colossal yet 
mutual misunderstanding between Suu Kyi and the West was due to the fact that 
she was not a Westernized Burmese (as most in the West believed), but a hybrid 
politician. Although being anticolonial personally, she unconsciously internalized 
colonial patterns picked up at schools and during her youth in Burma and India. 
This has moulded her, while her later socialisation with British elites in the 1960s 
completed the process. Even if Suu Kyi disliked some (or maybe even many) 
colonial aspects, she internalized the colonial intellectual superstructure. Burmese 
postcolonial elites, whose intellectual epigone Suu Kyi is, themselves staunchly 
anticolonial, emulated colonial patterns in private. And it is precisely this colonial 
heritage within Suu Kyi that is responsible for her shocking behaviours – from a 
contemporary Western perspective: Dictatorship in the party (in the colonial world 
democracy operated only west of Suez), the jailing of Reuters’ journalists or 
restricting freedom of speech. And especially the Rohingya. Her stance on this 
issues is the most glaring example of a lack of mental decolonization. It shows the 
enduring post-mortem symbolic violence of colonialism. 
The Western world was wrong about Suu Kyi, not because she pretended to be 
someone else or because of her acquiesce to being misunderstood. No. The West 
was wrong because it wanted to see in Suu Kyi the brighter face of its legacy in 
Asia (democracy, human rights etc.). And though it would be unfair to say there 
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was no bright side – there is definitely a lot – the dark side also remains and so does 
the unaccounted colonial guilt, the burden of creating many Asian structural pro­
blems, that hampers Asian countries still now. In this picture, Suu Kyi – a hybrid 
politician, a product of colonial heritage – is just a local, Burmese example of a 
wider spectre of Western colonialism’s heritage that still haunts Asia. 
And, hence it is with other postcolonial leaders she should be compared. In her 
paramountcy of leadership, she came up to Aung San’s level. But, painfully for her, 
she is not Aung San. She may share charisma and a certain Machiavellianism with 
him, but he was a much more skilful politician. More importantly, part of his 
success had to do with the fact that he surrounded himself with competent associ­
ates, had good ministers and commanded respect even from his enemies. Given her 
hybridity, she is perhaps closer to Jawaharlal Nehru, or rather to his post-1947 
governance. Obviously she lacks the credentials of his independence struggle – her 
‘second national independence’ may convince her supporters, but is not true. In 
terms of administrative (in)competences, she indeed reminds us of Nehru. Like 
him, she is a popular ruler, though not an effective one. Following in Nehru’s 
footsteps, she believes in democracy and does her best to introduce it to Myanmar, 
just as he tried to do so for India, but she, like him, is personally too autocratic to 
allow democracy to flourish. Ultimately, like Nehru who (less skilfully) copied 
British colonial practices, she emulates Thein Sein’s reforms, only with less effi­
ciency. So far, similar to Nehru, she does not seem to know how to rule well 
(though in her case, that may still change). She is even closer to Sirimavo Bandar­
anaike: a Sinhalese symbol of women’s political emancipation who ruled for a long 
time but not very effectively. Or to Benazir Bhutto, who also capitalised on her 
father’s legacy, constantly struggling with the army and ultimately failing to make a 
breakthrough in Pakistan. Or to Sheikh Hasina, Suu Kyi’s Bengali equivalent (for 
the good and the bad) – a mirror image minus the Nobel Prize. 
If we compare Suu Kyi to leaders in the 1980s, when she started her career, one 
politician – that she is not at all similar to – comes to mind. Deng Xiaoping. Suu 
Kyi is much more elegant but she badly lacks two of Deng’s features which helped 
him to make China’s spectacular transformation possible. Unlike him, she cannot 
accept being primus inter pares and ruling by advice rather than by command. And, 
totally dissimilar to him, she cares about the formal aspects of power. These two 
hindrances originate from her hubristic conviction that she is indispensable and 
infallible. This is, ultimately, her biggest weakness. If it was less about personal 
issues, then she might have achieved more. The Tatmadaw might have found it 
easier to cooperate with her and Myanmar could have been better reformed. But 
in Suu Kyi’s case – just like in many others in Myanmar – it is all about the leader. 
Ultimately, it is structurally detrimental to this country of great potential, yet weak 
institutions. 
If Suu Kyi wins the 2020 elections her administration will hopefully be better by 
the very fact of gained experience. She has the talent to stun by her unconven­
tional actions and thus I would not be surprised if she shocks the world yet again – 
this time by governing well. Yet a breakthrough in Myanmar’s fate – say reforms à 
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la Deng Xiaoping or a Korean-style miracle – is impossible. This is not only 
because the international circumstances are not favourable but, more importantly, 
because Suu Kyi is a tactician and not a strategist. She has mastered the very Bur­
mese feature of ad hoc actions to perfection. However, she lacks long-term policy 
strategy; she does not have a developmental vision. 
Aung San Suu Kyi may wish to finish her father’s job and make Burma great 
again. But she does not know how to do it. 
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